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ABSTRACT. 
The development of biotechnological solutions to previously insurmountable 
problems associated with agricultural production has led to the modification 
of the genomes of various crop species with genes taken from often quite 
different organisms. This technology is popularly lmown as genetic 
modification or GM. Opposition to the introduction of GM technology to 
mainstream agriculture has emanated primarily from environmental 
organisations, but has been strongly supported by groups and individuals with 
concerns about the biosafety of these crops or their possible effects on trade. 
In Australia, the States have used precautionary moratoriums to prevent the 
introduction of varieties that have been licensed for commercial production 
after scientific assessment by the Commonwealth's Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator. This has led to a regulatory stalemate and the 
breakdown of the working relationship between the biotechnology sector and 
most of the States. 
This thesis examines the rise of the concept of precaution as a response to the 
perceived inability of western democracies to satisfactorily deal with 
escalating risks associated with the rapid advancement of science and 
technology. It also considers the merits of science and precaution as 
influences in the GM regulatory system and the fundamental incompatibility 
of their basic ideas. The argument of the thesis is that a sound basis of 
scientific understanding is necessary to effective regulation and that 
precautionary approaches inhibit science. A research design involving the 
application of a comprehensive framework of outcomes to the cases of four 
GM crop plants is used to compare the effectiveness of precautionary GM 
regulation with that of science-based regulation. 
The analysis shows that precaution, applied by the States since 2000 has been 
a less effective regulatory approach than the entirely science-based system 
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that previously operated. Precautionary regulation is associated with loss of 
industry competitiveness, diminished research capabilities, inferior 
environmental outcomes and the entrenchment of political discord. Science-
based regulation has had positive outcomes in all these respects. The 
conclusion of this thesis is that while precautionary measures are capable of 
tt.~mporarily settling community concerns about biosafety, they cannot 
provide more than short-term regulatory solutions. 
vii 
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Chapter 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Issue 
The banning of genetically modified (GM) canola by the major canola-
growing States in Australia in recent years has raised the level of political 
tension between the economic needs of agriculture and the values of 
environmentalism to a critical point. In 2004, at the peak of the dispute, the 
Commonwealth - State relationship acquired a new and volatile edge when 
the Monsanto and Bayer corporations withdrew their programs for the 
c·,mmercial establishment of GM canola variet.i_..:s in Australia. This action 
was a response to the decisions by the canola-growing States to maintain 
their moratoriums on GM canola after the Commonwealth Office of the Gene 
Technology Regulator (OGTR) had approved both corporations' varieties 
and commercially licensed them. 
In 2006, as the ensuing deadlock between the biotechnology sector and the 
States persisted, the Commonwealth took steps to force a solution. In April 
2006, the then Minister for Agriculture, Peter McGauran, announced a 
"comprehensive" $850,000 enquiry into ''whether the crop [GM canola] 
should be introduced in Australia" ("The Weekend Australian", 29-30 April 
2006). This enquiry consisted of eight separate "major" studies by the Bureau 
of Rural Sciences, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
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Economics (ABARE) and "the private sector" ("The Age", 29 April 2006), 
whose findings were publicly released over the following year or so1 and 
added to the growing body of criticism of the moratoriums. 
In May and July 2007, respectively, Victoria and NSW instigated fresh 
reviews of their moratoriums on GM canola. In late November 2007 both 
States announced that these moratoriums would not be renewed when they 
expired in early 2008. This meant that canola farmers would be free to begin 
sowing GM varieties in autumn 2008. Although some dissent was reported in 
the media at the time of the announcements and the major environmental 
organisations have consistently maintained their opposition to the use of GM 
canola, these decisions appear to have been generally a~cepted. 
This significant adjustment of policy seems to have taken the immediate heat 
out of the issue but the underlying regulatory problems and political tensions 
remain. Unresolved differences over GM canola in the other States and 
Territories, and the incubating issue of GM poppies in Tasmania are in the 
front rank of foreseeable future disputes in Australia. In spite of almost total 
unanimity of scientific opinion on the question of the biosafety of GM 
canola, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania have strongly 
1 Such as ABARE's Market Acceptance of GM Cano/a, (Foster and French, 2007), which 
was released in March 2007. 
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reaffirmed their anti-GM stance, so political concessions by these States seem 
unlike! y in the near future. 
A further source of pressure is the many new GM varieties that are already in 
the research and development pipeline and which will undoubtedly refresh 
the debate in.due course. Early settlement of the differences of policy and 
regulatory approach between Australia's governments is clearly desirable. 
Aside from the economic and administrative benefits that would follow the 
establishment of consistency and certainty, the entrenchment of friction 
within the community over this issue could ultimately lead to more pervasive 
and damaging consequences. 
The Research Question 
The political difficulty in Australia with respect to the regulation of GM 
crops arises from a conflict between the pressures for farmers to adopt GM 
technology, and fears about the biosafety of the technology within the 
community. Support for GM crops can be associated with traditional notions 
of progress and reliance on science, while opposition to them is linked to 
newer concerns with environmental integrity and the fallibility of science. 
These differences are mirrored in the incompatibility of the Commonwealth's 
broadly scientific approach and the States' broadly precautionary approach to 
GM regulation. Since precaution by its very existence challenges the ability 
of scientific analysis to adequately fulfil its informative role, the two 
approaches are not compatible and must be regarded as alternatives. This 
incompatibility raises a fundamental question, which is taken as the research 
question underlying this thesis: "Is GM crop regulation in Australia better2 
framed and implemented on the basis of precaution or scientific analysis?" 
The GM Debate 
The GM debate is centred on d!fforences between mainstream proponents of 
scientific/rational assessment of GM varieties (who support the adoption of 
demonstrably safe technology) and dissenting GM opponents, who advocate 
the regulatory use of precaution to ban the technology on the grounds that its 
biosafety cannot be reliably predicted. Constructive argument has reached a 
stalemate over the irresolvable academic questions of certainty and the 
limitations of science. The epistemological point, that science is intrinsically 
uncertain can be construed to argue that the practice of science and the 
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adoption of new technology inevitably involve serious and unacceptable risks 
(Kellow, 1999a: 65). This has led to risk become a consuming focus of 
attention in most spheres ofhwna;1 activity and at all social levels. 
2 The meaning and implications of the descriptor "better" are dealt with below in the section 
concerning hypotheses and also in Chapter 8. 
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Scholars such as Wildavsky, Adams, Fonnaini and Douglas3, have argued 
that risk is inevitable and even necessary to social advancement, and risk 
management is now a major preoccupation of many decision-making 
organisations. The emphasis on risk as a cultural pivot and a parallel concern 
for the integrity of the environment have fed a natural tendency to distrust 
scientific and technological innovation, while a number of dramatic and 
large-scale failures and disasters have reinforced it. All this appears to have 
led to something of a lapse of public confidence in the direction that the 
science of the Enlightenment has been taking IJS, and consequently also to a 
re-examination of its principles and values. It is out of this reflective process 
that the idea of precaution has arisen. In the public's consciousness the 
practice of science and the use of new technology have now become linked to 
risk and danger. 
The differences, at the extremities of debate, between environmental 
"precautionists" demanding iron clad safety via regulation and technological 
"adventurers" who dismiss periodic technological failure as the price of 
scientific advancement are reflected in the more serious ideas supporting 
their arguments. However, the tendency of directly applied theory and 
ideology to be pragmatically weak is exemplified by the shortcomings of 
3 The arguments of these writers are discussed in Chapter 3. Wildavsky, Adams and Douglas 
have all been prolific writers on risk with numerous published works to their names. 
Formaini 's The Myth of Scientific Public Policy was published in 1990. See reference section 
for more detail. 
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policies framed in accordance with their prescriptions. On the one hand, 
public fear of technology has grown out of allegedly excessive tolerance of 
risk and disregard for biosafety, while on the other, regulatory precaution has 
compounded the political difficulties and been accused of smothering 
innovation. 
A further difficulty is that the central term "science" is often subjectively 
perceived and applied, so it has many intended meanings. Over the course of 
debate, particular confusion appears to have arisen over the distinction 
between the strict values and principles of traditional, peer-reviewed and 
openly accountable science, and the loosely defined "guidelines" of some 
(mostly notional) forms of unaccountable science. The intrusion into the 
areas of how science works (or should work) by social analysts - including 
some risk writers from both sides of the debate - with no genuine scientific 
learning or experience, is possibly responsible for the illogical persistence of 
the latter. As a consequence of this confusion, the debate about GM that is 
carried on is often futile, to the extent that it involves blurred or contradictory 
assumptions about the basic subject matter. 
Theodore Lowi' s important distinction between '\nai!istream" and "radical" 
politics (Lowi, 1987: x-xxi), which can explain the intractability of political 
conundrums such as GM, hinges on the recognition of a difference between 
rational and moral analytical bases. It is a development of the differences 
between induction and deduction, which in turn relate respectively to 
objective and subjective approaches to analysis. However, the 
characterisation of rational (or scientific) analysis itself as a radical or 
relativist process and the associated idea of the existence of alternative 
understandings of science undermine Lowi 's position and tend to impede 
disinterested political resolution, along the lines ofLowi's own rationale. 
When reduced to its· fundaments, the debate over GM amounts to no more 
than an argument over the irreconcilable merits of subjective and objective 
analysis of the issue. 
Insofar as the practical politics of GM crop technology in Australia are 
concerned, the weakening of confidence in technology has led to the 
Commonwealth's (objective) science-based policy being successfully 
blocked at State level by (subjective) precautionary measures, predicated on 
the existence of scientifically improbable but hypothetically possible risks. 
The Gene Technology Act and the Policy Principle 
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"Formal surveillance" of GM has existed in Australia since 1975 (Millis, 
2001: 191 ), and prior to the existence of the Commonwealth Gene 
Technology Act 2000 and the Gene Technology Regulator, it was sequentially 
the responsibility of several bodies, most importantly, from 1987, the Gene 
Manipulation Advisory Committee (GMAC). This organisation was 
comprised of : 
19 members who are recruited from the scientific community and the general 
public ... selected for their expertise or knowledge. This ensures that GMAC 
has access to the most up to date knowledge of a wide range of organisms 
from persons who are active in research with studies at molecular level and, in 
the broader aspects of ecology, the environment and legal issues. (Millis, 
2001: 191). 
Millis, who was Chair of that body, has outlined the structure and operation 
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of the regulatory system under it (Millis, 2001: 191-200). Although the office 
of Gene Technology Regulator and the Gene Technology, Technical 
Advisory Committee have since superseded this arrangement and apply the 
new Act and the Gene Technology Regulations, the Commonwealth process 
remains essentially the same (Millis, 2001; 191,200; DPIWE 2001: 17-18). 
Under Section 27, Subsections a and h of the Commonwealth Gene 
Technology Act 2000, the Commonwealth Gene Technology Regulator, is 
currently required to make case by case detenninations concerning licence 
applications for GMOs, essentially in relation to "risk assessment and 
biosafety'', which is an ultimately a scientific and evidence-based 
undertaking. "Final approval" for food, drugs and chemicals is also scientific 
and is respectively the responsibility of Food Standards Australia and New 
Zealand, the Therapeutic Goods Administration and the Australian Pesticides 
and Veterinary Medicines Authority (McGrath, 2003, 32). 
Under the provisions of Section 21 of the Act, however, the States are 
permitted to declare zones for ''preserving the identity" of either GM or GM 
free crops "for marketing purposes". The Commonwealth is obliged to 
acknowledge the existence of State zone declarations in respect of the 
licences it issues, but it does not otherwise affect Commonwealth procedures 
or findings. This division of responsibilities reflects the ultimate reducibility 
of the various uncertainties attached to any GM variety down to two broad 
questions: Is it safe and is it better? 
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As a consequence of these arrangements both a Commonwealth licence and a 
State permit are necessary before cultivation, or other use, of a GM crop 
variety may occur. The regulatory process as defined by the Act thus involves 
two independently responsible and conceptually different regulatory systems. 
The Act, however, does not address the practical difficulties that this raises 
for the orderly regulation of GM crops and to make matters worse, does not 
specify the legislative intent or the evidential requirements of the marketing 
clause. 
Experience has sh0v-. n that these are almost fatally serious on:rissions as the 
States have been able and prepared to effectively nullify quite properly issued 
Commonwealth licences either by declaring whole States to be GM-free 
zones or by the imposition of serial moratoriums against particular crops. 
Predictably, this has provoked an angry response from the biotechnology and 
agriculture sectors. The primary focus of this activity so far has been GM 
canola varieties. Under the terms of the provisions of section 21, and in the 
context of bitter political debate, the commercialisation of GM canola has 
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been entirely prevented for a number of years through precautionary bans 
(Meek, 2006, 2). 
In May 2004, the future of the entire system was thrown into jeopardy when 
the Monsanto and Bayer corporations abandoned their GM canola trials in 
Australia. This was a very serious step that exposed the depth of economic 
risk that is attached to the use of precaution. On the 13th of May of that year, 
The Sydney Morning Herald reported Monsanto spokesman Mark 
Buckingham as saying that the company had "taken a business decision to 
suspend our investment [in GM canola] in 2004 based on the patchwork of 
different regulatory systems that we are faced with across the states". 
Although the 2007 NSW and Victorian decisions suggest that a shift towards 
consistency in the regulatory system may be underway, fear of GM crops is 
now entrenched in some communities and, in the foreseeable future, even 
changes of government in the dissenting States may not lead to the 
abandonment of bans on GM technology. 
Gene Technology Bans 
Precaution has been formally articulated as the "Precautionary Principle", a 
concept that has currency in several versions. The most usually expressed 
form of the Precautionary Principle is Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation (UN, 1992). 
This version is incorporated into the Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 
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2000 in Section 4, Paragraph (aa) as an element of the regulatory framework. 
The logic underlying the Australian States' precautionary provisions may 
thus be understood to be that a putative biosafety risk attached to GM crops, 
involving the possibility of unspecified costs, r,an, if assllined to be 
significant, be extrapolated to insinuate a further possibility of damage to 
goodwill in the international marketplace. In plainer terms, the case of the 
States is that if they permit GM crops to be grown, fear of GM technology 
may cause their international customers to abandon trade with them, choosing 
in preference products originating in GM fo~e zones. There was, however, 
little in the way of solid data to support this notion at the outset and the 
opportunity, provided by the moratoriums, to strengthen this case has not led 
to any significant change. 
The Precautionary Principle bas been strongly criticised (see, for example, 
Kellow, 2002: 124) for including a number of imprecise or ambiguous terms 
(such as "threats", "serious", "irreversible" "full scientific certainty") which 
demand subjective interpretation, thereby compromising it as a generally 
12 
acceptable regulatory principle. \Vhile the environmental concern that the 
Precautionary P1inciple repr~~sents is genJinely and generally felt, the 
abandonment of scientific objectivity as an analytical essential at the political 
level is obviously profoundly problematic for some sections of the 
community and an insecure basis for policy. 
The GM Record 
The theoretical difficulties of the Precautionary Principle need not condemn 
it as a regulatory precept. A working, legal notion involving no obvious 
scientific or moral rule could conceivably be applied as a guiding principle if 
its implementation and effects complied with the practical demands of the 
law and reflected the needs of the community. This would, however, mean 
that there should exist a general acceptance of its validity and authority and 
that its application as an administrative rule should invariably (or almost 
invariably) yield optimum outcomes. These two ideas have an obvious 
relationship with the concept of broad cultural acceptance, referred to at the 
end of the introductory section. 
As Table 1.1 below illustrates, the superficial regulatory record of genetically 
modified pharmaceuticals, food imports, processing aids, edible oil and crops 
indicates that neither of these conditions apply in the case of precaution. 
While regulatory outcomes have been consistently satisfactory when case by 
case scientific conclusions have prevailed and the logic of precaution has not 
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been applied, they have typically raised problems of consistency and 
acceptability when scientific advice has been disregarded and precaution has 
been applied. This suggests that a.closer study of the detail of GM crops and 
the ways in which they have been regulated, might reveal patterns of 
correlation between regulatory outcomes and regulatory approaches, 
particularly the Precautionary Principle. 
Table 1.1 
GM product, crop or Type of crop or Status & main likely Influence of 
Microorganism product determining factor precaution 
Cotton Industrial crop Legal since 1996 None 
(NSW, Qld) (edible by-products) (economic/ environmental 
benefits) 
Poppies Industrial crop No commercial crops, Constrains 
Tas) (pharmaceutical) restricted trials. Research. 
(Precaution) Bans crops 
Canola (as a crop) Food crop No commercial crops, 
(all States & territones (edible 011) restricted trials. Limits research. 
except NSW, Vic, (Precaution) Bans crops 
Qlcl) 
-r---
Weevil-resistant Food ~1nd fodder I Atdndoned - health risk None 
Field pea crop exposed during 
evaluation 
Insulin Therapeutic product Legal & available None 
(injectable) (health/economics/ no 
genetic content) 
Modified Live bacterial HIV None. (Still under Would probably 
Lactobacillus Blocking agent in development) be banned 
(still experimental) dairyfood form 
Chymosin ("rennet") Processing aid Legal & available None 
(enzyme) (present in imports/ no 
genetic content) 
Cottonseed Oil Edible oil Legally used None 
(cotton byproduct/ no 
genetic content) 
Maize flour Food ingredient Legally used None 
(present in imports) 
Carnation Industrial crop Legally grown None 
(small scale/non-food) 
Summary, legal status and the influence of precaution on representative examples of 
GMOs in Australia as at January 200S. Compiled from numerous sources. 
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The Approach to Analysis. 
If regulatory mechanisms are considered as devices with theoretical inputs 
(expressed as political intentions) and practical (or applied) outcomes, it is 
possible to view the GM regulatory system in one of two broad ways - either 
as the product of theory or as the generator of results. From an analytical 
perspective, this means that it may respectivelv be treated as either a 
dependent variable or an independent variable, so analysis of regulation can 
be either deductive or inductive. 
Richard Simeon's seminal paper, "Studying Public Policy" (Simeon, 
1976:549-550), makes a similar distinction, but Simeon saw significant 
academic value only in causal enquiry and not in outcome analysis, of which 
he was dismissive: 
It is even more important to rescue the study of policy from what we might 
call the technologists, whose main concern has been to develop aids to assist 
official decision-makers make in some sense ''better decisions". In this view, 
exemplified by writers like Yehezkiel Dror, policy-making is essentially a 
technical que-.tion, a matter of developing non: systematic means to canvass 
alternatives, assess costs and benefits, and implement choices. This literature, 
which appears to have had considerable influence with government decision-
makers themselves, is also prescriptive: it seeks primarily not to explain how 
or why decisions are made, but to prescribe more effective ways of doing it. It 
also tends to focus its study narrowly, suggesting "better" policy- that is, 
policy which is more rational, consistent, cost-effective, and so on - will 
follow from reforms of administrative structure and development of new 
analytical techniques. Randall Ripley distinguishes between policy analysis -
"advice on the choosing of alternatives" - and "policy theory" - "the 
explanation of why certain alternatives are chosen and others are not." Ifwe 
are to understand politics generally, our study of policy must be firmly rooted 
in the latter view. (Simeon, 1976:549-550). 
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What Simeon does not consider here is that ultimately it is outcomes that 
matter to the public and to the economy and therefore to government. It 
seems unsurprising but significant that "government decision-makers 
themselves" should be interested in policy analysis. In a functional 
democratic system, feedback from political outcomes must eventually affect 
public policy and its processes, as well as perceptions of political theory. The 
point of studying public poiicy is surely ·;,q gauge its strengths and 
weaknesses with the intention of contributing towards the delivery of ''better" 
or more advantageous policy. This certainly gives it direction and purpose, 
but does not mean it has to be narrowly prescriptive. Although it is possible 
that the particular body of literature Simeon refers to was exclusively 
prescriptive rather than explanatory, no logic confmes policy analysis to 
prescription or precludes explanatory policy analysis. Convincing 
explanation and implicit prescription, on the contrary, seem inseparable. 
Since the GM debate involves t~c· (ldversative positions reflecting 
antag011Jstic ideolcgies and il:-1e political record demonstrates their 
incompatibility, a deductive solution (that is, theory as the independent 
variable and the regulatory process as the dependent variable) would be very 
unlikely to find general acceptance. The repeated failure of the Precautionary 
Principle - itself conceived as a compromising, deductive solution - to settle 
such matters, is evidence that insufficient common ground exists for 
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sustainable agreement to be reached. One ideology and its political morality 
may ultimately become dominant, but presently this is not the case and in the 
absence of any other obvious alternative, it therefore seems futile to look to 
policy theory as the source of a potential solution to the GM problem. 
This leaves the option of examining the pragmatic quality of regulatory 
outcomes (dependent variables) in order to determine the comparative 
usefulness of differing regulatory processes (independent variables). The 
changes to GM regulation along t.!.iP.se lines afforded by the Commonwealth 
Gene Technology Act 2000 provide a COl!Venient means of doing this because 
this act marks the point of change at which the scientific standard was 
abandoned and precautionary regulation at State level became possible. 
Precautionary regulatory outcomes that have been reached since that point in 
time may be compared with conventional regulatory outcomes from before it 
by assessing each according to a small number of pertinent criteria. 
A contemporary precedent for approaching the analysis in this way exists in 
the example of Aboriginal policy in Australia. In recent years, understanding 
of the difficulties and failures of Abopginal policy over a very long period 
has undergone something of a revolution in response to a shift from 
deductive to inductive analysis of Aboriginal disadvantage. The past policies 
of segregation, assimilation, self-determination and reconciliation have all 
been associated with intractable health and general welfare problems. The 
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emerging approach emphasises.the identification of direct practical solutions 
to these problems in an ideologically neutral context and stresses national 
inclusiveness. These initiatives have had significant support from influential 
figures within the indigenous community4• 
From Research Question to Hypothesis 
The intention of this thesis is to test the validity of a hypothesis framed to 
encompass the meaning of the research question: "Is GM crop regulation in 
Australia better framed and implemented on the basis of precaution or 
scientific analysis?" A direct, empirical answer to this question would be a 
product of the application of a measure of what is "better" regulation to all 
Australian GM crop regulato1y cases. This is r•ot a realistic proposal for two 
4 Prominent Aboriginal lawyer and community leader, Noel Pearson, a strong advocate of the 
new, pragmatic approach, wrote in 2002: 
Federal Labor is dominated by what I call the progressivist, intellectual middle 
stratum. They have played a role in achieving recognition of Aboriginal 
property rights, but the prejudice, social theorie3 and thinking habits ofleft-
leaning, liberally minded people make them unable to do anything further for 
Aboriginal people by attacking our real disadvantage factors. 
The only answer to the epidemics of substance abuse that devastate our 
communities is organised intolerance of abusive behaviour. The late Professor 
Nils Bejerot pointed out that historically, substance abuse epidemics have been 
successfully cured without much in the way of research and voluntary 
rehabilitation ... .I contend that t.lle iwo most important factors maintaining and 
worsening Aborigirial disadvrmtage are the substance abuse epidemics and 
passive welfare. But these two factors ultimately depend on one single factor: 
the thinking of the progressive , liberally minded intellectual middle class 
(Pearson, 2002). 
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main reasons. First, the word better (or any appropriate substitute) reduces a 
complex assortment of objectively and subjectively assessed factors down to 
a simple, abstract idea that cannot be directly measured. Second, the total 
numher of cases.is far too high for them all to be considered in any useful 
detail. 
However, better outcomes can very reasonably be equated with greater, long-
term social advantage and, consequently, with social sustainability. It is thus 
possible to compare the sustainability of the current precautionary regulatory 
system of the States with that of the Commonwealth's scientific system, by 
rating representative examples of GM crop varieties according to a balanced 
selection of assessable indicators of social advantage. 
A requircm~nt for falsifiability and the avoidance of negative constructions 
are taken as principles that are logically essential to the composition of valid, 
working hypotheses. It follows from these understandings that if a 
comparison of any conclusive value is to be made, it is necessary to 
simultaneously test two mirroring hypotheses framed as objectively refutable 
propositions. 
The two hypotheses to be tested, therefore, are: 
I.The precautionary approach to GM crop regulation that has been applied by 
the Australian States under the Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 2000, is 
delivering outcomes that are measurably more advantageous to the Australian 
community than those that arose from the previous science-based approach to 
regulation. 
2. The science-based approach to GM crop regulation applied prior to the 
Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 2000, delivered measurably more 
advantageous outcomes to the Australian community than does the current 
precautionary approach of the Australian States. 
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Since the intention of the research is to test the strength of these hypotheses, 
the research process, consistent with the dictates of Popper5, takes the form of 
"severe attempts to refute them" (Popper, 1972: 81 ). In practice, therefore, 
the purpose is to demonstrate that the available evidence does not, in either 
case, support the hypothesis. 
The upholding of one hypothesis and the nullification of the other would 
5 Popper wrote in his,book Objective Knowledge: "The method of science is the method of 
bold conjectures and i•1genious ar:;l severe attempt~ t:J refute them". He continued ... 
. . . All we can do is search for the falsity content of our best theory. We do so 
by trying to refute our theory; that is, by trying to test it severely in the light of 
our objective knowledge and all our ingenuity. It is, of course, always possible 
that the theory may be false even if it passes all these tests; that is allowed for 
by our search for verisimilitude. But if it passes all these tests then we may 
have good reason to conjecture that our theory, which (we know) has a greater 
truth content than its predecessor, may have no greater falsity content. And if 
we fail to refute the new theory, especially in fields in which its predecessor 
has been refuted, then we can claim this as one of the objective reasons for the 
conjecture that the new theory is a better approximation to truth than the old 
theory (Popper, 1972: 81 ). 
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indicate that a clear conclusion could be drawn with respect to the relative 
merits of the approaches. Were both hypotheses to be either sustained or 
nullified, or if no clear result was obtained, it could be concluded that the 
comparative dimension of the exercise had failed to distinguish between the 
two approaches and that no important difference of outcome had been 
detected. 
Two case studies from each type of regulatmy regime will be considered. The 
examples of conventional (science-based) regulation are GM cotton and GM 
carnation. The examples of precautionary regulation are GM canola and GM 
poppies. These cases comprise: 
1. Two GM crops that have been regulated on the basis of their scientifically 
established qualities (cotton & carnation). 
2. Two GM crops that have been regulated on the basis of precaution 
( canola & poppies). 
3. Two edible oilseed crops (cotton & canola). 
4. Two "industrial" or non-food crops (poppies and carnations). 
5. Two major iniemational commodity crops (cotton & canola). 
6. Two minor, localized crops (carnation & poppies). 
GM cotton and GM carnation (both in several variant forms) are the only two 
GM crops that were fully licensed for commercial production under the 
GMAC system and so compulsorily comprise the two examples of 
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scientifically assessed crops. They both, nonetheless, make excellent case 
studies, due to the very strong contrasts between the ways they are cultivated 
and utilised and their long records of use. 
Canola, which is significant as the primary focus of controversy and as an 
economically important crop, also has some useful parallels with cotton. 
They are both widely grown, broadacre crops yielding edible oil and GM 
canola is technologicalJy very similar to GM herbicide resistant cotton. 
Opium poppies, which are grown only in Tasmania, are of particular 
relevance as they constitute a potential pressure point for GM advocates. 
They are of considerable economic importance in Tasmania and genetic 
modification is seen by the industry as inevitable. Poppies have been 
successfully modified and trial crops of GM varieties have been grown. GM 
poppies are also argued to be a fairly safe GM crop from a marketing 
perspective. As poppies are a source of narcotics, their cultivation is rigidly 
regulated and controlled, and since they comprise an industrial crop, issues 
associated with direct human consumption of the plant or its parts are 
avoided. It is consequently difficult to link the nature of poppy crops to the 
biosafety of food exports. 
The analytical :framework, or the specific criteria against which the four case 
studies are to be tested, will be drawn from the set of issues thrown up by the 
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theoretical review and analysj.s that comprises the first half of the thesis. 
Parameters 
The scope of a PhD research project is particularly constrained by the limited 
human and material resources available. Ultimately, it is an individual 
endeavour that is reliant upon the capabilities of one person operating largely 
alone. This means that time also becomes an important restraint, so the 
boundaries of its realistic reach have to be acknowledged. If the argument 
made is to be concisely and economically communicated, it is necessary to 
disregard topics and areas of investigation that have potential significance, 
but which, for practical reasnns, cannot be properly researched. 
In this case, the many relevant international factors and events, although 
often considered informally as background material, are not included as part 
of the study. Moral considerations have been similarly treated. The very 
important areas of GM law and agricultural economics, while sometimes 
touched upon in a general way, are examples of relevant aspects of the issue 
that have not been comprehensively investigated. 
The opinions and knowledge of a range of specialists have been sought, but 
the list of those comulted is necessarily limited. Although the narrow 
purposes of the investigation have been served, the views of political 
organisations, primary industry representative bodies, constitutional lawyers 
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and trade experts are examples of possibly important avenues of inquiry that 
have largely been passed over, The consequenc,e of these limitations is that 
the conclusion that has been drawn, although confidently argued on the basis 
of the available evidence, is ultimately qualified and would not be claimed to 
lie any closer to certainty than favourable probability. 
Research 
Research was conducted in three distinct and consecutive parts. The first 
involved a coverage of risk literature and other information sources, in order 
explore the background of the issue and gain sufficient understanding of it to 
develop an analytical purpose and an analytical framework. 
The second part of the projed was the gathering of data. This took the form 
of a desktop search for information from open sources and eighteen 
interviews6 that were conducted with key informants in accordance with the 
6 The subjects were: Adam Kay, General Manager of Cotton Seed Distributors, Wee W aa, 
NSW; Ben Stephens (Farm Manager) and Tom Breen (Agronomist) of Auscott, Narrabri, 
NSW; Gary Fitt (Deputy Chief Entomologist) and Peter Reid (Research Scientist and 
Program Leader) of CSIR.O; Cindy Hanson, Senior Policy Analyst, Tasmanian Dept. Primary 
Industry and Water; Malcolm McKenzie, grain farmer, Wagga Wagga, NSW; Peter 
Whitehouse (Breeding and Product Development Manager) and Scott Carpenter (Program 
Manager, Biotechnology) of the Bayer Corporation; Robert Sward, Manager, Biotechnology 
Policy, Dept. Primary Industry, Victoria; Bruce Finney, Executive Director Cotton Research 
and Development Corporation; Bronwyn Dixon, Senior Food Scientist, Food Standards, 
Australia and New Zealand, Canberra, ACT; Elizabeth Flynn, Director, Policy and 
Compliance Branch, .:ffice of the Gene Technology Regulator, Canberra, ACT; Buzz Green, 
founder and Chief Executive, Serv-Ag, Devonport, Tas; Greg Hall MLC (Tas); Jeremy 
Rockliff, MHA (Tas) and Tony Fist, Manager of Agricultural Research, Tasmanian 
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applicable guidelines 7. The choice of interviewees reflects the main purposes 
of the research, which were to inve;:stigate the science behind the selected 
crops, to ascertain its impact on re:gulatory processes and to establish the 
consequences of the two regulatory approaches to GM technology. The intent 
was not to investigate or record public piJlitical debate. The semi-structured, 
face to face interviews involved five or six previously forwarded questions 
and typically lasted between thirty and sixty minutes. The material obtained 
was transcribed, checked by the source and summarised. One interview (with 
Gary Pitt of CSIRO) was conducted by telephone, with the same follow up 
procedure, while Stephen Ainsworth of Monsanto and (for his second 
interview only) Tony Fist of Tasmanian Alkaloids provided written answers 
to written questions by email. 
Data collected in this way can r;rovjde a valuable supplement to open source 
m1:1.terial by accessing inf om1ation that is <;pecifically relevant to the research. 
It is also, in some instances, a means of directly accessing obscure or 
privileged information, or the insights and experiences peculiar to an 
individual or a position. The main disadvantages are the time and difficulties 
involved and the issues of reliability arising from the inherent subjectivity of 
the process. 
Alkaloids . Two of these (Ben Stephens of Auscott and Greg Hall MLC) declined to have 
their comments formally recorded and have consequently not been cited. 
7 That is, according to tho~e set down by the Southern Social Science Ethics Committee. 
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The third task was analysis of the material gathered and the development of 
conclusions. The analytical process involved testing or assessing the 
regulatory outcomes relating to each of the crops in respect of four types of 
criteria: "Direct-Physical", "Economic-Material", "Conceptual-Research" 
and "Social-Political". The logic of these choices and the meanings attached 
to them are explained in Chapter 5, but they substantially fulfil the 
., 
requirement that variables be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
Outline and Synopsis of Thesis 
This thesis is a product of the existence of differences of intent and understanding 
between the State and Commonwealth arms of the GM regulatory systems in 
Australia, which in tum stem from incompatible views within the Australian 
community. These differences have led to the failure of the system as a whole to 
deliver generally ac,ceptable regulatory outcomes. 
It is a premise of this thesis that rational analysis based in empiricism can identify 
patterns and inconsistencies in the record of events and facts, thereby leading to 
the possibility that the regulatory intentions of the States might be reconciled with 
those of the Commonwealth. The conclusion reached is that precautionary 
regulation of GM crops has led to indecision and uncertainty, so that the long 
continuation of this approach would be likely to threaten the economic health of 
the agriculture sector in Australia. Properly conducted scientific evaluation, 
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although not entirely free of risk can be shown to be a safer basis for decisions. It 
has, so far, consistently provided informed and reliable guidance on these matters. 
The work has two main parts. The first of these, consisting of Chapters 1 to 3, 
is concerned with the theoretical background to the issue and the thesis, while 
Chapters 4 to 9 comprise the original research and its findings. Some aspects 
of the idea of risk are analysed in the second chapter8, which critically 
considers the arguments of several eminent and representative scholars of the 
subject who have significantly influenced the way in which it has been 
understood and managed in recent years. The positions of John Adams, 
Aaron Wildavsky, Robert Formaini and Mary Douglas are examined in some 
detail in preference to the alternative approach of more superficially 
reviewing the work of a broader selection of writers. 
Despite the significance and the pertinence of many of the observations and 
arguments of these thinkers, it is within the context of their guidance on the 
topic of risk that the difficulties of risk management that comprise the subject 
matter of this investigation have arisen. Their concessions on the questions of 
subjectivity and the function of science have provided leverage points for the 
case against empiricism and scientific analysis that underpins the concept of 
precaution. This chapter, therefore, actively seeks to uncover problems and 
8 Chapters 2 and 3 could have been presented in reverse order. The existing sequence was 
judged most logical but neither option is entirely satisfactory. 
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incongruities in their arguments in an attempt to establish a consistent and 
coherent intellectual standpoint on the subject as the conceptual basis of this 
thesis. 
Chapter 3 considers the emergence of the Precautionary Principle as a 
political idea and looks to its conceptual limitations for explanation of its 
failure to satisfactorily resolve the regulatory problem of GM technology and 
risk. This chapter establishes the context in which it arose, examines its 
possible meanings and identifies shortcomings. 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the case studies of the four GM crops being 
studied - cotton, canola, carnation and poppy. The intention is to provide a 
sound basic understanding of each as a part of the economic and agricultural 
fabric of Australia. Analysis of the cases is undertaken in Chapter 8. Various 
outcomes of the regulatory management of the four GM crops selected as 
case studies are compared, in order to throw light on the differences of 
outcome between scientific and precautionary regulation. The final chapter 
presents the conclusions of the thesis and considers some significant 
questions that have been raised by the research process, but which remain 
unanswered. 
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Chapter 2. 
RISK THEORISTS 
The introductory section of this thesis has argued that politicisation of_ 
theoretical inconclusiveness surrounding science and biotechnology has 
translated into difficulties of a practical and economic nature for the 
agricultural sector in Australia. Debate about science, uncertainty, probability 
and technological failure is now frequently categorised under the broader 
heading of "risk" and the mainstream theorists Mary Douglas, Aaron 
Wildavsky, John Adams and Robert Formaini are among the more significant 
scholars of this subject whose work has collectively influenced public policy 
over a generation. The evolution and increasing acceptance of the essentially 
anti-scientific concept of precaution over the same tir.ae - roughly the period 
since the Vietnam era - .:;an hardly be a coincidental development, so it is in 
the understandings of these writers on risk that incongruity and theoretical 
difficulties should logically be sought. Definition of the terms upon which 
science is accepted and a clear expression of its function are preconditions for 
lucid discussion ofthis subject matter, particularly in circumstances of 
epistemological flux. This chapter seeks to identify the difficulties in order to 
clarify, for the purposes of this thesis, the task and nature of science, and to 
thus also provide firmer grounds for the evaluation of precautionary thought 
and the Precautionary Principle in Chapter 3. It explores the contributions of 
the above-mentioned theorists to the understanding of the concept of risk, 
commencing with the work of John Adams and then, in tum, that of Aaron 
Wildavsky, Robert Formaini and Mary Douglas. 
John Adams 
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John Adams is an influential contributor to the debate and literature of risk. 
He has strongly challenged the mathematical understanding of risk as a 
measurable entity, which he sees as narrow in its logic and tyrannical in its 
implementation. His writing suggests a deep concern with authority and its 
expression as callous, bureaucratic officiousness. The ''tyranny" of majorities 
over minorities and a tendency towards the establishment of "despotic" elites 
have both been well established as practical shortcomings of democracy, and 
Adams is a spirited defender of individual autonomy and vulnerable 
minorities. 
At its most simple, the observation underpinning Adams' position is that risk 
perception is reflexive and self-regulating. Behaviour in circumstances of 
perceived risk is altered in order to accommodate that perception, thus 
reducing or raising the actual level of risk. Accordingly, the imposition by 
authorities of safety measures intended to reduce danger serves to change or 
displace risk perception so the real danger level tends to return to its original 
level as people take greater risks in the context of greater safety. He refers to 
this phenomenon as "risk compensation". In the preface to his book "Risk" 
(first published in 1995), Adams writes that risk compensation theory: 
accords primacy in the explanation of accidents to the human propensity to 
take risks. The theory postulates that we all come equipped with "risk 
thermostats" and suggests that safety interventions that do not affect the 
setting of the thermostat are likely to be frustrated by behavioural responses 
that reassert the level of risk with which people were originally content. 
(Adams, 1998: ix). 
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The second understanding central to Adams' thesis is that people perceive 
and manage risk according to four worldviews. This results from his linking 
the idea of risk compensation to the "perspective that has come to be known 
as 'cultural theory' developed by Michael Thompson" (Adams, 1998: ix), 
which views risk as: 
culturally constructed; where scientific fact falls short of certainty we are 
guided by assumption, inference and belief. In such circumstances the 
deterministic rationality of classical physics is replaced by a set of conditional, 
probabilistic rationalities .... Cultural theory illuininates a world of plural 
rationalities; it discerns order and pattern in risk-taking behaviour and the 
beliefs that u::•d~1pin it. Wherever debates :!re prolonged and umesolved ... 
cultural theory seeks an explanation not in further scientific analysis, but in the 
differences in premises from which the participants are arguing. (Adams, 
1998: ix). 
Adams' position, then, is ultimately a relativist one that perceives and 
emphasises an essential equality between different "rationalities" and views 
risk as being ubiquitous and, critically, very human. Scientific measurement 
and analysis is accordingly seen as a simplistic, narrow and limited approach 
to dealing with risk and in his estimation it signifies ''very little" (Adams, 
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1998: 3-4). This rejection of the prevailing objective or scientific approach to 
risk constitutes the third important element of Adams' thinking and is dealt 
with in some detail in the second half of "Risk". 
Adams cites chaos theory as the basis for his further assertion that "complex 
natural systems" are "inherently unpredictable" due to their "extreme 
sensitivity" (Adams, 1998: 4). His rejection of the validity of empiricism is 
almost absolute. "Rarely" he says, '"are risk decisions made with information 
that can be reduced to quantifiable probabilities" (Adams, 1998: 4). 
Consequently, Adams divides the world (more or less along an 
objective/subjective fault-line) into two camps with respect to the perception 
of the meaning of risk. These are a "formal sector" closely linked to 
authority, that pursues the objective of risk reduction and an "informal 
sector" consisting of ordinary human individuals whose objective "is to 
balance risks and rewards" (Adams, 1998: 4). These sectors "co-exist 
uncomfortably'', with the behaviour of the informal sector "modified by the 
activities of the formal sector" (Adams, 1998: 4-5). 
The ''theory of risk compensation" fundamentally underpinning Adams' 
argument was originally devised by Gerald Wilde in 1976 but has been 
modified significantly by Adams over the intervening years (Adams, 1998: 
14). It hypothesises that all individuals have a unique propensity to take risks 
which involves weighing potential rewards against potential losses and that 
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rewards and losses will be incurred in proportion to the risks taken (Adams, 
1998: 14-15). Adams considers that the propensity to take risks is reflective 
of a "need for excitement inherent in all of us ... a need for a certain level of 
arousal" (Adams, 1998: 15). This perception leads to his assertion that ''the 
starting point of any theory of risk must be that everyone willingly takes 
risks" (Adams, 1998: 16) 
Building on this premise, Adams considers the idea drawn from quantum 
physics that uncertainty is "inherent in physical nature" (Adams, 1998: 17) 
and the opinion, e:\.pressed by quantum physicist Max Born, that it "is the 
only thing that permits us the possibility of moral significance [through the 
exercise of] ... responsibility and conscience. Without it", says Adams, "we 
are mere predetermined automata" (Adams, 1998: 18). He goes on to cite 
Dostoyevsky' s rationale that there exists an essential, human determination to 
maintain a capacity for independent choice which is critical to the existence 
of individuality and consequently also of personality. As a result, ''the greater 
the success of the safety regulators in removing uncertainty from our lives, 
the stronger will become the compulsion to reinstate it" (Adams, 1998: 19). 
Thus risk compensation theory postulates the presence of a fundamental 
human resistance to the development of ;;:ntirely risk-free environments and 
that a risk-free world "would be one with no uncertainty or freedom or 
individuality'' (Adams, 1998: 19). 
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Adams became inter~3ted in cultural th~ory bc~ause he believed it ''would 
cast helpful light on how the [risk] thermostat was set" (Adams, 1998: ix). 
Founded on Douglas' and Wildavsky's view, expressed in their book "Risk 
and Culture" (1990), that risk is "culturally constructed" (Adams, 1998: 35), 
the Adams version of risk construction embodies Holling's idea that cultural 
assumptions about nature can be reduced to three groups (Adams, 1998: 33) 
and Schwarz's and Thompson's further development of these "cultural 
patterns" into a "fourfold typology" (Adams, 1998: 35). The combination of 
these ideas forms "the central framework of Cultural theory'' (Adams, 1998: 
38). 
Adams graphically locates the four types of understanding on a bivariate 
chart with two axes representing variations between individualised and 
collectivised outlooks (x axis) and social environments of equality and 
inequality (y axis) (Adams, 1998: 35). The described types are: individualists 
(bold, entrepreneur-types who regard nature as robust and well-buffered), 
egalitarians (more cautious types who regard nature as fragile and delicately 
balanced), hierarchists (conservatives who regard nature as having reasonable 
but limited robustness) and fatalists (resigned types who regard nature as 
unpredictable) (Adams, 1998: 34-36). 
These notions are perceived to be representative of "four distinctive world 
views [reflecting] four different rationalities" the different underlying 
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.premises of which are ''themselves beyond the reach ofrationality'' (Adams, 
1998: 37). This effectively means that they are intrinsically beyond analysis 
and (given the distinctiens between them that are emphasised by their 
placement at the four extremes of the graphical axes) also rationally 
incompatible. Adams further stresses the cultural basis of these rationalities 
by pointing out the means by which they are maintained: 
Both the paradigms of science and the myths of cultural theory are powerful 
filters through which the world is perceived, and they are reinforced by the 
company one keeps. (Adams, 1998: 37). 
While noting that "empirical support for the theory ... is sparse", Adams 
suggests that "in the uncertain world we inhabit" its validity is to be judged 
by ''the degree to which it accords with people's experience" (Adams, 1998: 
38). He uses the ...-~1y relevant example of traffic pollution to illustrate this 
point and to expand his main argument (Adams, 1998: 38-45), which he 
applies to "all disputes that are unresolved or unresoJvable by science" 
(Adams, 1998: 45). 
A 1983 US National Research Council report is cited by Adams as providing 
evidence to support his belief that science is "groping in the dark" (Adams, 
1998: 49). Scientific ignorance about the potential of almost all of the "5 
million chemical substances ... known to exist" to negatively affect human 
health, and an alleged inability of science to assess them accurately anyway 
(Adams, 1998: 45-50) are used to buttress this argument. The section 
concludes: 
The prospect of future research breakthrough lighting more than a few 
flickering candles in the vast darkness enveloping the problems they are 
addressing is not encouraging. Indeed the problem appears to be getting worse 
as the rate continues to increase at which chemists, physicists and genetic 
engineers create new dangers. Even more urgent than the need for more 
science is a need for a better understanding of the bridge of inference and 
belief. (Adams, 1998: 50). 
Critical Assessment of Adams' Position 
The observation of a link between risk perception and compensatory 
behaviour is at once both facile and profound. It is obvious that people 
modify their behaviour in response to perceived danger, but we do not so 
readily recognise that when we consciously or deliberately modify risks we 
are also affecting likely behavioural responses. The consequence is, as 
Adams has pointed out, that safety measures may have the effect of altering 
the degree, nature or location of a particular risk. This realisation has 
important implfoations for the decisions and practices of governments and 
government bodies at all levels, adding a highly significant dimension to 
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questions of risk. Its logic is clear and Adams has convincingly argued, with 
numerous examples, (such as Adams, 1998: 113, 125-126, 154-155) that 
planned safety measures can result in unforeseen and undesirable outcomes 
for this reason. 
However, the broad acceptance of Adams' principle as a vehicle for 
achieving a greater common good ultimately means the permanent 
acceptance of a certain level of risk and consequently also of accidental 
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deaths, injuries and material losses. Indeed, taken as an absolute, risk 
compensation implies that imposed safety measures are pointless because 
they can never make any difference anyway. Neither of these propositions 
though would be attractive to political institutions sensitive to popular feeling 
or to community members and leaders, who would consider any such 
position to signify resignation and failure. Adams' own experience with 
government seems to confirm this. 
The extension of risk compensation into risk compensation theory is not as 
well argued, being less well supported by both evidence and logic. The use of 
cultural theory to justify risk compensation theory, also without the support 
of persuasive hard evidence, does little to overcome the problem. The further 
attempt by Adams to take a hatchet to empiricism in general and its 
application to risk in particular, is necessary to support these theoretical 
extensions. Although he exposes much irrationality, narrow thinking and 
bureaucratic arrogance in the process, and weakens significantly the case for 
certain empirical approaches to risk management, his attack on scientific 
thinking is not strongly supported by the evidence he offers and is ultimately 
unsuccessful. These points will each be further discussed in a little detail. 
Risk Compensation Theory 
Adams progression from the observation of risk compensation to risk 
compensation theory is based upon the observation that "everyone has a 
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propensity to take risks" (Adams, 1998: 14,16) and involves the notion of a 
risk thermostat (Adams, 1998: ix). The idea that risk-taking is essential to 
human nature is perhaps difficult to demonstrate. Certainly risk-taking is 
inseparable from living and is necessary for life to continue and all people 
probably enjoy risk-taking at some level. However, neither the enjoyment of 
risks, nor the fact that people routinely take them can be argued to show that 
people innately and involuntarily maintain a set level of risk in their lives. 
The strongest empirical evidence that Adams offers in support of risk 
compensation theory is the six graphs reproduced in Figure 3 .1 overleaf 
which illustrate "ratios" of death by accident and violence in thirty one 
countries over the first three quarters of the Twentieth Century. Although 
they are described as "standardised mortality ratios'', (Adams, 1998: 60) their 
axes are unlabelled, so the values represented on the ''y" axis and by the 
curves unfortunately remain unknown. Nonetheless, their patterns are clear 
and a general tendency towards maintenance of a steady level of deaths over 
long periods is discernible. This characteristic is visually accentuated by the 
smaller vertical scale of the last, aggregate graph that has the effect of 
vertically compat.t.ing the data on the graph. Adams is quite properly cautious 
about the strength of the claims he makes on the basis of this statistical 
record, but he observes that "risk appears to have been suppressed in some 
activities only to pop up in others" and suggests that: 
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there is little to show in the aggregated statistics of death by accident and 
violence for all the labours of the risk reducers - tl:e regulators, the police, the 
doctors, the safety engineers and all the others involved in the safety industry 
over many decatles. (Adams, 1998: 61-62). 
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Quite clearly, Adams is saying, the efforts of the "risk reducers" to reduce the 
costs of risk has transferred rather than eliminated them. 
However, this interpretation implies that new activities involving risk are 
merely the product of risk reduction measures. It ignores the restless, 
inquiring nature of the human mind and the constantly changing and evolving 
pattern of human activity that this engenders. Assuming (as Adams quite 
reasonably does) that the specific causes of these deaths do change over time, 
the graphs convey no more information than that an ongoing equilibrium 
appears to exist between the rates at which old problems are solved and at 
which new problems are encountered. They do not distinguish between 
causes of death and hence cannot illustrate the existence (or the absence) of 
any relationship (causal or casual) between deaths from one cause and those 
from another. 
Adams applies risk compensation theory to conventional approaches to road 
safety at some length (Adams, 1998: chapters 7& 8) offering statistical 
evidence to support his claim that the approach is essentially wrongheaded 
and counterproductive. While convincingly arguing that the phenomenon of 
risk compensation ought to be included in the assessments and decisions of 
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road safety, most of his empirical evidence does not isolate the factors under 
question and so cannot demonstru~ e the causal relationships he seeks to show 
(such as Adams, 1998 127, 138-140). Wh~t they do effectively demonstrate 
above all is the bottom line of the available hard evidence - that road fatalities 
are falling in the face of huge increases in vehicle registrations and road use. 
According to risk compensation theory this cannot happen as a consequence 
of safety measures unless deaths from other risk-related causes increase in 
response. 
Total road fatalities in Australia have approximately halved since 1970, 
falling from 3,798 to 1,636 in 2005, while fatalities per 100,000 persons fell 
from 30.4 to 8.1 and fatalities per 10,000 registered vehicles fell from 8.0 to 
1.2. over the same period (ABS, 2007). During this time, car registrations, 
population and car ownership all increased significantly and a continuing 
road safety campaign has been waged, involving the imposition of increasing 
constraints on driving behaviour. No doubt, over the same period, accidental 
deaths from other causes such as recreational drug use and high risk sports 
has simultaneously increased, but there is no good reason to logically link 
these things and use risk compensation theory to explain increased drug 
overdoses. It is conceivable that road safety campaigns which dissuade young 
men from taking risks on the roads result in more hang-gliding and substance 
abuse, but a patterned relationship between these things is not intuitively 
obvious. 
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There is though a clear causative relationship between road safety measures 
taken in Australia in the last thirty-five years and steep falls in fatal accident 
rates, which does not support risk compensation theory. Adams' assertion 
that "as traffic increases, the death toll is contained, and sometimes reduced, 
by behaviour that avoids danger rather than removing it"(Adams, 1998: 140) 
is credible but not verified by his evidence. It is equally incredible that road 
safety measures would have no net effect upon the road toll. In any case, the 
halving of the road toll over thirty five years is well beyond his claim of 
containment. 
Adams' previously mentioned graphs (Figure 4.3 Adams, 1998: 60) do show, 
reasonably convincingly, that deaths by violence and accident remain at a 
roughly constant level in various populations over long periods of time, but 
they do not explain this. The constant level does suggest the existence of a 
governing link between the reductions and the increases in deaths from 
different causes, but it is not possible to conclude from the information 
presented (and Adams does not) that it validates risk compensation theory. It 
is possible, though, as Adams does, to view this material as strongly 
supportive of the theory. 
On the other hand, these graphs (and much of Adams' other evidence) are 
equally supportive of a possibly more credible counter-logic which is also 
compatible with the phenomenon of risk compensation. This logic is that, 
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contrary to Adams' proposition that humans perversely insist upon 
maintaining a fixed (or minimum) level of risk and death in the face of 
broadly supported efforts to reduce them, they are prepared to tolerate deaths 
by violence and accident only up to a common maximum level. The corollary 
of this is that social acceptance of risks resulting from human imagination 
and scientific inquiry, such as teclmological advancement, may be understood 
to be limited by tbe rate at which safety measures for existing technologies 
are devised and imposed. This is contrary to the implied logic of risk 
compensation theory that such acceptance is conditionally dependent upon a 
social reaction against risk minimisation. Accordingly, the acceptance of 
novelty and invention, with their inherent risks, could be considered to be 
conditionally dependent upon the satisfactory resolution of old problems and 
the elimination of existing risks. 
The inevitable end point of this logic is that productive efforts to minimise 
existing risk-associated costs must increase the preparedness of communities 
and individuals to take up new challenges. For example, until a relatively 
recent change, heavy vehicles in Tasmania were limited to a maximum speed 
of eighty kilometres an hour. On the basis of a good safety record and 
technological advances, this was increased to a hundred kilometres an hour. 
Although an initial increase in the accident rate was a risk, it would have 
been possible to reduce maximum speeds until a low, acceptable, accident 
rate applied again. But the same transport system, with a high initial accident 
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rate would have been expected to employ measures to reduce accidents, 
possibly including a reduction in its maximum operating speed below eighty 
kilometres an hour in order to achieve an acceptable level of safety. 
Increasing the maximum speed (the independent variable) would be 
unthinkable until the system was operating at an acceptable level of safety 
(the dependent variable). The rationale of risk compensation theory would be 
that the independent variable of the thermostatically set accident rate would 
determine the speed at which trucks should be driven. 
The advantage of this conceptual position over risk compensation theory is 
that it is entirely consistent with the behaviour of governments, communities 
and individuals virtually everywhere who, quite reasonably, pragmatically 
and humanly, take great pains to minimise human and material loss before 
extending risk activity. This renders unnecessary an explanation for the 
problem of human perversity, provoked by compensation theory, which 
involves the simultaneous expression of essential social needs to both 
minimise the dangers inherent to risk while compensating for that 
miriimisation with more dangerous behaviour. Thus th.e requirement for a 
social theory of cultural diversity to validate the primary corollary of risk 
compensation and accommodate its obvious difficulties is dispensed with. If 
empirical evidence is the evidence of experience, the clear existence in 
advanced democracies of a consistent and persistent, historical pattern of 
general concern at government level to reduce risk, provides strong empirical 
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support for this a:lternatiYe position. Denial of the validity of this evidence is 
denial of the essential understanding of democracy-that the activities of 
representative governments, in broad terms, reflect the wishes and aspirations 
of their electorates. 
At several points in his narrative (such as Adams, 1998: 11,16,30,114), 
Adams chides governments and safety authorities for seeking a zero risk 
environment, but the pursuit of hmm reduction, as a constituent of social 
betterment, seems a high cultural priority. Ever-increasing efficiency and 
technological sophistication are probably of equal rank on most socio-
political agendas. Excepting authoritarian and violent regimes, it is hard to 
conceive of circumstances in which any responsible government would not 
actively seek risk-minimisation. 
Of course, nobody likes accidents and Adan1s is not suggesting that they do 
or should. People abhor needless and expensive injury, death and loss and 
obviously want to enjoy life and health, so it is natural and reasonable for 
them to expect their government!? to think in the same way. Communities do 
not, on the whole, desire or accept policies that will lead to accidents, losses 
or damage and governments must' respond to their communities if they want 
to be re-elected. Certainty is vastly more attractive than uncertainty, so 
policies offering predictability and security will transfer into votes. Policies 
that involve the public's acceptance oflosses or uncertainty are obviously 
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unappealing to voters and so are eschewed by political parties. Risk 
compensation theory seems to unavoidably provoke a problem of logic with 
regard to human behaviour and to imply aspirational confusion and political 
dysfunction in the election and operation of democratic forms of government. 
Cultural Theory 
While Adams openly admits to vulnerability with respect to the demonstrable 
validity of Cultural theory (Adams, 1998: x; 38; 64; 66; 200), he says he still 
finds it ''useful" (Adams, 1998: x). Nonetheless, it remains a problem for his 
argument that Cultural theory's four1 "rationalities" of human nature2, also 
referred to as "myths", (Figs 3.2 and 3.3, Adams, 1998: 35, 37) cannot be 
shown to be anything other than arbitrary values supported by circumstantial 
evidence. 
Superficially and subjectively, the four "myths" provide a reasonable 
description of the main ways in which risk is perceived, but the absence of a 
strong empirical basis or oth~r compelling logic jeopardises the credibility of 
any theoretical projection premised upon their validity. Although not an 
unreasonable proposition, cultural theory is vulnerable to the claim that it is 
no more than plausible conjecture. Ptolemy's view that the earth was the 
1 A fifth "way of life" (Adams, 1998: 200) described in the last chapter of Adams'book, is 
here ignored, as encompassing it would involve unnecessary and distracting complication of 
the argument. 
2 Hierarchists, egalitarians, individualists and fatalists. 
centre of the universe no doubt seemed a reasonable supposition prior to its 
refutation by the hard empirical evidence of Copernicus. 
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A diversity of understandings of the world about us, including the 
understanding of risks in general and risks in particular, no doubt exists and 
Adams' construct provides, in some respects, compelling and valuable 
insights concerning this complexity. The possibility of multiple 
interpretations of any given set of information is easily forgotten or ignored 
and his model emphasises this possibility. 
It also involves recognisable truths and so appears to fit the evidence of 
everyday life, tempting one to accept its logic. However, its value is limited. 
The four values of cultural theory are not sho\Vn to be, in any evidential 
sense, substantial or exhaustive of possible human understandings of nature 
or the universe or risk. These categories are strongly reductionist in nature, to 
the point of dangerous over-simplification. It would be no less rational, but 
equally misleading to classify and then draw major conclusions about 
Australians as humans according to the political party they last voted for, 
their ethnic background, religious convictions or their socio-economic status. 
Furthermore, the names these categories have been given are drawn from 
morally loaded values, which presume to comprehend and explain the 
primary motives of human behaviour. The more closely it is examined, the 
weaker the "cultural" thesis appears. Are hierarchists all in the government 
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and do egalitarians, individualists and fatalists all vote for the hierarchists? If 
not, why and how is the hierarchist view of risk inflicted upon everybody 
else? Did the hierarchists alone develop hard science and somehow impose it 
upon the world? Does hard science rationally fit into the theory al all? The 
unanswerable questions are endless. 
Adams openly recognises and acknowledges many of the weaknesses of 
cultural theory and attempts in the last chapter of the book to, at least 
partially, overcome them. He (apparently adopting ongoing modifications to 
cultural theory) adds a further dimension to the concept, which increases the 
number of possible human categories fourfold, to sixteen. This reduces the 
conspicuousness of the substantiation difficulty, but does not remove it. 
Indeed, he openly admits to the failure of efforts to statistically verify the 
theory (Adams 1998: 38; 200). Nevertheless, its function in Adams' 
argument is critical, as has been noted. Its role is to neutralise the logical 
tension between the vital premise that people and communities inevitably 
assert their need to take risk and the glaring difficulty provoked by the 
measurable fact that large portions of the resources of most advanced 
societies around the globe are devoted to eliminating risk. 
Cultural theory's apparent conjecture is that a culturally based, internal, 
structural conflict is responsible for this anomaly. The complex struggles 
between the forces for risk-taking and the forces for risk-reduction are 
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presumably alleged to give credence to the notion that essential risk-taking 
and risk-minimisation social dynamics are not rationally or practically 
irreconcilable. If the assumptions and claims of cultural theory or a suitable 
substitute are denied, risk compensation theory remains exposed to the 
assertion that it flies in the face of overwhelming and obvious evidence that 
individuals and communities emotionally and rationally aspire to eliminate 
risk. 
While noting that "empirical support for the theory ... is sparse", Adams 
asserts that "in the uncertain world we inhabit", its validity is to be judged by 
''the degree to which it accords with people's experience" (Adams, 1998:-38). 
However, empirical evidence is experience and scientific empiricism is 
nothing more or less than formalised guidelines for the re-creation and 
measurement of experiences under conditions that strive to minimise the 
opportunities for error due to subjectivity or other distortions. The 
substitution of opinion for unavailable evidence marks the point of the 
ahandonment of analytical reason. 
Martin Landau (1972: 7-13) was a noted critic of the tendency to discount the 
value of scientific quantification: 
There is no human judgement that is not based upon "sampling": any 
observation, of any kind, is a count, and any conclusion must be based on a 
sample survey ... If Morgaenthau and Wolin have concluded that 
quantification has trivialised our work, have they not assigned a "grade"? 
There must be a scale involved in this judgment, probably unidimensional, 
ranging from trivia to importance - and by some count of some sample, they 
have plotted the quantifiers on this scale. 
As Landau implies, the abandonment of analytical discipline risks mental 
drift towards recognition of only desirable information and rejection of the 
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undesirable. It is simply not good enough to trust subjective humanjudgment 
to be the arbiter of the validity of cultural theory. To dub cultural theory ''the 
anthropologists' myth of myths" or a "super-myth" as Adams does (Adams, 
1998: 38) is quite acceptable, but it is not acceptable to then declare that it 
has greater validity than empiricism and that this validity can only be verified 
by recourse to other myths. Although a side issue, it is also the case that the 
possibility of the existence of validity requires the existence of absolutes, 
which Adams appears to deny. Both of these understandings are fundamental 
to the concept of empiricism. 
The Problems of Empiricism 
Absolutes and certainty may or may not exist in the universe, meaning that 
ultimately empiricism and hard science may well not be the most appropriate 
possible instruments of material interpretation. But the ultimate truth about 
these things is largely irrelevant here, the pertinent understanding being the 
way in which humans comprehend and communicate about their physical 
environment. People perceive the world in what might be termed a practical 
way, meaning their perceptions are related to their own sensory experiences 
and are based upon a relative certainty about its nature. This is the certainty 
50 
historically constmcted ~1pon a common human understanding of the world as 
it is thus perceived through the senses. It is not possible to form or 
communicate meaningful ideas about the material world without reference to 
what people agree to be meaningful evidence. This is what is commonly 
called ''truth". The general belief in the material existence about us and the 
way it behaves allows us all to agree that fire is hot, water quenches thirst and 
concrete is hard. Denial of such things (which are also called "facts") falls 
outside the bounds of our common practical experience and so cannot be 
considered useful in communicating with other humans generally. 
Consequently, it is not possible to make broadly coherent statements about 
the world without reference to such truths, or to accounts that are understood 
to be truths. The awareness that cultural and personal understanding may 
conflict with these commonly agreed truths is logically the basis of the 
formality of scientific analysis, which merely seeks to establish and describe 
the nature of material entities in terms that are universally acceptable. 
A simple model of human understanding of a particular thing may, on this 
basis, be considered to consist of areas of empirical certainty and areas of 
empirical uncertainty. To achieve a confident working understanding of it, 
areas of empirical uncertainty need to be either empirically understood or to 
be transformed into a fonn of certainty by constructing it through cultural or 
personal understanding. Hard science may be understood to formalise the 
processes of empirical enquiry in order to exclude the empirically uncertain 
and to construct platforms of certainty by linking many empirically 
established facts upon which theory may be built. The technology upon 
which much in modem life depends, such as medicine, communications, 
transport and food production are completely the product of this kind of 
thought. 
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A basic problem for Adams is the ambiguity surrounding his articulation of 
his understanding of such fundaments. This ambiguity is expressed in two 
main ways. Firstly, he rather sweepingly dismisses those who accept the 
scientific notions of empiricism and relative certainty as "Kelvinists, in 
keeping with the theological character of their position" (Adams 1998: 10-
~7), yet he does not hesitate to point, again and again, to empirical evidence 
as the proof validating his assertions. ·Secon<liy, since cultural theory is a 
relativist construct, premised upon the non-existence of absolute truths or any 
form of certairity, and the equality of the merits of competing world-views, 
empirical science can presumably only be considered to be another 
competing interpretation of the world. Yet Adams does not take the step of 
either embracing this view or otherwise clarifying the dilemma it creates for 
the acceptability of the evidence he offers. He allows empirical science to 
drift from positions of validity to positions of non-validity (such as Adams, 
1998: 77 and 10) as occasion demands. It is not at all clear where he can 
locate it in the difficult presence cf cultural theory as the following example 
shows. 
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With reference to the application of the four "rationalities" of cultural theory 
to the example of traffic pollution (Adams, 1998: 38-45), Adams states that 
his "speculations'" are "relevant to all disputes that are unresolved or 
unresolvable by science" (Adams, 1998: 45). Ignoring the possibly pedantic 
point that speculation is definitionally not relevant to anything, the logic of 
this statement involves an unstated presupposition that another, truly 
objective and analytically superior rationality- science - actually exists, in 
spite of his frequent statements to the contrary. Given the primacy of 
opportunity to resolve disputes, which he here accords to science, it can only 
be construed that the other four "rationalities" are applicable only in the · 
absence of sound scientific evidence. In other words, the implication is that 
certainty ultimately exists. However, such a position completely denies both 
the validity of any rationale fur abandoning science as the appropriate tool of 
analysis in the first place and the premise of cultural theory that "multiple 
rationalities" of equal validity exist. Indeed, Adams has fairly significantly 
dug himself into this position: 
Both the paradigms of science and the myths of cultural theory are powerful 
filters through which the world is perceived, and they are reinforced by the 
company one keeps. (Adams, 1998: 37). 
Although he never denies the existence of an "objective reality" (Adams, 
1998: 42) and refers to the "certainty" of "scientific fact" (Adams, 1998: ix), 
Adams, as an entree to cultural theory, floats the idea of uncertainty being 
"inherent in physical nature" (Adams, 1998: 17), describing it as the position 
taken by the quantum physicist Max Bo~ in a long-running debate with 
Einstein. While not unequivocally siding with either of these theorists, his 
sympathy with Born's view is clear from his introduction of the idea, his 
frequently insinuated rejection of certainty and physical science (such as 
Adams, 1998: 10 and 17) and the embodiment of uncertainty and relativist 
thought in his arguments. These are completely inconsistent with Einstein's 
cited belief "in complete law and order in a world which objectively exists" 
(Adams, 1998: 17). The consequence of these inconsistencies is that this 
book provokes considerable confusion as to where Adams has founded his 
thinking. 
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Adams' thorough and effective debunking of attempts to quantitatively 
measure risk is significant but not at all in discord with the idea of 
empiricism. If risk is a product of the uncertainty born of an absence of 
knowledge it has no physical existence. It is of course not possible to 
measure anything which does not physically exist, as Lord Kelvin's 
observation, cited by Adams, strongly implies: "Anything that exists, exists 
in some quantity and can therefore be measured" (Adams 1998: 10). Risk, it 
would seem logical to conclude, therefore, cannot be measured. It seems 
curious (in the absence of knowledge of the context of Kelvin's remark) that 
Adams should have so thoroughly misinterpreted him and chosen to label 
those intent upon measuring risk as "Kelvinists" (Adams 1998: 10). If 
Kelvin's seemingly faultless logic is accepted, the problem of risk 
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measurement, which Adams has misidentified as evidence of the analytical 
limitations of hard science, lies with those who have erroneously attempted to 
extend the validity of statistical probability into the area of valid empiricism. 
Finally, Adams notes the irony of the conclusions drawn by both Beck and 
Wildavsky, who having "argued the case for the cultural construction of risk, 
both conclude that what is needed is better, more 1.;ritical science, and 
improvements in the conduct of scientific debates" (Adams 1998: 184). 
Although not concurring with this view and offering no prescriptive advice 
on the management of risk himself, Adams does not distance himself from 
the other two theorists' perception of the problem "as one of liberating 
science from the oppressive grip of the dominating hierarchy" (Adams 1998: 
185). Perhaps the remedial approach is simpler - the understanding and 
practice of science according to its original principles. 
Aaron Wildavsky 
Aaron Wildavsky (1930-1993), a leading scholar of risk, was Professor of 
Political Science and Public Policy at Berkeley. His published work on risk is 
considerable and apart from several important publications consisting entirely 
of his own writings, includes "Risk and Culture'', written in collaboration 
with Mary Douglas, a British anthropologist noted for her work on the 
cultural dimension of risk. 
/ 
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Wildavsky' s approach to risk is decidedly mistrustful of the direction taken in 
western political development during the third quarter of the Twentieth 
Century and can be strongly identified with the peculiarly American, 
historical, mainstream values centred around individual, economic autonomy. 
It follows that his understandings of risk and the political process are 
consistent with and inseparable from a laissez faire, economic viewpoint. 
A fundamental Wildavskian ob5ervation is that safety and danger are 
"intertwined" and thus "inextricably mixed, [so] it is not possible to have one 
without the other" (Wildavsky, 1985: 16). A classic example of his is the 
"Jogger's Dilemma" (Wildavsky, 1988: 1-14; Smith, 1995: 2): a risk of not 
being a jogger lies in vulnerability to heart attack, but a risk of jogging is that 
it may trigger a heart attack. The dilemma results from the integration of the 
ultimate cost (heart attack) with both of the alternative courses of action · 
(jogging and not jogging). According to Wildavsky, it is not possible, either 
predictively or practically, to isolate the cost factor of heart attack from either 
of them. The conceptual consequence of this is that, in the predictive and 
practical business of risk analysis, no course of action can be trusted to 
provide· absolute safety. However, continues the argument, while the general 
inseparability of safety and danger is absolute, certain courses of action are 
likely to provide more safety and less danger than others, so relatively safe 
courses of action may be sought. Smith paraphrases - "To make our lives 
56 
safer, we must prudently accept the introduction of new risks" (Smith, 1995: 
2). 
This understanding leads to a second important concept ofWildavsky's, 
which is that "relative safety is not a static but rather a dynamic product of 
learning from error over time" (Wildavsky, 1985: 5-6). "Without trial there 
can be no error, but without error there is no learning ... Knowledge grows 
by criticising the failure of existing theory to explain or predict events in its 
domain of applicability" (Wildavsky, 1985: 1). Smith succinctly summarises: 
''we search for safety, ... [so it] is discovered- not designed" (Smith, 1995: 
2). ''Trial and error" is a colloquial term, its existence indicating the ubiquity 
of the concept, which "has seeped so far into the collective consciousness that 
it has become a stock phrase" (Wildavsky, 1985: 2). It might also be noted 
here that, more than being socially entrenched, it is a cornerstone of science. 
Scientific experiment applies the notion of trial and error in the form of tests 
of small-scale models (with small-scale errors) which may provide reliable 
indications of full-scale outcomes. 
The same idea can also be implied by the word "experience'', a valued human 
quality which is often used to infer a practical understanding of strengths and 
failings acquired through the learning process of doing something. "The 
debate on risk", writes Wildavsky, with reference to risk aversion, "proposes 
a radical revision of this practice. If we have to guarantee no errors before we 
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start, then we cannot start at all" (Wildavsky, 1985: 2). From this perspective, 
then, risk is unavoidable and necessary if the human condition is to continue 
to change, whether of its own accord or in response to changes which occur 
in our environment. 
Wildavsky argues that as acquired "resilience" is a product of exposure to 
varying environmental conditions (discussed below), national health and 
wealth are promoted by "private markets rather than public agencies", 
through their inherent tendency towards "larger rather than smaller numbers 
and extents of risk" (Wildavsky, 1985: 14). He also argues that ''wealthier is 
healthier ... [being] a measure of our ability to fend off disasters" (Smith, 
1995: 2). 
Contrary to common opinion, living in a rich, industrialised, technologically 
advanced country that makes considerable use of iudustrial chemicals and 
nuclear power is a lot healthier than living in a poor, non-industrialised nation 
that uses little modem technology or industrial chemicals. That individuals in 
rich nations are far healthier, live far longer, and can do more of the things 
they want to do at corresponding ages than people in poor countries is a rule 
without exception. (Wildavsky, 1993: 1). 
In a paper analysing the connotations of mortality statistics from 1850 until 
the late Twentieth Century (Wildavsky, 1993: 1-4), Wildavsky contends that 
the capitalist system, economic efficiency and the march of modernism (all 
perceivable as products of "resilience"), are responsible for the superior 
condition of western nations and populations, in comparison to the ex Soviet 
bloc countries and peoples. It is an argument backed by strong evidence, but 
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his further assertions (Wildavsky, 1993: 6-8) that people are constitutionally 
incapable of arriving at any useful predictive understanding of, or general 
agreement about risks, is overwhelmingly hypothetical and thus, much less 
convincing. 
The keystone of Wildavsky's risk construct is his identification of two 
differing approaches to risk, which he calls "anticipation" and "resilience". 
-
His assertion that resilience delivers to communities far greater long term 
benefits amounts to a "challenge ... [to] the common belief that risks should 
be avoided [and] that we should always look before we leap" (Smith, 1995: 
2). 
The conceptual origin of this idea as it is put in the pithy "Trial Without 
Error" (Wildavsky, 1985), lies in the Darwinian principle of evolutionary 
adaptation to the environment The argument effectively forwarded by 
Wildavsky is based upon the notion that adaptation to a stable environment 
renders a species vulnerable to harm from subsequent environmental change, 
whereas adaptation to an unstable environment renders it more resistant to 
such environmental change (Wildavsky, 1985: 9). He draws on the 1979 
work of ecologist C. S. Holling which refers to ''thirty years of data collected 
for every major forest insect throughout Canada by the Insect Survey 
Program of the Canada Department of the Environment" (Holling in 
Wildavsky, 1985: 9) to substantiate this as an observable phenomenon in 
natural systems. Then, in a great bound of logic, Wildavsky declares: 
Though the language ofHolling's theory is abstract, its policy implications can 
be made quite concrete: the experience of overcoming danger increases safety, 
whereas continuous safety is extremely dangerous to the survival ofliving 
species. Keeping out of harm's way ... is harmful. (Wildavsky, 1985: 9). 
It is thus in empirical entomological evidence that Wildavsky roots his 
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argument that economic resilience may he engendered in human communities 
via public policies promoting risk. The possibility of humans learning about 
themselves from the evolutionary features and patterns of other creatures, 
including insects, is well established in the history of science. However, 
satisfactorily justifying the validity of a claimed human policy need on the 
basis of observed characteristics of insect communities demands very clear 
lines of logic, which in this case are absent. The insect example can provide 
no more than a confirmatory comparison at most, but even then is of no value 
unless parallel structures and processes are shown to be present. To do so 
would appear to be a disproportionately challenging task. 
In contrast to this quality of "resilience", says Wildavsky in continuance of 
his argument, that of "anticipation" underlies prevailing approaches to 
regulation (Wildavsky, 1985: 10) and leads to ''the facile conclusion that the 
best way to protect people is by reducing the risks they face, rather than by 
enabling them to overcome dangers" (Wildavsky, 1985: 9). Regulation, he 
says, "is a form of anticipation ... [which] cannot wait for evidence from 
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actual events" and "requires bureaucracy to enforce standards". In contrast, 
"resilience is based on self-regulation by the people who are closest to the 
scene and who, therefore, have the best inf onnation about what is happening" 
(Wildavsky, 1985: 10). 
Beyond these central but unfalsifiable ideas, founded upon simple 
observation and rational constrnction, rather than clear and hard evidence, 
Wildavsky sought sociological explanations for his propositions in cultural 
analysis (Smith, 1995: .2·3; Wildavsky, 1993: 6). In this regard he shares a 
good deal of common ground with John Adams and Mary Douglas. These 
issues are not specifically addressed here as they are substantially dealt with 
in discussion of the ideas of the other two thinkers. However, it is re-
emphasised here that the main problems perceived to lie in these 
understandings is their arbitrary (that is to say, non-demonstrable) nature and 
their inability to satisfactorily resolve the dilemma they create for their own 
credibility through their failure to adequately define and accommodate 
empirical evidence. Relativist theory must reject the ultimate validity of 
empiricism in order to sustain its own validity, but the denial of the existence 
of a fundamental level cf human perception and communication is a denial of 
the possibility of any useful form oflogic or communicable thought. 
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Critical Analysis of Wildavsky 
Since Wildavsky's definitions will be scrutinised below, it is necessary to 
point out at the outset that the keywords "anticipation" and "resilience" are 
not neutral terms. Anticipation is a word, often used negatively, that can 
imply presumption with regard to speculation concerning the essentially 
unlrn.owable future. It is a word that seems, therefore, to have been chosen for 
its emphasis on the weakness and naivety of the position of those practicing, 
or believing in, the practices associated with the predictive determination of 
dangers. It is, therefore, to some extent pejorative. Resilience, on the other 
hand, is a completely positive word that conveys ideas such as stamina, 
strength, flexibility and survival. While these ideas are consistent with 
Wildavsky' s broader case and were presumably selected for that reason, their 
use detracts from unencumbered expression of the ideas entailed. Perhaps 
less suggestive words, such as ''projection" and "experience" would have 
served cold logic better. 
A broad problem of inconsistent argument is identifiable within the body of 
Wildavsky' s writing on risk, which pertains to matters close to the heart of 
his thesis. Although not negating his postulations, this inconsistency can be 
understood to significantly weaken his position by blµrring contrasts that he 
has sought to maximise. 
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Wildavsky' s asserts the superiority of (free-market/small government/risk 
taking) "resilience" over (centrally plaimed/ over regulated/risk averse) 
"anticipation" (Wildavsky, 1985: 9-16; Wildavsky, 1993: 1,7), unfavourably 
comparing the ex Soviet bloc nations with the west. This understanding is 
clear and quite acceptable as a rational, explanatory analysis of fundamental 
differences, between the Soviets and the liberal west, in approaches to 
government and the resulting outcomes. However, that view is difficult to 
reconcile with his diagnosis of "anticipation" or "risk aversion" as a 
fundamental political and economic problem for the west. It is hard to accept 
that the stark, causative notion of risk aversion can be applied simultaneously 
to the failings of, on one hand, a decayed Soviet bloc (compared to 
"democratic and industrial societies" [Wildavsky, 1993: 1]) and on the other 
hand, to the USA itself, with the disaster of Three Mile Island held to be the 
consequence of anticipatory, bureaucratic activity. 
Bluntly, the advanced west of the late Twentieth Century can either provide 
convincing evidence of a resilience inherent to capitalism, or strong evidence 
of the trap inherent to "anticipation", but not both. It is either in an advanced 
condition because it relies on resilience, or it is threatened and limited in its 
potential because it relies on anticipation. 
Although it remains. possible. to argue that a definitional change of stance has 
occurred in the west, it becomes necessary to show that this is inconsistent 
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with fundamental western aspirations and thus constitutes a structural change 
rather than a logical political development. It might also be suggested that it 
is the degree of anticipatory activity that is critical to outcomes rather than its 
mere existence, hence aJlowing both assertions to hold. But in either case, the 
clarity ofWildavsky's position seems severely compromised by the attempt 
to identify anticipation and risk aversion as the root of so many ills. 
This inconsistency invites further criticism. If the record of western, liberal, 
capitalised democracy in the late Twentieth Century provides a good example 
of the prosperity and efficiency achievable by human communities 
(Wildavsky, 1993: 1), why, in the first place, seek a significant flaw in its 
culture? More importantly, why and how does its fundamental, analytical (or 
anticipatory) approach to problem-solving demonstrate a profound weakness? 
For the attempt tv understand the nature of the material world and to thus· 
construct certainty for humanity is the quintessential practical intent of 
scientific enquiry. When Wildavsky denounces "anticipation'', he inevitably 
denounces scientific enquiry. 
Science, like any other intellectual tool, can be applied and it can be 
misapplied. But if, as Wildavsky implies, the Enlightenment has delivered 
and continues to deliver so much, why should the failure of modem political 
culture to provide immediate and faultless solutions to the plethora of 
problems provoked by the rapidity of technological development (and which 
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are only apparent anyway because of scientific understanding), be sheeted 
home to the Enlightenment concept of scientific analysis? For effectively, 
this is Wildavsky's position. 
Is Wildavsky seriously suggesting, given the successes of the liberal west, 
that we abandon I.he intellectually disciplined and deliberate approach of 
science for some kind of restrained anarchy? Apparently he is not. In the last 
paragraph of "Trial Without" Error he provides what is interpretable as an 
ironical repudiation of his own approach: 
Looking back at the past quarter century, living standards have risen 
dramatically and along with them, morbidity and mortality have undergone 
substantial improvements. Why, then, is there so much distrust of the W estem 
institutions that have been, on any criterion of safety achieved anywhere in the 
world at any time, so successful? For the escalating concern over risk to the 
human body and natural environment stemming from technology is exactly a 
referendum on these institutions. (Wildavsky, 1985: 19). 
Wildavsky, it seems, is premising his thinking on an assumption that 
"anticipation" is a new phenomenon which has intruded onto the territory 
more properly occupied by "resilience". It can only be concluded, therefore, 
that he does not perceive a strong conceptual link to exist between the ideas 
of "anticipation" and "science", which means they require definition if this 
difficulty is to be clarified. 
"Anticipation" (or risk aversion), as Wildavsky sees it, is the attempt to 
discover the outcome of an activity before doing it, effectively elevating 
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theoretical construction, or projection, to a decisive level of function 
(Wildavsky, 1985: 5-6) so that "potential dangers are averted before damage 
is done" (Wildavsky, 1985: 9). He identifies "resilience", the product of trial 
and error as the obverse (and far more effective) means of arriving at the 
same awareness (Wildavsky, 1985: 5-9). Wildavsky's "resilience", as his 
entomological example shows, refers to a purely practical process - learning 
from experience. Thus his differentiation between "anticipation" and 
"resilience" is in essence a distinction between theoretical and practical 
approaches to determining risk. 
The term "science" does not require particularly precise definition for the 
immediate purpose of this discussion. It may reasonably be described as the 
intellectual tool that modem human communities have developed for the 
specific purpose of understanding the nature and behaviour of matter. 
Common usage of the term is adequately covered by the "experimental 
investigation and theoretical explanation of the nature and behaviour of 
phenomena in the physical and natural world" offered by the Penguin Precise 
English Dictionary (2001: 792). The critical duality of the nature of science 
implicit in this definition is the primary point to be noted here. Essentially, if 
we accept this, the effective practice of science must involve a combination 
of both practical and theoretical skills. The elemental scientific notion of 
cause and effect involves the inextricable marriage of the two essential 
conceptual threads. Always, in science, an abstract theory explains a practical 
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observation. In isolation, both theory and observation amount to nothing 
more than just that - theory or observation. Neither on its own constitutes 
science. Consequently, Wildavsky's dichotomous (theoretical versus 
practical) description of the possible approaches to the determination of risk 
is incompatible with the concept of science. His understanding demands that, 
for the purpose of determining risk, the idea and the practice of science be 
tom into two halves, both of which alone are useless for arriving at coherent 
conclusions about the physical world, and that a choice be made between 
them. For the purpose of risk management, then, Wildavsky offers us a 
contrived and unrealistic choice - either theory or practice, anticipation or 
resilience, speculation or experience (Wildavsky, 1985: 9; Wildavsky, 1993: 
7; Smith, 1995: 2). There is nothing obvious in the nature of the world or 
human understanding of it that justifies the idea that the key to the cognisance 
of risk lies in this pointless dichotomy. 
The concept of attempting to manage anything at all in the real world by a 
process involving abstract analysis alone is in itself nonsensical. Our material 
environment is perceived in practical, comparative ways through our senses. 
Theoretical understandings· about it cai.1not even exist, much less be 
communicated, without information that is perceived in such fundamentally 
practical terms. Theory (and theoretical projection) involves and (if it is to 
have any point) is entirely about practical things. 
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At the other conceptual extreme, insect communities have (we understand) no 
intellect or capacity for abstract thought and cannot, therefore, do other than 
"learn" by trial and error - or experience. The powerful human ability to 
construct sophisticated abstractions and to imagine the future, combined with 
our other great asset, the developed ability to be aware of and to objectively 
observe the material world, is exactly what sets us apart from other creatures 
and has allowed us to analyse and manage our physical environment. 
Wildavsky' s postulation that the promotion of resilience provides the best 
solution to risk management ignores this marriage and relegates us to the 
deprived intellectual state ofHolling's insect communities that have no 
choice other than to merely react to the buffetings of fate. 
In a discussion of the "processes" of bureaucracies and markets, which in the 
Wildavskian construct are, respectively, logical extensions of the abstract and 
practical, he dismisses the notion of drawing from both as impractical: 
Ruling out Goldilocks' strategy of getting things just right as beyond cognitive 
and collective capacities, my last refoIDlulation goes, would people be better 
off having their porridge too hot (ie too much risk) or too cold (too little risk)? 
Which horn of the dilemma of risk taking - anticipation or resilience - do we 
wish to grasp? (Wildavsky, 1985: 14). 
The question is not rhetorical. Wildavsky's answer, which is that it is 
resilience that should be grasped, is clearly put in the subsequent paragraph 
"more people will be healthier by taking larger rather than smaller numbers 
and extents of risk" (Wildavsky, 1985: 14). His following example of 
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resilient and anticipatory approaches to criminal justice, in fact identifies the 
palpable inadequacies of both n~si1ience and anticipation alone, but curiously 
he leaves this quite critical difficulty for his thesis almost completely 
unresolved (Wildavsky, 1985: 15). No further alternative to the shortcomings 
of anticipation apparently exists, other than to simply accept the inevitability 
of collateral damage inherent to a resilient approach. However his reasons for 
not looking to the middle ground, for having dismissed other options as 
"Goldilocks's strategy of getting things just right" (Wildavsky, 1985: 14), are 
neither properly explained nor apparent. 
The ultimate consequence of all this is that Wildavsky's notion of 
anticipation and resilie.nce is highly significant to the extent that it recognises 
the existence of both theoretkal and practical dimensions of risk and its 
analysis. However, as a useful framework for analysis and management 
alone, it makes very little sense. Firstly, it ignores the fundamental dichotomy 
of risk that demands an analytical distinction be made between perceptive 
and scientific factors and, secondly, while effectively identifying the practical 
and theoretical components of scientific analysis, it fails to perceive their 
vital interdependence. Wildavsky's view that experience is the key to risk 
management is at best only half an answer. 
The perhaps cognitively even more basic idea ofWildavsky's, that safety and 
dap.ger are "i.J;ih~rtwined" (Wildavsky, 1985: 16; Smith, 1995: 2) is a premise 
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that also deserves careful analysis. It proposes that safety and danger, labels 
for the two alternative human conditions constttuting the dilemma central to a 
situation described as involving risk, are analytically and practically 
inseparable. "With good and bad inextricably mixed, it is not possible to have 
one without the. other" (Wildavsky, 1985: 16). This understanding effectively 
paints the concept of risk into the problematic comer of non-susceptibility to 
analysis, from which Wildavsky is later able to rescue it with his 
anticipation/resilience management framework. 
As a contravention of what must be the most basic principle of scholarship, 
which is that no problem of a material nature should be considered to be 
intrinsically beyond the reach of human reason, a claim such as this requires 
considerable justification. The realm of completely abstract thought, though 
never entirely dissociated from worldly realities, can be reasonably said to 
inc01porate "mysteries", which may be debated, but not settled. These are 
cases that cannot be proved or disproved to the general satisfaction by means 
of evidence and reason, but instead are practically resolved by substituting 
belief for rational certainty. Belief can create subjective certainty where 
evidence and reason, for one reason or another are unable to provide rational 
certainty. It is on this basis that the roots of cultural identity can be 
understood to be belief, rather than reason. 
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However, the treachery of belief, as we all know, lies in this very dissociation 
from reason and its ensuing propensity to engender cultural clashes. In asking 
us to "believe" that safety and danger are inseparable, Wildavsky is asking us 
to embrace an assumption based upon a simple observation (such as the 
existence of a relationship between heart attacks, jogging and not jogging) 
and not upon sound logic or evidence. He tells us that we cannot have safety 
without danger, but there is no good reason to accept that this is the case. 
Safety is not danger and the cost of an action is not the same thing as a 
benefit of the same action. In cases where a cost is linked in a fixed way to an 
activity involving a benefit, such as in that of omelettes and eggs, no risk 
exists. The loss of the eggs is a certainty, not a possibility. 
In cases of risk, on the other hand, only a possibility of costs being incurred is 
involved. Hence the relationship between an activity and a cost is not fixed -
the execution of the activity will not definitely incur the costs. The benefit is 
usually fixed to the activity, creating the incentive to undertake it, in the face 
of the possible cost, but the linkage of benefit to cost is far from certain and 
cannot therefore be said to be inseparable from it. The very existence of the 
possibility that the cost may not be incurred completely negates Wildavsky's 
assertion that cost and benefit (or safety and danger) are intertwined. 
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A case in point is Wildavsky's jogger, the middle-aged health seeker of the 
1980s. With the fruits of considerable scientific enquiry to draw upon, it is 
possible for middle-aged health seekers of the new century to reap the health 
benefits of jogging without risking its costs. Low cholesterol diets, good 
medical advice and low-stress forms of exercise have all but eliminated the 
risks of keeping fit. It is possible to both model an individual's vulnerability 
(practise anticipation?) and design an appropriate exercise regime (promote 
resilience?), thereby separating safety from danger. A policy approach to the 
risk of jogging based upon Wildavsky's understanding could only categorise 
the jogger's dilemma as a mystery and allow people to make their own, 
uninformed decisions as to whether jogging would cure or kill them. 
A last and slightly less tangible criticism ofWildavsky's analysis arises from 
his recourse to the broad sweep of cultural explanation as a means of 
resolving the inconsistencies and confusion alluded to above. Having 
' 
declared humans incapable of untangling the complexities of risk, he seeks 
explanation in cultural theory (Wildavsky, 1993: 6), which has the 
characteristic of sid~stepping clashes ofrationality and subjectivity by 
turning this vice of analytical challenge into the virtue of human diversity. 
''Nobody is wrong" is the lofty conclusion of this so-called analysis. 
By admitting this relativist construct into his thesis, Wildavsky drives the 
cause of the understanding of risk into an intellectual cul-de-sac. His solution, 
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as we have seen, is to take refuge in pragmatism in the form of his 
"resilience" option. But the abandonment of the path to understanding brings 
another difficulty. He has exercised his subjective judgment, not reason, in 
arriving at this point and is forced to continue doing this in order to reconcile 
the empirical evidence of Kahneman and Tversky (Wildavsky, 1993: 6-7) 
with his chosen destination of "resilience". "Individuals", he writes in 
summary of their research, 
are very poor judges of probability. More important, perhaps, is their general 
conservatism; large portions of people care more about avoiding loss than they 
do about making gains. Therefore, they will go to considerable lengths to 
avoid losses, ev::n in the face of high probabilities of making considerable 
gains. (Wildavsky, 1993: 7). 
Irrespective of the conclusions drawn by Kahneman and Tversky, this view is 
Wildavsky's interpretation of their work. Not only are people unable to agree 
about risk, he is arguing, but they are unaware of its true nature and thus 
incapable of being trusted to make the correct decisions with respect to its 
management. However, Wildavsky himself is less confused. His prescription 
for the malady of wishing to avoid danger is not to explore the issue and 
understand it, but to somehow impose the "tried and true" practical remedy of 
resilience upon cotTu-nunities. As an example of presumptuousness about the 
human condition, it is comparable with Marx's patronising "false 
consciousness" thesis and possibly no less dangerous in the wrong hands. 
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Robert Formaini 
Robert Formaini is "senior economist and public policy advisor at the Federal 
Reserve Banlc of Dallas and adjunct professor of economics at the University 
of Texas at Dallas (FRBD, 2006). His short but dense book, "The Myth of 
Scientific Public Policy" is the published version of his Ph.D. dissertation 
(FRBD, 2006) and is conceived along the lines of the Austrian School3 of 
economic thought. It argues strongly against the methodological validity of 
empirical approaches to the analysis of politically sensitive risks, advocating 
subjective (or what he also terms "normative") policy analysis and 
formulation as the logical and only alternative. Its real target, however, 
appears to be philosophical opposit10n to free-market economics4 (see for 
3 The Austrian School, also known as the Vienna School or Psychological School of 
economics grew up around the ideas of Karl Menger in the late Nineteenth Century. It is 
essentially subjective in its analytical approach and study is always focused on the 
individual. Human behaviour is considered too complex for meaningful analysis and costs 
and benefits are regarded as unmeasurable due to their subjective values. Classical statistical 
methodology is rejected on the grounds of the prohibitive complexity of human behaviour. 
The Austrian School stresses the undesirability of g0vernment intervention in the market. 
4 Formaini's ideas and form of argument are very comparable to those ofWildavsky, to 
whom he refers more than once in the text. It would seem that both share a common political 
outlook. Both attempt to theoretically isolate predictive theory (Formaini's objective analysis 
and Wildavsky's "anticipation") from experience (Formaini's subjectivity and Wildavsky's 
"resilience") finding fault with the fo1mer and favouring the latter. Neither considers the 
possibility that these things might operar.::: as integrated parts of a much greater functioning 
whole, while actually having no in:iependem existence of their own. Although apparently 
attempting broad engageme!;t with the concepts of risk and public policy formulation, both 
can ultimately be perceived to be selectively focussing on partial information in order to 
argue the superiority of a policy-formulation system that is based on and serves the interests 
of free market theorists and players. 
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example: Fonnaini, 1990: 97) and Fonnaini's work effectively engages two 
distinct arguments that have been put in respect of this debate. 
Firstly, he is concerned to refute the notion that "scientific measures of 
analysis permit objective scientists to determine which programs best 
promote social welfare" (Gordon, 1991: 129), particularly in respect of risk 
evaluation and cost-benefit analysis. Fonnaini's purpose here seems to be to 
challenge the credibility of central planning in any form or at any magnitude, 
this being the most obvious (and widely accepted) philosophical alternative 
to the free-market approach that he clearly favours. Categorising central 
planning with ''technocracy ... and bureaucratic decree", he declares that they 
"can never be successful substitutes for markets" (Fonnaini, 1990: 97). 
Secondly, his case challenges the relevance of the significant body of 
criticism of free market economics that seeks to exploit a perceived reliance 
on empiricism. He thus (presumably) seeks to bolster the legitimacy of free 
market economics by invalidating any assertion of dependence upon a 
methodological approach that he regards as vulnerable5• 
5 A further, less direct, but nonetheless tangible, advantage Formaini's case brings to his own 
scholarly/ideological position is that the rival "British School" of free market thought, 
founded upon objective methodology (Formaini, 1990: 25-32) is effectively excluded from 
the main arena of economic debate if his arguments are accepted. 
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Two qualities of debate in particular stand out in this book. The first is that 
Fonnaini's research and argument are meticulously undertaken and his 
discussion is filled out with careful consideration and explanation. As a 
consequence, the sheer weight of detail alone is a formidable deterrent to 
critical scrutiny - a response at lea:it as long as his book, matching paragraph 
for paragraph, wolild be necessary to deal with his arguments in ful16• The 
second point is that his argument is made in several ways7, so no major 
possible means of invalidating objective analysis seems to have been 
neglected8• In broad terms, Fonnaini claims that, as a basis for public 
6 In the constrained context of a brief, critical summary, engagement with the minutiae of 
Formaini's work and detailed exploration of the subject matter are not possible. Nor is it 
really feasible to encapsulate the sense of his highly detailed, disjointed, frequently 
aggressive and sometimes wandering style of argument. Ultimately, if his arguments are to 
be seen as convincing, they must be justifiable at a macro-conceptual level - that is in his 
fundamental understandings, which are outlined early in the book. Similarly, potential 
weaknesses are likely to lie in the elemental assumptions upon which his work is premised 
and in areas he has not discussed, rather ~han those he has. 
7 As an instrument of scholarly attack, this approach could be said to owe more to the 
shotgun than to the rifle, an observation not intended to be pejorative, but descriptive. 
Simple, linear logic may be a devastatingly effective weapon in debate, but is vulnerable to 
simple counter logic, which may easily negate it. Multiple points of argument, even if 
involving only a single basic notion, can advance that notion from many differing 
perspectives, each of which may need to be negated in order to effectively refute the entire 
argument. 
8 Rather than articulating a straightforward linear sequence oflogic to establish his position, 
Formaini's forensic approach is to seek multiple points of vulnerability in the arguments he 
seeks to refute and to simultaneously advance his own position as the alternative. A favourite 
tactic is to present an issue as a dichotomy and to justify the validity of the view he wishes to 
advance by undermining the other. (For example, the division of probability into objective 
decision-making, scientific analysis is not (in the statistical sense) reliable9, 
that it is constitutionally incapable of ever being reliable and that even if it 
were, its validity would always be arbitrary and uncertain. 
The Essentials ofFormaini's Case 
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In his introductory comments, Formaini identifies ''the objective nature of the 
reality which surrounds us" and "the ability of our techniques accurately to 
explore and to coutrol that reality" as "main assumptions" constituting the 
"framework" within which ''public policy in the United States is debated 
analysed and implemented" (Formaini, 1990: 1). He suggests that confidence 
in public policy: 
is not a function of the objective reality we seek to model, but is rather the 
result of our having accepted the pronouncements of philosophers, scientists, 
consultants, policy analysts and others who have succeeded in convincing 
most people of the efficacy of their methods of analysis. (Formaini, 1990: 1). 
It is, therefore, unsurprising that in this introduction he anticipates the 
conclusion of his analysis thus: 
Scientifically based (i.e. justified) pi.:blic policy, a dream that has grown ever 
larger since the Eniightenment and that, p~rhaps, has reached its apogee 
and subjective and risk assessment into deductive and inductive approaches [Formaini, 1990: 
13, 12]). 
9 His central "idea" - his sole theoretical point really- is that scientific objectivity is not 
realistically attainable, and he argues and illustrates, then re-argues and re-illustrates this, 
resting his assertions on the authority of such scholars as Bayes, Menger, Hayek and Weber 
and citing frequent fictitious (and it must be said, usually calculated) examples of 
contemporary public policy to demonstrate it. 
towards the close of our own centwy, is a myth, a theoretical illusion. It exists 
in our minds, our analyses, and our methods only because we seek to find it 
and typically, we find what we seek. (Formaini, 1990: 1). 
Hence, the intent and terms of his argument are quite clear from the outset: 
the object of the exercise is to confute the notion that science provides the 
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best or only model for the analysis of the human environment. "Keep an open 
mind," he advises, 
and realise that there may be more than one path to valuable, true knowledge 
of the world and its inhabitants. The scientific rationalism that has dominated 
the world since the Enlightenment is powerful and useful for some problems, 
but lacks persuasive pcwer when applied to others; no matter how cleverly, 
honestly or rigorously it is carried out, it cannot free us from other decision 
criteria.(Formaini, 1990: 5). 
Formaini applies his view of science to the theory and operation of risk 
assessments, which: 
play an increasingly important role in the life of the average person, since they 
tend to determine the regulatory decisions that are ostensibly made in order to 
protect people from risks that occur in the ... environments they live in. 
(Formaini, 1990: 7). 
He argues that, their objectivity is corrupted by subjectivity, which ''usually 
enters the methods and arguments of risk analysts via the areas of uncertainty 
[that] rema~n unexplored by current approaches". 
A short, critical description of comparative risk assessment (CRA) 
procedures compresses the diverse and complex theoretical constructs of this 
concept and its applications into a mere thousand words or so and finds it 
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wanting (Formaid, 1990: 8--11)10• Poinfa1g out the essentially 
multidisciplinary and consequently "less quantifiably precise" nature of CRA 
in policy evaluation (Formaini, 1990: 10) Formaini infers an inevitability 
concerning drift into subjectivity and bias that renders the techniques 
"inaccurate" (Formaini, 1990: 11). This in tum is argued to throw doubt upon 
the value of conventional policy analysis per se. 
Formaini nominates "data" as the "first problem" of CRA as a conditional 
consequence of its frequently being "either sparse or nonexistent" (Formaini, 
1990: 11) although he neglects the rather obvious point that any analysis 
made on such a b=-: :;is is neifoer objective ~1or scientific. Having subsequently 
insinuated the existence of a general suspicion of risk analysts' claims, he 
then declares that "frequently analysts only have highly speculative 
techniques based upon myriad assumptions about situations that, in some 
1° Formaini's somewhat sweepmg argument is that these approaches (the term encompasses a great 
swathe of highly specific techniques applicable to almost every avenue ofhfe) are crude, arbitrary and 
theoretically suspect. For example, "expenmental testing", cited as one of four possible methodological 
classes in respect of engineering safety assessment, 1s described as: 
an attempt to learn of such things as "failure rates" for various circumstances. This is 
done by using samples under predicted conditions of use and generating frequency data 
for extrapolation to the 11niverse for which the study is bemg conducted (Formaim, 
1990: 9). 
One could be forgiven for assuming that the author was about to propose a revolutionary advance in 
testing procedure for engineenng safety. The logic of environmental risk assessment is similarly 
dispatched entire: "health assessments data and computer modelling can be combined to make guesses 
about environmental effects" (Formaini, 1990: 9; emphasis added). 
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cases, have never existed" (Fonnaini, 1990: 11) 11 • But irrespective of data 
quality, subjectivity is inevitably present in CRA, he says, and the specificity 
of individual cases renders averages unreliable "even where relationships are 
rather well defined, as in toxicology"12 (Formaini, 1990: 12). 
Under the heading "Subjectivism and Objectivism in Probability" (Formaini, 
1990: 12) Formaini ordains a ruling dichotomy with respect to ''the 
estimation of risks" whereby, he asserts that ''the estimation of risks can be 
accomplished in one of two ways: deductively or inductively" (Formaini, 
1990: 12). In pursuit of this idea, which reflects a long-established academic 
debate within the world of statistical analysis, he discusses in the following 
eight or nine pages t'vvo conflicting approache~ to probability. One of these 
("Laplacean", representing the current status quo) is, he argues, in essence, 
11 Although not citing Adams, he also identifies the subjectivity of risk as a complicating 
factor in analysis, using the example of accidents commonly (and counter-intuitively) 
increasing at dangerous intersections after the installation of traffic lights (Formaini, 1990: 
11). 
12 With regard to this example, it must be remarked that he does not enter into any of the 
highly pertinent detail regarding the frequency of individual variations from statistical norms 
in toxicology, or explore the (presumably extant) scientific explanations of their occurrence. 
He restricts his commenta1y to a water-nmddying inference that such complex problems are 
well beyond the scope of science: '·individuals' respond differently because of their not easily 
understood internal mechanisms, which in tum rely on the interaction of both the body and 
the mind" (Formaini, 1990: 12). 
theoretical and objective and the other ("Bayesian")13 in essence, empirical 
and subjective14• Having thus ddined the debate, it really only remains for 
him to underline the methodological doubts and disagreements, for virtual 
completion of his argument that objective science and probability fail as 
reliable instruments of analysis and that his ultimate prescript, normative 
judgment, is unassailable. A critic puts it this way: 
As Formaini shows, the two variant approaches sometimes arrive at different 
estimates of probability for the same case. If so, the scientific pretensions of 
non-market decision makers already seem shaky. If no consensus exists on the 
way to estimate probability, how can it be claimed that there is a scientifically 
objective way of calculating benefits and costs? (Gordon, 1991: 130). 
Formaini's case is that "Bayesian" analysis, as an inductive and subjective 
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process, offers a better alternative as it considers data more inclusively (being 
intrinsically non-deductive) and it is not premised on an objective (and, 
13 Bayesian analysis is an approach to probability revolving around a theorem articulated by 
the Eighteenth Century English mathematician Thomas Bayes, which provides a means of 
solving complex questions involving multiple probabilities. Although lending itself to 
inductive analysis through its ability to inc01porate new data into an existing probabilistic 
calculation, and thus also useful to subjectively inclined analysis, through its capacity to 
inc01porate subjective estimations of bias, it is intrinsically neither subjective nor inductive. 
It is simply a mathematical expression oflogic. 
14 This dichotomy can be understood to he conceptually very close to the Wildavskian 
"anticipation" and "resilience" construct of the possible forms of risk management, which 
similarly considers theory and practice as mutually exclusive alternatives that comprise the 
entire range of possibilities. 
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therefore, constrained) understanding of risk (Formaini, 1991: 12)15• He also 
contends that "one fundamental difference between Classicals and Bayesians 
seems to be that the Classicals see probability as inhering in the things being 
analysed, while the Bayesians see it as states of subjectively held beliefs 
about those same ;;bjects and their relationships with humans"16 (Formaini, 
1991: 15). 
With reference to the formation of links between theory and evidence, 
Formaini writes that in addition to the usual association of "scientific 
undertakings with induction ... there is always a good deal of deduction 
present in standard scientific technique" 17 (Formaini, 1990: 12). He also 
observes ''that probability theory is not 'science' [because it is not] 
inductively generated or empirically falsifiable" (Formaini, 1990: 13). The 
15 He cites Parry and Winter from a 1981 article on uncertainty in probabilistic risk 
assessment to support this view: "Induction, as learning from experience, is just the process 
of revising probability estimates in the light of additional information" (Formaini, 1991: 15). 
16 However, in addition to the usual criticisms levelled at subjective analytical approaches, 
the routine use of Bayes Theorem may reasonably be viewed as an open invitation to the 
drawing of wrong conclusions. This is because it demands the inclusion of further data, but 
lacks any in-built means of distinguishing genuine causal mechanisms from false causality. 
Formaini advocates the practical utilisation of Bayes Theorem via the incorporation of 
subjectively estimated bias (belief of accuracy) into calculations of probability (Formaini, 
1990: 22) which is a controversial and contestable position. 
17 This would have been a good opportunity to explain more exactly, perhaps with definitions 
and examples, the rational operation of the relationships pertinent to this topic of debate (that 
is between scientific enquiry, theory, evidence, objectivity, subjectivity, deduction and 
induction) and thus to outline his understanding of precisely what constitutes science, but 
unfortunately for the clarity of his argum~nt, he takes the subject no further. 
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difficulty of any theory "being" science aside, this is a possibly valid, but 
highly debatable position that demands both more discussion and a 
declaration of commitment to a palpable definition of science before it can 
have any real pertinence to his argument. Superficially (that is without the 
benefit of this definition) it would seem a very difficult task to convincingly 
separate the notions of probability and empirical science18• 
Critical Analysis of Formaini 
"The Myth of Scientific Public Policy" identifies some theoretical and 
practical imperfections, or limitations, of the scientific analysis of political 
problems. However, while quite valid as criticisms, these do not amount to a 
convincing case that conventional science is either inappropriate or 
dispensable as the main workhorse of useful analytic thought. Insofar as the 
constitution of a defmitive position is concerned, therefore, it is possible to 
identify a number of problems with Fonnaini's case. 
The first and probably the most important of these is the inability of his thesis 
to accommodate within its conceptual domain the fact of science. Fonnaini 
has not articulated an appropriate political, cultural or intellectual role for 
18 Firstly, science-based projection (by any definition) is ultimately no more than a 
probabilistic estimation of a certain magnitude, based upon "sample" empirical observations 
- even if no actual variation is ever observed. Secondly, the concept of probability is 
pointless and meaningless without both an empirical origin and a material application as 
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science, or explained its rise, the general acceptance of its validity or its 
apparent centrality to western, if not all, human life. Nor has he (as an 
inevitable consequence of this), at any point, defined science. 
The discussions of science in Formaini's text, however, do imply certain 
assumptions about it. The primary claim affecting science is that of the 
absolute inevitability of subjectivity in human enquiry ("all evidence is 
filtered through human perceptive faculties") and the mferred, consequent 
futility of pursu{n£ objective analysis (Fonnaini, 1990: 17, 33). Although this 
is not an invalid point of debate, he does not offer any clear definition of 
these terms (subjectivity and objectivity) as they function within his 
postulated scheme of human enquiry. Nor does he explain (beyond rather 
vague assertions, such as that science "flows from the processes within 
human consciousness" [Formaini, 1990: 33]) why or how they can be shown 
to have been achieved or not achieved in any particular case. fu consequence 
his concluded notion of the ascendancy of an essential subjectivity in human 
perception of the material universe, while not completely unreasonable, is of 
limited value to his argument. 
Formaini also uses a brief reference to Karl Popper's analyses to imply that 
the practice of science is necessarily and inarguably deductive and that any 
claim to the authority of science has been given the lie by Popper's famous 
reference points. In other words, probability theory can have no conceptual existence or 
function that is independent of scientific understandings and procedures. 
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view that it can do no more than deductively falsify theory (Formaini, 1990: 
33). However, he is less modest than Popper in asserting the strength of this 
claim and makes no attempt to unravel either the spirit or the letter of the 
philosopher's most well known understandings. 
Having declared ''the great questions of philosophy" to be "how do we know 
anything and how do we know that we know it?" Formaini makes what might 
be interpreted as an attempt to address the thorny issue of what constitutes 
science by declaring (without supporting evidence) that: 
... most of those engaged in science accept a position best articulated by Sir 
Karl Popper. Selection between competing <heories is to be accomplished by 
appealing to a repeatable process called "falsification". This process does not 
determine whether something is true, but rather whether it is false; this, Popper 
claims, is after all positive knowledge ofreality. (Formaini, 1990: 33). 
While this highly qualified and very limited description of science opens up 
issues that are critical to its nature (and that eminently suit Formaini) it does 
not amount to an exhaustive or otheiwise satisfactory definition of the nature 
and :function of science or an accurate rendition of Popper's understanding19• 
19 Falsifiability, anyway, is no more than a direct, logical consequence of the probabilistic 
nature of science. Since empirical evidence can never be ..;omplete and certainty can never be 
established, scientific understanding can never amount to more than a level of probability. 
Absolute verification of a theory demands certainty- or one hundred percent probability-
meaning that verification is always, in Popperian terms (contrary to Formaini's unsupported 
claim) at best, "provisional, conjectural, hypothetical" (Thornton, 2005: 7). On the other 
hand, a single evidential exception renders impossible the attainment of the required one 
hundred percent probability, so falsifying the theoretical principle in question. 
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Formaini's occasional concessions to the conspicuous necessity to find a 
place for science in his conceptual firmament, are exemplified by the 
intrinsically patronising and practically meaningless comment that "decisions 
will require, and ought to have, [his emphasis] the input of science and its 
practitioners" (Formaini, 1990: 97). This declaration is problematic for 
Formaini, as the tactic of attaching even a half-hearted sense of dispensability 
to science fails to address the glaring difficulty of its profound place in 
human (and most particularly, western) culture. His reluctance to follow his 
own rationale to its logical conclusion of altoge1·her disposing of science, 
betrays an unsurprising lack of co11viction, on his part, that subjectivity can 
ultimately be trust~d more than objectivity. 
A further concern is a vital practical question provoked by this comment of 
Formaini's, but which he does not address. This pertains to precisely where 
the role of the scientist should end and where subjective or normative 
judgment should begin, if the principles of science are at some point to be 
abandoned. 
If, as Formaini argues, scientific enquiry is to be deemed an exercise of 
limited value and relevance, the necessary definition of the bounds of 
science's validity requires extremely careful consideration. The denial of the 
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primary importance of scientific analysis in the process of decision making 
amounts to a denial of the capacity of scientific thought to effectively 
interpret the material world. (F ormaini has argued this to be the case in 
practice, but not at the far more fundamental and important conceptual level). 
The discipline of science is essentially no more than a formally defined and 
consistently applied form of the thought processes routinely and universally 
used by the human mind to understand our physical environment. Materially 
verified theory, as the product of experience that is perceived through the 
senses, provides surety about the external world, without which it would be 
impossible to function at all. It is also logical that these thought processes are 
both shaped and limited by the innate physiology of the mind and the sensory 
resources it is able to draw on. This llleans that almost all sensory perceptions 
and the immediate understandings that they engender are common to all 
normal humans. It is similarly logical that such common understandings are 
central and essential to t"lie formation and function of community at any level 
or degree. If F ormaini' s contentions concerning the limits of science are to be 
accepted and these ideas somehow embodied into processes of government, it 
is necessary that the ramification of his thesis, brought into focus by these 
observations, be addressed. Under his conditions, if public policy is to 
continue to have an aspirational basis in common, or shared, human 
understandings, some non-scientific means of understanding the material 
world (which is of at least equal merit to science) must be shown to exist and 
be applicable. Normative understandings do not and cannot fulfil these 
demands as they are not, by definition, generally shared. 
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With regard to the question of limiting the jurisdiction of science, the 
prospect of its general down-gradi..11g and the up-upgrading of subjective 
interpret~tion provokes a nua1ber of practical questions, such as: Exactly how 
much science is enough? When and where and based upon what criteria and 
principles of analysis do we accept or reject or limit scientific evidence? Who 
(or what sort of experts) should determine this? Who should appoint such 
officers or experts? How do we measure whether the experts (or their 
appointments) are right? Who should ''watch" the experts? 
A brief consideration of these questions makes it apparent that the 
abandonment of science as our primary means of navigating the material 
world would not solve the problems identified by Formaini. The same old 
questions concerning validity and capacity an<l credibility would arise again, 
along with new ones relating to the absence of demonstrable, universally 
acceptable reason. It is not the scientific process that is the source of public 
policy failures, but the incompleteness of our understanding, our inevitable 
ignorance of the future and the assumptions we must continually make about 
it in order to go on living. 
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The rejection of the principle of scientific assessment in favour of"normative 
policy judgments based on moral and political foundations" (Formaini, 
1990:97) can be perceived to ultimately amount to the endangerment of 
democratic government through the tyranny of (at best) an uninformed 
majority or (at worst) an uninformed elite. The failures of science, _which 
arise from gaps in our knowledge: as well as its successes, would, under 
Formaini's prescript, be placed in the hands of a class of decision-makers and 
a system of anaiy;;is, not only scientificaliy uninformed,- but Un.constrained by 
scientific principle. Science is reason and the most fundamental point of 
democracy is to bring reason to the process of government. A part and an 
inevitable consequence of this is the understanding that minorities ought not 
overrule majorities, but this does not mean that a minority of highly trained, 
recognised and respected specialist analysts whose educated opinion differs 
from a less informed and possibly misinformed,public should be ignored. 
Scientific thought is not separable from the democratic process and the 
currency of both is due solely to the failures and distortions of the earlier, 
traditional subjective/normativ~ approaches to knowledge and to government. 
Oyer emphasis o:·~_b.e imporcance of majority opinion and its application to 
areas where understanding is poor, is a clear corruption of the rational basis 
of democracy with the potential to lead to the erosion of orderly government 
through unreason and demagoguery. 
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A further difficulty for Formaini, in theory and fact, is the nature of the law 
as an integral component of any democratic system. Any law, but particularly 
democratic law, is in principle objective in its equal and impartial application 
to all citizens. It is founded upon the veracity of the concepts of objective 
understanding of the universe and the possibility of objective analysis and 
measurement of the conditions of human social existence. Evidence, in a 
legal sense, is a profoundly objective idea and is the determinant of all proper 
legal conclusions on the grounds of this very quality of objectivity. 
The objective nature of the legal system is recognised as being so 
:fundamental that it is enshrined in the traditional, symbolic blindness of 
"Justice" who objectively weighs the evidence placed before her and delivers 
judgment accordingly. The existence of objectivity and the possibility of its 
determination are at the heart of the whole concept of law and thus the 
effective mechanisms through which any society :functions as a self governed 
entity. Consequently, the introduction of procedures premised upon 
understandings other than these would create numerous destructive tensions 
between the law makers, those administering it, those affected by it and those 
interpreting it. 
A legal system based upon material evidence, objective assessment and logic 
cannot accommodate an inherently subjective approach to policy making. At 
a practical level, a law drafted according to the dictates of subjective 
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understanding and thus drafted in ignorance of, or with disregard for the 
appropriate processes of objective analysis, would most probably not prove to 
be legally effective or acceptable. If in conflict with the existing (objectively 
framed) structure of law and legal precedent, it could not (or at least, should 
not) survive the (objectively framed) processes oflegal review. General 
acceptance of, and agreement concerning the nature and operation of law, 
reflects a general acceptance of the validity of the scientific approach to 
analysis, as a formalised version of a human thought process that results in 
generally acceptable outcomes. 
Even the watered down "ought to have the input of science and its 
practitioners" (Formaini, 1990: 97) concession cannot escape this logic. A 
process that deliberately de-emphasises the intellectual strength of objectivity 
and promotes subjectivity as a superior form of understanding has renounced 
all claim to being scientific or objective or just. It is not possible to be "a bit 
subjective" or "partly scientific" unless the areas of operation are very clearly 
and formally delineated as they are in courts of law where judges and juries 
weigh the strengths of objective evidence. (Formaini describes these 
resonsibilities as "inordinate burdens" [Formaini, 1990: 97].) A conceptual 
parallel to the legal process may be argued to in fact already exist in a system 
in which administrative decisions are made by a democratically accountable 
government that is - at least notionally - informed by scientifically derived 
and objective evidence. 
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Formaini.'s Approach to Argument 
A significant weakness in Fonnaini's case is his failure to ground his position 
firmly in observation and exhaustive logic. Instead he obfuscates the basis 
and origin of his thought process by means of abstruse utterances and esoteric 
references. The heart of his discussion is the ultimate invalidity of objective 
analysis and a consequential emphasis on the validity of subjective 
understanding, but the rational justification for his stance is ultimately reliant 
upon intangible generalisations such as: "all evidence is filtered through 
human perceptual faculties" (Fonnaini. 1990: 17). 
He outlines his proposition citing Bayes Theorem (Fonnaini. 1990: 13) and 
points to the intellectual positions held by Menger, Weber, Hayek, Mises and 
others (Fonnaini. 1990: 28-31) as the scholarly foundation for his views and 
argument, but he does not describe the logical pathways that he has followed 
or present any definitive rational construct. 
He observes that Bayes' Theorem is associated with the subjective approach 
to probability and that "Bayesians" "subdivide into objective and subjective 
camps" (Formaini. 1990: 13) but digs no deeper. He describes Menger as the 
"father" of the "Austrian method" of economics and (somewhat curiously) as 
the "codiscoverer ... of marginal utility theory'.' (Fonnaini. 1990: 28). But his 
exploration ofMenger's reasoning goes no further than referring to his 
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position as being "firmly grounded in Aristotelian metaphysics" leading to a 
belief that "individuals are driven by psychological needs that are 
independent of the reasoning prnc0ss, yet must be discovered by each person 
through his own development" (Formaini. 1990: 28). His reasons for 
advancing his view of the way in which people perceive the universe are 
never articulated as the logical corollary of a coherent and consistent human 
thought process. The social legitimacy and human relevance of his scholarly 
opinions are simply assumed. 
The central weakness of a heavily deductive analytical approach, which 
Formaini outlines and describes in his first chapter, presents a further 
difficulty for his own case. He assumes an inflexible position at the outset of 
his argument and then searches for evidence to justify it, rather than 
following his own :1dvice and inductivel:.' evaluating the available evidence in 
order to inform his position. As a consequence (and in accordance with his 
own observations about deduction) he tends to overlook factors that fall 
outside his conception of the issue. 
Formaini's argument also has an important structural difficulty that might be 
considered to entirely negate his conclusions. This difficulty is that his 
position is variously predicated on two quite different and incompatible 
assumptions that are selectively applied and implied to suit specific purposes 
of argument. 
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The first of these assumptions is that the subject of his criticism, which may 
be described as the human approach to the problem of understanding the 
material universe, otherwise known as scientific analysis, is a simple, if not 
facile technique that is easily described and assessed. Formaini takes it for 
granted that "science" is intrinsic'<!lly vulnerable to his methods of analysis 
and that he is ther~fore capabie of objecdvely determining its nature, 
capabilities and limitations. He further assumes that these things can be 
meaningfully described and communicated to other people in objective terms. 
However, the process of the rational unfolding of a theory and its verification 
with the evidence of experience is the process of scientific analysis. While its 
use would be logical and acceptable ifhe was advocating or merely accepting 
of objective analysis, neither is the case. 
Formaini's conflicting assumption, which he repeatedly attempts to apply as 
a nullification of the analytical power of science, is that the complexity of the 
universe and its cnnlents rer:<lers it impr:!gnabie to the simplistic analytical 
techniques of science. The inevitable and ironic endpoint resulting from the 
identification ofthis conflict is that Formaini is attempting to use science to 
demonstrate that science does not work. A further consequential irony is that 
the only position that a "Formainian" could arrive at, with respect to 
Formaini's thesis is that it is not possible to ascertain whether it is valid or 
invalid. 
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The Usurpation of Normative Policy 
Under the heading "Scientific Public Policy: AN ew Secular Theology'' 
(Formaini, 1990: 69-70) Formaini asserts that science has uswped the rightful 
role of normative policy formulation during the twentieth century and that its 
merits have generally been overstated. In strongly pejorative terms, he 
patronises and belittles the prosecution of objective understanding while 
bemoaning its geueral acceptance. He also alleges a presumption, on the part 
of scientists and advocates of scientific analysis, to infallibility of method. 
However, he can offer very little, if any, useful evidence for any of these 
claims, which is consistent with the conclusion that these statements are (at 
best) no more than heavily biased generalisation or (at worst) an attempt to 
fabricate a straw man which can be conveniently dispatched. 
While it may well be the case that some individuals have over-emphasised 
the value and role of scientific analysis in policy-making, Formaini presents 
no evidence that such a distortion has ever been widely or deliberately 
promulgated or that it has been generally accepted. Presumably this is 
because he is unable to do so. 
While science has, quite logically, played an increasing role in policy 
determination as our overall scientific understandings have increased in 
volume, breadth, depth, detail and sophistication, western culture is now 
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profoundly and definitively scientific and scientific understandings define 
almost every facet of western life. There is no evidence in Formaini's book to 
suggest that science influences public policy in any way, or to an extent that 
is not consistent with the place of science in the rest of the culture. 
Contrary to Formaini's view and in accordance with the growing extent and 
sophistication of our scientific understandings, science can very logically be 
understood to have tempered the irrational and sometimes dangerous 
extremes of normative political decision-maki:ug. If its function has been 
misunderstood or its powers exaggerated, that is not the fault of science and 
is no reason to do other than encourage rigorous adherence to scientific 
principles. 
Formaini offers no example or other evidence to substantiate his allegation 
that public policy outcomes are determined on simple scientific grounds, 
merely claiming that this is ''beyond argument" (Formaini, 1990: 69). 
Science certainly informs decision-makers, but their decisions are ultimately 
the result of much more complex processes than merely following the 
"numbers", even when the "numbers" are determined to be the most 
important criteria. Judgment, as Formaini says, is always finally subjective, 
which is why the character and performance of magistrates and judges is so 
highly scrutinised. The case history of DDT, banned without scientific 
justification, demonstrates, quite unequivocally, that when the courtesies 
' > 
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between a government and it::< electorate are relinquished, the science 
determining public policy is revealed to be the science of public opinion or -
in Formaini's terms- normative values. 
It has been pointed out that Formaini has rested his case partially on the 
assumption that the physical universe is beyond human and scientific 
understanding. This is justified on the grounds that objective certainty is 
undeniably unattainable20• However, certainty is not synonymous with 
understanding, which is attainable, and the two should not be confused21 • 
20 It is a truism that scientific certainty is, in the narrow sense unattainable, but it is 
misleading to apply this observation as the most critical or only criterion in determining the 
value of scientific analysis. The findings of science are always probabilistic and often not 
precisely quantifiable, but these imperfections neither preclude it from being the best tool 
available nor justify the abandonment of its principles. 
21 With respect to toxicology, for example, he observes that "Dose/response data are 
averages, and individuals respond differently because of their not easily understood internal 
mechanisms, which m tum rely on the interaction of both the body and mind" (Formaini, 
1990: 12). Formaini's clear implication here is that the complexities of the human body, 
including the workings of the human mind are, somehow, intrinsically beyond human 
comprehension or analysis, thus denying the ability of objective analysis to ever fathom 
them. However, there is no good reason (within or without Formaini's text) to brand any area 
of current ignorance with regard to the material universe as ''unknowable" and there is every 
reason not to do so. If the purpose of scholarship is to understand, nothing can reasonably or 
safely be dismissed as "too hard" or "too complex". Besides negating the whole point of the 
exercise, to do so i;ivites exclusivity, bias, error and irrationality. (For those who might argue 
that Formaini has deliberately avoided actually articulating his implication, it is pointed out 
that he cannot have it both ways. If his scholarly position is to be at all credible, he must 
either accept or reject the possibility of reaching objective understanding). 
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The essentiality of mystery has long been associated with religious law, 
which usually emphasises a severely constrained model of the human 
intellect and offers, as the alternative to scholarship, the acquisition of 
understanding from previously prepared doctrine. In his diary entry of the 5th 
of November, 1665 Samuel Pepys took issue with the Duke of Abermarle's 
chaplain for preaching on the "imperfections of humane learning." He quotes 
the chaplain as crying ... "All our physicians can't tell what an ague is, and 
all our Arithmetique is not able to number the days of a man" - which God 
knows", the exasperated Pepys comments, "is not the fault of arithmetique, 
but that our understandings reach not that thing" (Pepys in Latham, 2003: 
Formaini's Examples 
The examples Formaini uses through his text to illustrate his arguments are 
problematic as a source of relevant substantiating content. They are 
frequently fictitious, rarely representative of his subject matter and at times 
no more than implausibile products of his imagination. They also tend to be 
22 With the benefit of almost three hundred and fifty years hindsight, incmporating great 
developments in science and medicine, and a commensurate decline in the influence of 
theology, it seems clear that Pepys, in his time, was the more perceptive judge of the path to 
human betterment. Like the alternative, conservative philosophy of the Duke of Abermarle's 
chaplain, the guidance ofFormaini would ~dtimately lead us back to the values of the 
Seventeenth Century and earlier, when "normative" theological doctrine served as a 
significant determinant of policy. 
unnecessarily colourful and emotionally manipulative in their implications. 
Examples are given in the notes.23 
The book's fourth chapter (F(mnaini, 19~0: 67-93) consists of a lengthy 
consideration of ''the swine flu episode", during which a series of 
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23 For instance, (with reference to the insoluble "Laplacean"/''Bayesian" argument) the 
alleged dangers of our misplaced trust in the uncertain practices of science are insinuated by 
a discussion of the inability of probability to determine (from two hypothetical, 
uninformative and ambiguous clues) whether "an enemy nation" actually intends to produce 
1,000 or 10,000 tanks (Formaini, 1990: 14). The complete absurdity of this scenario is not 
betrayed by the gravity with which it is suggested and discussed, but the vulnerability of 
helpless millions to the alleged vagaries of scientific methodology and the incompetence of 
its practitioners is threateningly implicit in its use as a serious example. 
He similarly cites an actual instance of alleged scientific uncertainty over whether alarming 
"chromosome damage" could have actually resulted from a New York case of toxic waste 
exposure (Formaini, 1990: 18), adding to the dramatic nature of his example by floating the 
further possibility of the psychosomatic induction of sickness and death (Formaini, 1990: 
19). While Formaini does not attempt to establish what actually occurred in this case (which 
is intended to demonstrate the inconclusiveness of scientific analysis) the main effect of its 
use as an example is the emotive linking of fear and doubt to the notion of scientific analysis. 
A third instance, drawn from the same chapter as the previous two, insinuates that safety 
from nuclear catastrophe is completely dependent upon very slender and questionable 
scientific resources. In a brief(and highly critical) summary of the operations of comparative 
risk assessment and its failings, Formaini casually suggests it "might be applied to a question 
such as: what is the likelihood that, in a standard water-cooled nuclear reactor, water will fail 
to be supplied to the central fuel core?" (Formaini, 1990: 9). He revisits the theme of nuclear 
holocaust a little later in the chapter, in the context of risk assessment, when he again cites 
this example as if it were a routine problem of probability: "What is the probability that 
nuclear power plant x will suffer a LOCA (loss of coolant accident) that results in a total 
meltdown of its core?" (Formaini, 1990: 20). In the face of such constant inferences that 
people are perpetually a hair's breadth from apocalyptic events, the question of his purpose 
in choosing such e-xamples becomes unavoidable. 
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administrative blunders ensuing from a na'ive, bureaucratic overreaction to a 
speculated "doomsday scenario" led to around fifty deaths through (as it 
transpired) unnecessary and dangerous vaccinations. His case is that it 
demonstrates the veracity of his anti-science thesis. 
This is, however, a curious case study for Formaini tc have chosen, for his 
narrative is one of high-level, bureaucratic panic, scientifically uninformed 
decision-making, lack of coordinated research and failure to observe the 
simple logic of cause and effect. It does not demonstrate a failure of science 
either in principle or in fact, but it does demonstrate the failure of a 
government body and its key individual decision-makers to apply the most 
basic of scientific principles to its decisions24. If anything, this example 
demonstrates the grave dangers of subjective interpretation and the need for 
even more rigorous adherence to the principles of objective analysis. 
Formaini and Subjectivity 
There is considerable evidence in Formaini's book that he comes to this 
debate with strong subjective preconceptions of his own with regard to 
science and scientists25• At the end of the final chapter, he quotes his 
24 While "scientists" certainly were among these individuals, their presence in this saga does 
not alter one whit the crucial point that the decisions were unscientific. Even if every 
individual involved had been a practising scientist, the case study would still fail to prove 
Formaini's case, simply because bad scientists do not make science bad. 
25 This sentiment is also evident in his marked tendency to stereotype and ridicule scientists 
and advocates of scientific understanding and in his inclination to caricature the aspirations 
grandmother as saying that ''there is no damage like that often caused by 
educated fools" and continues: 
As I survey the entire terrain of our institutions with their expert-generated 
assumptions and often incredible outcomes, I begin to understand that my very 
uneducated relative was correct. There can never be any substitute for 
common sense and moral premises. (Formaini, 1990: 97-98). 
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Such defensive rejection of the notion of measured, scientific enquiry might 
be unremarkable in circumstances where the necessity for practical outcomes 
eclipses the need for understanding, but it is unusual and discordant in the 
context of academic pursuit. The purpose of analysis is to bring clarity and 
intellectual order to confusion by the application of detached logic. No logic 
can justify the rejection of objective understanding in favour of "common 
sense" or "moral premise" or any other prejudice in the process of scholarly 
consideration - or for that matter, in the process of public policy formulation. 
Formaini also goes out of his way to point out that scientists "are motivated 
by the same desires and biases as any other person, and they exhibit the same 
human weaknesses from pettjness and. envy to desire for wealth, fame, and 
power (to say nothing of absolutely pure political motivation)" (Formaini, 
of science (such as Formaini, 1990: 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 69, 98). On the first page of his book he 
asserts that the general confidence in empiricism is the consequence of "philosophers, 
scientists, consultants, policy analysts and others who have succeeded in convincing most 
people of the efficacy of their methods of analysis" (Formaini, 1990: 1)- a virtual assertion 
that the broad acceptance of science is no more than the product of rhetoric. In the first 
chapter he refers, without qualification, to "the mistrust of scientists by the average citizen 
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1990: 3). Of course this may be true, but equally, it is no more true of 
scientists than of any other professional group, including academics, and so 
scarcely deserves particular emphasis. Its pointed mention, however, tends to 
imply that the fundamental and consciously held scientific tenet, of the 
imperative to continuously strive for objectivity, is somehow corrupt or 
hypocritical. 
While these small points, concerning what appears to be a petty, ingrained 
prejudice, do not in themselves detract from the quality of his main 
arguments, their mention is more than mere nitpicking. The consistency and 
vehemence of his comments suggest that Fonnaini's work is not unsullied by 
partiality, which detracts from its scholarly stature and consequently its 
value. This amplifies the importance to analysis of eliminating subjective bias 
and maintaining neutrality and objectivity. 
The Value ofFormaini's Case 
While the point that has just been made suggests that it is entirely appropriate 
for Formaini's arguments to be rigorously scrutinised, the pertinence of many 
of the points he raises, and the significance of his critical standpoint in the 
broader landscape of science and risk theory must be acknowledged. 
[that] has been caused by the claims of scientists to know more than they do" (Formaini, 
1990: 8). 
102 
Objective enquiry is vital to the process of understanding the material 
universe, but as its practitioners are usually acutely aware, the theoretical 
workings of objective science are ideals - always to be striven for, but rarely 
attained. In practice it is an imperfect analytical mechanism, but one which, 
by virtue of its phenomenal success since the Enlightenment, inevitably 
tempts complacency and the supposition that it cannot fail. 
Formaini's analysis identifies and examines some of the limitations of 
scientific investigation that appear to have frequently been overlooked, 
especially in respect of environmental management, by people at all levels in 
the community. He provides, in the context of the simplistic view that all 
components of the regulatory process can be successfully objectified, a 
reminder that science and objective analysis have inherent constraints. 
Somewhat ironically, given his views, is possible to draw from Formaini's 
work some quite positive conclusions about science and its role in regulating 
environmental risks. Providing that sufficient pertinent data is available, the 
delivery of a pragmatic or working level of certainty about a particular 
problem is a reasonable expectation, but as Formaini has shown, science 
cannot and should not be expected to unerringly provide infallible, objective 
solutions to regulatory problems. Conceptually, its level of reliability is at 
best only probabilistic, so its predictions must always and inevitably be 
regarded as imperfect and provisional. 
103 
,Nor can objective enquiry be viewed as an approach that can stand alone as a 
means of forming understandings and making judgments. A scientific fact, of 
itself, is culturally inert. Objective facts take no account of human need or 
preference. The fact that pure water consistently boils at a particular 
temperature could not even be comprehended outside a quite complex, pre-
existing cultural framework. Subjectivity is both inherent to and necessary for 
the formation of any individual or collective perception, but subjective 
perceptions are equally meaningless (and pointless) unless they are related to 
more generally agreed or shared objective facts. No amount of belief can stop 
water from boiling when it reaches boiling point, a fact that cannot be 
ignored and has to be culturally accommodated. 
Unfortunately for Formaini's position, however, his contention that the 
analytical instrument called subjectivity can be stretched to provide more 
complete and useful information, while the analytical instrument of 
objectivity cannot, has not been demonstrated. His advocacy of Bayes 
Theorem as a solution for regulatory problems of multiple and complex 
probabilities is forensically no better supported than any prevailing 
misapplications of hard science to these problems, which is the approach that 
he is targeting. 
104 
Neither has he provided any justification for his primary assumption that 
objectivity and subjectivity are mutually exclusive alternative vehicles for 
arriving at useful material understanding, which impairs his argument. The 
practice of good and objective science, in the nattiral world or the human 
environment, in no way precludes the acknowledgement of subjective or 
cultural interpretations in the forming of judgments or the making of 
decisions. Were such a dualistic premise to be argued to underlie Formaini's 
case, it could only be replied that, he has not articulated it in his book. 
For all his pertinent observations, Formaini's fundamental oversight is the 
function of objectivity in the processes of reason. Since humans cannot 
escape their own subjective and cultural perceptions, they are most crucially 
and usefully informed by neutral observation, which represents broader 
views. Consequently, more and better, rather than less, science is necessary if 
the process of human enlightenment is to continue. 
Mary Douglas 
Mary Douglas has written extensively on the topic of risk, understood as an 
anthropological phenomenon, chiefly in the form of essays that have been 
published both singly and as collections. As (in the main) a subjectively 
reasoned sociological explanation, her articulation of the nature and meaning 
of risk neither complies with, nor seems intended to comply with, the 
demands of objective science. Consequently, her ideas cannot be expected to 
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either throw light on the nature of the objective elements of risk, to 
satisfactorily resolve specific, contemporary questions of risk, or to 
objectively inform debate concerning the definition or roles of science. The 
value of her insights lies in what they suggest about the way risk is culturally 
(and thus politically) understood and managed. She clearly delimits the 
debate she is engaging in the essay "Risk as a Forensic Resource": 
Note that the reality of the dangers is not at issue. The dangers are too horribly 
real, in both cases, modem and premodem. This issue is not about the reality 
of the dangers, but about how they are politicised .... The debate always links 
some real danger and some disapproved behaviour, coding the danger in terms 
of a threat to valued institutions. (Douglas, 1990: 8). 
However, if the constraints and ramifications of these limitations with regard 
to objectivity are scrutinised, the applicability of her insights to analyses, 
beyond those of relatively narrow academic interest, is thrown open to 
question. However much sociological light Douglas' analysis might be 
considered to throw upon the subjective motivations of those with strong 
views on environmental issues, it is not capable of advancing the 
understanding, or thus of facilitating the resolution of the material problems 
at the heart of these matters. 
Douglas' Articulated Stance 
The essential feature of her theoretical position is that danger and risk are 
matters that are not primarily perceived (and that are thus not primarily 
definable) as the objective products of observation, but are perceived in 
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cultural terms and, therefore, should be defined, as cultural products. While 
expressing considerable disdain, if not hostility, for objectively focussed 
social sciences, such as psychology, on the grounds that cultural bias 
excludes the possibility of objectivity (Douglas, 1990: 10) she does not frame 
her view as a direct attack on the validity of hard science. Her ideas, though, 
are predicated on an assumption that objective science is a sterile substitute 
for authoritative judgment (Douglas, 1990: 12). 
The genesis of Douglas' ideas lies in the difficulty that she had, as a scholar, 
in identifying any justification for the notion that there exists a "distinctive 
pre-modem mentality" which leads to the explanation of taboo through "a 
line ofreasoning ... from misfortune to spiritual beings" (Douglas, 1992: 3). 
The illogic and "implicit bias" (Douglas, 1992: 3) ofthis position clearly 
rankles with her. Accordingly, she has described the persistence into 
modernised cultures, of a more generally observable human tendency to 
exploit ''the political uses of natural dangers" (Douglas, 1992: 4). 
In modem western culture, she argues, this is centred around the idea of risk 
as a consequence of technological advancement. With respect to the broader 
association of risk with technology, in the international community, she 
writes: 
A culture needs a common forensic vocabulary with which to hold persons 
accountable and .... risk is a word that admirably serves the forensic needs of 
the new global culture. (Douglas, 1990: 1). 
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Although related to a simple central notion, Douglas' expressed ideas are 
fairly diverse and include the following points: science can never provide 
definitive answers; science cannot remove the "old link" between morals and 
danger, because it is not the product oflack of knowledge; people inevitably 
want to dominate each other; knowledge exists in a competitive environment 
where old knowledge is constantly replaced by new knowledge, resulting in 
uncertainty; the idea of "risk" is linked to older notions such as "taboo" and 
"blame"; blame is a product of perceived danger; blame "mans the gate" and 
"arms the guard'. in the jnterests of the "public good"; "risk management" 
security replaces the security of small, traditional communities. 
Critical Analysis of Douglas 
The secularisation of western society is generally accepted to have promoted 
individual autonomy at the expense of traditional authority and responsibility. 
The perceived security of the individual in a strong, pyramidal power 
structure can be reasonably said to stem from anonymity - the lack of 
individual recognition, the lack of individual intellectual autonomy, the lack 
of individual responsibility and 1he lack of capacity for individual 
significance. If a hierarchy headed by a powerful god is believed to be 
directing human affairs, there is little an individual should or can do to 
influence major social or political events. Movement in the great tide of 
human events is understood, from within such a society, to be determined by 
deities, monarchs, scriptures and priests. So the acceptance of rationality, 
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science, liberal democracy and individual autonomy means the acceptance of 
materialism as the source of ultimate truth about the universe. The rejection 
of faith in gods places a corresponding responsibility for the direction of 
human events in the individual and collective hands and minds of human 
beings. This social state is, more or less, acknowledged by Douglas (Douglas, 
1990: 11-13), but she considers the human environment to be, crucially, both 
competitive and politicised. 
More fundamentally and importantly, she characterises the philosophy of 
materialism, the essential sub-stratum of science, as no more than a belief 
system involving a c011Ipetitive "knowledge market" (Douglas, 1990: 11). 
No one offers us certainty, even in science. When we lived in a hierarchical 
culture, we used to think that either a thing was known to be true or it was 
wrong; a fact was a fact, and as such it guaranteed deductions made from it. 
Now that we are committed to an individualist culture, the competition is on; 
knowledge has to be defended at every point; the open society guarantees 
nothing. Each type of culture is based on a distinctive attitude towards 
knowledge. Hierarchy, both as a system of knowledge and a type of culture, 
assumes that the world is up to a point knowable, and that itself, the hierarchy 
is organised according to the principles which run the universe. Consequently, 
the consensus that upholds the political system upholds the authority of facts. 
(Douglas, 1990: 11). 
While these things may or may net be so, to credibly relegate materialism 
and science to no.more than another alternative understanding of the 
universe, demands considerably more logical justification than Douglas 
offers. Her thesis, by at least strong implication, supposes that the processes 
of human thought and understanding are inexorably cultural in their genesis, 
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rather than biological, and that consequently the objectivity of science is, 
most saliently, no more than a form of socially constn1cted authority. 
However, aside from heatedly disparaging the discipline of psychology 
(which focuses on individuals) as irrelevant (Douglas, 1990: 9-11; Douglas, 
1992: 11-12; 31), she does not address the more obvious logic that groups of 
people reason in ways that are comparable and consequential to the ways that 
individuals do. Nor does she offer any direct evidential or logical basis for 
her belief that cultural influences upon material understanding are more 
significant than the basic biological functions of the human being as an 
animal. 
The original premise upon which Douglas constructs her arguments seems to 
be that all knowledge is culturally defined and conforms to a "consensus that 
upholds the political system [and] ... the authority of facts" (Douglas, 1990: 
1). The word "seems" is applied here because although (in a section entitled 
"Culture and Knowledge") by this means of argument, Douglas effectively 
removes the possibility of objectivity being achievable, she avoids outright 
denial of its ultimate possibility: 
the theme, well known to anthropologists, is that in all places at all times the 
universe is moralised and politicised .... For example, a woman dies; the 
mourners ask, why did she die? After observing a number of instances, the 
anthropologist notices that for any misfortune there is a fixed repertoire of 
possible causes among which a plausible explanation is chosen, and a fixed 
repertoire of obligatory actions follow on the choice. (Douglas, 1990: 1). 
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Douglas thus sidesteps the more contentious and challenging, theoretical 
questions that such a stance would provoke. However, as a consequence, 
there exists in her thesis an inherent ambiguity with regard to the nature of 
scientific enquiry. It is very difficult to theoretically account for dangers that, 
as she has said, are (presumably in an objective sense) "real" (Douglas, 
1990:8) but which cannot actually be objectively measured or understood by 
anybody since they can only be perceived through a distorting, cultural haze. 
Robert Pollack makes reference to the not uncommon assertion that Douglas 
is an advocate of cultural relativism, excusing her on the grounds that she 
"discounts" objectivity "in order to emphasise the role of cultural factors" 
(Pollack, 1996: 29). However, probing this matter raises a series of fairly 
calamitous points of logic for her thesis. A criticai view of her case 
understandably arises because she does not articulate a clear position on · 
objectivity in her arguments. The absence of this clarification is also 
understandable, because commitment either way on the question of 
objectivity would tend to dilute and/or undermine the central ideas that she is 
advancing. 
Were she to hold that objectivity is not possible, she would be forced into 
complex epistemological argument about the nature of matter in order to 
justify her stance. Not only would this drag her discussion into highly 
contentious debate along the lines of radical scepticism, but it would 
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inevitably lead to scrutiny and criticism of the values and premises inherent 
to her own approach to analysis, in accordance with this view. The ultimate 
non-existence of objectivity would render her own observations meaningless 
and her ensuing generalisations (or theories) invalid. If, on the other hand, 
she were to assert that objective understanding is possible, her understanding 
that cultural analysis and cultural theory are of critical relevance would be 
invalidated, since the authority of objective analysis would always be 
absolute. 
Such ambiguity and rational tension is continually detectable in her work on 
risk. Having seemingly declared her hand to be supportive of the idea of 
objective scientific enquiry (Douglas, 1990: 9) Douglas immediately qualifies 
her position by suggesting science is only useful "ifthe parties agree on 
community goals", a statement which takes her dangerously close to adopting 
a blatantly self contradictory stance. (Science either is, or it is not, objective 
and thus valid.) However, she uses her cultural perspective to justify her 
position. "Consensus," she goes on, "does not depend on the facts being 
recognised" (Douglas, 1990: 9) an assertion that can be logically sustained 
only ifthe human reasoning process is conceded to be unrelated to the 
evidence of facts. 
The formation of consensus, however, must depend upon the recognition of 
facts as there is no other apparent, possible basis for any form of decision 
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making. The interpretation of the word consensus that is salient to this view, 
is that it is a general agreement about what constitutes the relevant facts and 
what those facts demonstrate. Different facts support different decisions and 
the emphasis of particular facts leads to particular decision making outcomes. 
In 17th Century Salem, on the basis of facts that 21 st Century westerners 
would find completely irrelevant to the issue, the consensus was that witches 
were living and making magic in the community. To the contemporary 
western mind, tifr~ logic is bizarre in its blindness to scientifically established 
certainties. Nonetheless, the reasoning process (and the parallel justice 
process) followed the entirely rational pattern of marrying observation - or 
facts - with theory and arriving at conclusions. Magistrates Hawthorne and 
Corwin, Governor Phips and Deputy Governor Danforth, the deliverers of 
justice in the town of Salem in 1692, would, no doubt, have been outraged at 
the suggestion that they had ignored or misunderstood the evidence of fact, or 
that their judgments were anything but fair and reasonable. 
So Douglas' imputation that e1npiri.cal evidence is of limited significance to 
political outcome~~ i.s potentially very mi;::l~ading. The politically important 
insight behind what she has written is that expert opinion may be at variance 
with what the public wants, an observation that is critical to the 
understanding of political risk, as it has serious, practical consequences. But 
it is significant that Douglas has chosen to express this in a way that (as was 
noted above) conceptually separates the logic of consensus from the logic of 
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science. These two thought processes (she is saying) are quite different and 
are incompatible, but she does not explain how understanding has been 
reached. 
The dichotomous character of this premise forces her to then discriminate 
between science and culture. They effectively become comparatively situated 
on a gauge of worth, the nature of which also remains undefined. She 
accordingly ranks the analytical strength of cultural considerations above that 
of science, applying the supremely patronising and heavily value-laden label 
"culturally innocent" to the pursuit of objective analysis. The clear 
insinuation of this pejorative tactic is that any intellectual position seeking to 
establish objective truths that are free of cultural values, is ignorant, naive 
and wrongheaded (Douglas, 1990: 9-10). Presumably in order to ensure that 
no stone is left unturned, she smprisingly and quite unnecessarily, goes on to 
suggest that those following such courses of enquiry consider themselves to 
be free of cultural bias and view members of other cultures as "Wogs" 
(Douglas, 1990: 9; Douglas 1992: 31). 
Apart from the immediate implications of the tension between evidence and 
opinion, noted above, Douglas does not consider the very significant 
response to new evidence of accepted fact over time. Contrary to her 
assertion (Douglas, 1990: 9), in the longer run, consensus most certainly does 
depend on the facts being recognised. If this were not the case, the human 
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race would have long lost the ability to survive in the physical world. Fairly 
plainly, the facts inform us about the material environment that we inhabit 
and, over time, their truth (or falsity) becomes quite clear, is then culturally 
established and, consequently, generally accepted. Cultural and personal 
perspectives alter as people recognise through experience the validity (or 
invalidity) of apparent facts and by this means accept change. In this way the 
west long ago rejected the validity of the supposed links between certain 
observed events and witchcraft, between bad smells and infectious disease, 
between the apparent revolving of the sun about the earth and the centrality 
of the eart.li to the universe. 
Consensus, then, changes over time and, like all judgments and decision, is 
ultimately subjectively or culturally determined, on the basis ofreasonably 
established facts. Even so, considered as processes of human thought, both 
cultural and individual forms of subjectivity are themselves fundamentally 
and critically informed by "the facts" of experience. Ajury might, for 
example, on the strength of forensic and circumstantial evidence, find an 
accused murderer guilty because in their own experiences of real events, they 
have learnt to trust the consistency of patterns of cause and effect. A 
subsequent revision of foremdc practices in the light of new facts might alter 
the individual or consensus view of the significance of the original ones. The 
case of Lindy Chamberlain, in which sound-deadening paint was eventually 
J! 
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shown to have produced a positive reaction to a test for foetal haemoglobin, 
is a well-known example (Crispin, 2005: 5). 
The arguments of Douglas probably served to dilate a constricted focus on 
the physical and objective aspects of risk in the times they were conceived. 
However, their intemperate tone and avoidance of involvement in more basic 
debates ultimately renders them rhetorical rather than intellectual devices. 
Her perceived view that objectivity is unachievable and thus dispensable as a 
goal, has helped steer debate about risk away from areas of specificity into 
less tangible arguments. The consequence is that hard evidence has become 
refutable and the resolution of problems through the casting of scientific light 
has been, to some extent, eclipsed by resolution through the wielding of 
political might. 
It nonetheless is clear that the subjective views of individuals and 
communities profoundly affect the ways that risks are perceived and 
managed and that these understandings are essential to the understanding of 
the politics of risk. Although Douglas' arguments appear to have been pivotal 
in a de-emphasis of scientific understandings of risk, they do not alter the 
logic that scientific perception is the primary instrument in the human and 
social processes of dealing with risk. Consequently, they do not diminish the 
over-riding requirement of risk managers for more and better objective 
information. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to clarify some matters pertaining to the function 
of science by examining the work of four important scholars who have 
influenced the peiception of science and fisk during the period of the 
evolution of precautionary thought. The ensuing understandings support the 
notions that the practice of science is a natural and essential human activity, 
that science, by its nature, is uniquely capable of reliably providing objective 
knowledge of the material world and that sound scientific knowledge and 
good decision-making are closely associated. These ideas are further 
legitimised by the centrality of science to global culture and the 
intensification of human reliance upon science and technology almost 
everywhere, in the face of ongoing criticism. 
Chapter 3 examir;.~s the emergence of th;: concept of precaution and its _,_ 
development into the political idea currently termed the Precautionary 
Principle. 
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Chapter 3. 
THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 
As public concern about technology has increased markedly with the rise of 
environmentalism over the last forty or fifty years, it is unsurprising that 
institutions and devices enabling a sense of public control over new 
technologies and developments have evolved over this period. Although the 
use of scientifically established standards as benchmarks for empirical 
soundings in environmental impact studies is now routine, the stringency of 
regulatory demands has tended to increase in parallel with public awareness 
of the environmental risks attached to technology. 
During the latter part of this period, the concept of mandatory precaution has 
emerged as an administrative means of eliminating the risks inherent in new 
technology and innovative science. However, although it has been very 
effectively applied to prevent environmental degradation, it has also been 
criticised for stifling economic and social advancement and sidelining 
science. 
The Origins of Precaution 
The introduction of new technology has probably always provoked social 
division, but the single, most controversial technological development of the 
last century or so is without doubt nuclear technology. Launched into the 
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public's consciousness in the form of the two devastatingly destructive 
bombs that ended World War II, it riveted the world's attention on the 
capabilities of science and coagulated vague doubts about the noble status of 
science into a more solid scepticism. Although it has subsequently been 
widely used for peaceful and humanitarian purposes as well as making 
weapons of war, the prevailing perception of nuclear technology is that it is at 
best a double edged sword. The strong vein of pacifism in western society 
has often been attributed to social memory of the butchery that occurred in 
the trench warfare of World War I and it can be similarly supposed that such 
an association may exist between contemporary environmentalism and the 
bombing of Japan in 1945. 
Consequently, it is significant that it was in the context of a world on the 
brink of nuclear war that Rachel Carson's book Silent Spring (Carson, 2000) 
was published in 1962. This book famously linked the ubiquitous pesticide, 
DDT, with profound environmental degradation and serious human and 
animal disease. It quickly found a large audience that overlooked its scientific 
weaknesses and inaccuracies and was prepared to accept that there was a dark 
side to science. "Silent Spring", commonly cited as the spark that lit the 
modem environmental movement, is still a very widely read text in the US 
and revered in environmental circles everywhere. Consciousness of natural 
history and conservation, as they were then called, grew very quickly through 
the 1960s, while alarm arising from Carson's book quietly smouldered and 
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spread. In 1972, at the peak of US political self-hate, the EPA fell into accord 
with public opinion and in perhaps the first true environmental precautionary 
action, banned DDT - against the weight of scientific evidence that showed it 
to be a relatively harmless and useful chemical. 
Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and Verstegen (2005: 2) also identify 1972 as a 
critical year in the genesis of "precautionary thinking'', arguing that by this 
time that it was already becoming a political force to be reckoned with: 
Two influential international reports gave the cultural ecological critique of 
green thinking intellectual (scientific) and political repute. First in 1972 Ward 
et al presented a report to the United Nations World Conference on the Human 
Environment [entitled Only One Earth: the Care and Maintenance of a Small 
Planet]. It argued that man had to replace family or national loyalties with a 
sense of allegiance to the planet in order to save it from destruction. . .. 
Second and more known to the general public, the Club of Rome, in their 1972 
report "The Limits to Growth" also projected imminent global devastation, 
unless resource use was curbed and resources shared ... Twelve million copies 
of the report were sold worldwide and it was published in 37 different 
languages. These two reports coincided with the oil crisis of the early 1970s, 
which gave them economic credence and social support. (Hanekamp, Vera-
Navas and Vf'rste:gen 2005: 2-3). 
It seems clear, therefore, that by the time the landmark acid rain issue arose 
in Germany in the mid 1970s, the ideological and precedential groundwork 
for precautionary, political action was well and truly laid. 
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The German Roots of Precaution. 
Despite the important precautionary milestone that DDT constitutes, the 
attachment of precaution to regulatory issues of technological biosafety is 
usually more strongly associated with Europe than America. Without EU 
support, opposition to GM may have remained confined to environmental 
groups. Within Europe precaution seems to be particularly strongly rooted in 
German culture and history, where purity, wholesomeness and the natural 
state have long been considered tC' :provide security of health and social 
wellbeing. Genn?.;. y' ~ beer purity laws 0 ate back to 1516 when Duke 
Wilhelm N of Bavaria decreed that lager should be made from nothing other 
than hops, barley and water. This condition still applies to German lagers and 
is voluntarily applied to most other German beers. The only concession that 
has been made to technology over the last half-millennium is the addition of 
yeast to that short list of ingredients, due to the discovery that the 
fermentation process is dependent upon its presence. 
The secular Nazi German state, having little regard for the finer points of 
democratic sensitivity, imposed some quite extreme public health measures 
upon the German populace in reflection of the almost god-like respect it 
accorded the integrity of nature. This subject has been explored in several 
books by Robert Proctor, a Professor of the History of Science at 
Pennsylvania State University (Proctor, 1999). 
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The Nazis reinforced their view that individuals had a patriotic duty to 
maintain good health, with campaigns and administrative measures designed 
to eradicate behaviour and practices that were inconsistent with this aim. 
Their intention was to ensure that the workplaces of the Third Reich were 
healthy, that its citizens were sustained by wholesome, natural diets and that 
their use of alcohol and tobacco was constrained. 
While describing Nazi fascism as "the low-water mark in twentieth century 
moral culture", Proctor also considers it to have been "a more subtle 
phenomenon than we commonly imagine, more seductive, more plausible ... 
nuanced and complex" (Proctor, 1999: 8). 
People saw the movement as a source of rejuvenation - in public health and in 
other spheres as well. People looked to Nazism as a great and radical surgery 
or cleansing, and not always in ways that are abhorrent, even with the 
privilege of hindsight. (Proctor, 1999: 7-8). 
While Germany was a world leader in many areas of science, including 
medicine, Erwin Leik, the so-called "father of Nazi medicine" was: 
best known for his critique of the "spiritual crisis" of modern medicine ... 
[which was] enervated by specialisation, bureaucratisation, and scientisation, 
warped by greed and myopia but also by its failure to appreciate the natural 
capacity of the body to heal itself. (Proctor, 1999: 22). 
However, the Nazi health campaigns were sullied by their links to notions of 
genetic pollution and racial elitism. Proctor emphasises that there is no 
logical link between the Nazi's quest for social purity and our contemporary 
aspiration to leave the natural order undisturbed (Proctor, 1999: 277). 
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Irrespective of the Nazis, twenty-first century western precautionary thinking 
does, however, have strong roots in Germany, for the formal flame of 
political precaution was ignited there in the 1970s. 
Acid Rain and Precaution. 
The observation in the mid 1970s, of yellowing, needle loss and death of 
spruce trees in German forests led to the hypothesis of a link with acid rain, a 
chemical product of fossil fuel residues from power generation and motor 
vehicles (Pearce, 1987: 3). Since the consequences of waiting for conclusive 
evidence were potentially catastrophic, the German Government acted to 
force cuts to emissions citing the vorsorge prinzip (Kellow, 1999b: 128; 
Takeuchi, 2004:3) which means the principle of "preventative action" or 
"forecaring". This precedent was the genesis of the environmental regulatory 
approach adopted by Helmut Kohl and sometimes known as "Green 
Keynesianism" or "ecological modernisation" (Kellow, 2002: 128). Certain 
justifying conditions and circumstances that characterise this seminal 
instance of openly precautionary, environmental regulation should be 
identified at this point, because they contrast starkly with those surrounding 
more recent cases of precautionary intervention, such as GM crops. 
The first difference is of palpability - the problem was obvious for all to see. 
It was not hypothetical or scientifically fanciful and its cause appeared to be 
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external. Secondly, the potential scale of damage was huge - the possible 
deforestation of central Europe was an intolerable prospect. Third, the danger 
was imminent - the fast rate of damage made immediate action necessary. 
Fourth, the scien(.;e was authentic- serious concern was based on a sound 
hypothesis, so mainstream science was not in conflict with public opinion. 
Fifth, verification and closure was expected - scientific substantiation of the 
main part of the theory (one way or the other) was both possible and likely. 
Sixth, the probability of net gain was high - the likely cost of inaction could 
reasonably be expected to outweigh the likely cost of taking preventative 
action. Seventh, the steps taken were consistent with mainstream values - the 
preventative action taken accorded with the principles of science and with the 
aspirations of the community. The regulatory requirement for lower 
emissions both anticipated and forced technological progress as a remedy to 
the problem. The target was Lhe damagirig side effects of ~mperfect 
technology, not the technology itself. 
The scientific questions raised by the acid rain hypothesis are complex and 
answering them involves significant empirical difficulties, which means that 
the whole issue is still far from fully understood. The remaining areas of 
uncertainty concern the movement and behaviour of chemicals in the 
atmosphere, in soils, in bodies of water and in plants (Pearce, 1987: 1). The 
investigation of acid rain has raised as many questions as it has answered but 
the enforced reduction of emissions ahead of scientific verification was a 
124 
successful tactic. The recovery of the German forests was in fact so rapid that 
the whole acid rain thesis has since been questioned by some scientists 
(Pearce, 1990). 
Nonetheless, the important and I?ain accepted features of the acid rain story 
amount to the simple narrative sequence that a problem arose, logical 
remedial action was taken and the problem receded. The science of acid rain 
is an evolving body of knowledge that has never been anywhere near 
complete or certain, but it has, so far, managed to reliably point the way for 
regulators. The precis of the ongoing story is that the acid rain problem has 
been progressively dealt with at both the scientific and regulatory levels 
(Pearce, 1987: 1; Pearce, 1990; Pearce, 1996: 7) and that precautionary action 
delivered the Europeans a positive outcome. 
Strict emission control regimes, international cooperation and steep reduction 
gradients for industry and motor vehicle emissions have led to drastically 
reduced outputs of the main chemical culprits in the formation of acid rain -
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides - by forcing technological advancement 
(Pearce, 1987: 4; Pearce, 1996: 7). These technology-driving regulatory 
controls can be extremely severe. A British regulatory decision of 1996 
compelled electricity generators, responsible for two thirds of the country's 
sulphur dioxide emission, to reduce sulphur dioxide output by 85% before 
2005 (Pearce, 1996: 7). This measure was expected to reduce the level of 
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emissions of sulphur dioxide to less than 10% of the peak of over 5 million 
tonnes that British industry was releasing into the atmosphere annually in the 
mid 1970s (Pearce, 1987: 1). 
The Environmental and Health Catastrophes of the 1980s 
The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power accident was the first of a series 
of major catastrophes that unr.lermined public C•Jnfidence in the ability of 
science to lead the world forward. The Bhopal disaster in India (1984), the 
explosion of the Challenger space shuttle (1986), the meltdown of the nuclear 
reactor at Chernobyl (1986) and the massive Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989) 
were all massively significant failures of technology. These events 
punctuated a period of growing concern that human activity was irreparably 
harming the environment as the hole on the ozone layer and greenhouse 
theory became determining forces in environmental politics. Perhaps 
significantly, all this occurred as the maturing baby boomer generation was 
abandoning the discomforts of the counter culture's puritanical ideology and 
looking to existing economic and social structures for a future. 
The accelerating efficiency of media coverage of these terrible events meant 
that people everywhere were graphically exposed to the dramas and tragedies 
of them in some detail. They also shared the very human response to them 
that anthropologist Mary Douglas has associated with threats to communities, 
which is that someone was responsible for the harm. Rightly or wrongly, the 
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players and moral narratives described in the media were consistently 
recognisable and even formulaic. Following the same line of argument as the 
1972 UN and Club of Rome documents, the news stories usually propagated 
the view that unless corporate greed and scientific ambition were brought 
under control, they would probably destroy the world. 
The ancient cultural theme of the need for the forces of good to unite and 
overcome the forces of evil seems to have become dominant in western 
perceptions of these events. In an analysis of the roots of precaution, 
Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and Verstegen have linked "green thinking", as 
Bramwell' s conjunction of ''the cultural ecological critique ... [and] the 
scientific economic concept of non-renewable resources" with Veldman's 
"green thinking" as a romantic worldview with a "focus on the past ... as a 
guide to the future" (Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and Verstegen, 2005: 2). 
According to V eldman' s understanding, this romantic worldview is 
centred on the conviction that modem science with all its statistical and 
explanatory potential cannot depict or grasp all ofreality, which is experienced 
beyond the reach of the physical senses. (Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and 
Verstegen, 2005: 2). 
Variant versions of this notion, suggests Veldrnan, have been articulated and 
disseminated in the writings of E.F.Schumacher (such as "Small is Beautiful" 
[Schumacher, 1973]), and generally popularised in the broadly appealing 
fiction of C.S.Lewis and J.R.R.Tolkien (such as "The Chronicles ofNamia" 
[Lewis, 2004] and "The Lord of The Rings" [Tolkien, 1995]). Perhaps more 
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directly tellin.g, the idealised mindset of green thinking is no less evident in 
the opening chapter of "Silent Spring", which "depicts a similar unhistorical 
landscape ofa world past" (Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and Verstegen, 2005: 2). 
Throughout the political incubation phase of the precautionary principle, 
further evidence of the inadequacy of science that supported the emerging 
deep green worldview was never hard to find. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the episodic development of first the HIV/AIDS epidemic and then 
the BSE crisis provided a constant drip of bad news about science. Kellow 
(2002, 115-135) has pointed to the fears raised by the BSE issue as an 
important source of pressure for the adoption of regulatory precaution and 
has identified a particular link between BSE and the formation of negative 
public perceptions about GM food. 
At the time of the first occurrence of HIV/AIDS in the late 1970s, the last of 
the great infectious disease epidemics remained a fading nightmare. Although 
still within living memory, these memories were associated with a less 
scientifically enlightened and far less secure past. However, the outbreaks of 
BSE and HIV/ AIDS dramatically dispelled any possible illusion that medical 
science had completely conquered infectious disease. Although, ironically, 
the scientific responses to these two new and unforeseen public health threats 
were actually prompt and effective, the hitherto heroic image of medical 
science and its researchers appears to have suffered significantly from the 
mere fact of their occurrence (Breithaupt, 2001: 12). 
128 
While a vaccine is yet to be produced against HIV I AIDS, technically 
speaking it is already (albeit at a significant cost) a controllable disease. The 
causative agent of AIDS - the HIV virus - was identified "in record time" and 
within 5 years of this breakthrough its genome had been sequenced, blood-
screening processes had been developed and implemented and AZT trials had 
begun (Breithaupt, 2001: 12). 
In respect ofBSE, biologists swiftly "came to understand a disease that. 
defied all attempts to explain it based on existing knowledge" (Breithaupt, 
2001: 12). Stanley Pmsiner was awarded the Nobel Prize for his discovery 
that the disease is caused by prions - "a tme scientific revolution [which] 
gave some completely new insights into nature" (Breithaupt, 2001: 12). 
The legal/regulatory establishment cannot be accused of operating with 
anything less than exemplary effectiveness and speed in this case either. 
Aynsley Kellow (2002: 134) has pointed out that the biomedical research 
effort was not triggered until the first positive diagnosis ofBSE in cattle at 
the end of 1986, but within eighteen months, initial research had been 
completed and its findings translated into regulatory action and implemented. 
The consequenc.e 0fthis measured and efficient response was that high-risk . 
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material was quickly excluded from the human and animal food chains, so by 
the time the issue began to raise public anxiety the most important remedial 
regulatory controls had already been in place for some time. 
The BSE/nvCJD outbreak ... demonstrates that we are capable of regulating 
risks ... By 1997 there were only nineteen established cases ofnvCJD in 
Britain and one in France, w!lile there were over 80 by 2001. The horrific 
manner of death, rather than the frequency, has heightened public concern. 
About one million cattle were slaughtered and Britain's beeftrade was 
harmed, but despite the high economic stakes, scientists and regulators 
mimrnised the impact of the tragedy ... The role of good science and risk 
management in limiting the scope of the tragedy has been submerged in a 
climate of dread, and the risk management success overlooked. (Kellow, 2002: 
134). 
The "Rio" Version of the Precautionary Principle. 
The term "Precautionary Principle" has had increasing currency in political 
language since the early 1990s. According to Hathcock (2000, 256) the term 
has been derived from the understanding of precaution that was articulated in 
Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio. Declaration, which was an annex to the Report 
of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in 
Rio de Janeiro that year. 
The "Rio" version is generally recognised as the benchmark version of the 
Precautionary Principle. Kellow (2002: 124) refers to it as ''the accepted 
version" and Hanekamp, Vera-Navas and Verstegen, (2005: 1) describe it as 
''the most authoritative among the many formulations of the precautionary 
principle that can be found". In this form it states that: 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capiibilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. (UN 1992). 
The UN also included what is probably a non-binding form of the Rio 
Precautionary Principle in the pre~mble to the simultaneously drafted 
Convention on Bii:.·logical Diversity. Thi~; re(;ords the signatories merely 
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''noting" the Precautionary Principle. The "Rio version" has since been quite 
widely copied at national and sub-national governmental levels for legislative 
purposes. 
In Australia, it has been incorporated almost word for word into the 
Commonwealth Gene Technology Act 2000, [Section 4, Paragraph (aa)]. It 
has been adopted as a "core element" of the National Strategy for 
Ecologically Sustainable Development and been included "either specifically 
or by inference as part of BSD [ ect-,Jogically sustainable development] in 
numerous Australian environmental statvtes" (Cole, 2005: 1). These include 
the South Australian Environment Protection Act 1993, and the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999. 
At a judicial level the Precautionary Principle has been applied or considered 
in several Australian environmental disputes (Cole, 2005: 2-3). In 1993, 
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Judge Stein, of the New South Wales Land and Environment Court, 
disallowed a NSW Parks Service permit for a local government to construct a 
road, and ruled in favour of a third party challenger (Leatch v. National Parks 
and Wildlife Service). The court refused the licence on the grounds that there 
was insufficient scientific certainty about the impact upon populations of the 
endangered giant burrowing frog and yellow-bellied glider. Judge Stein said 
that ''the precautionary principle is a statement of commonsense and has 
already been applied by decision-makers in appropriate circumstances prior 
to the principle being spelt out" (Cole, 2005: 2). Stein cited a number of 
international judicial applications of the Precautionary Principle, in Britain, 
India, Pakistan and New Zealand as well as judgments in the International 
Court of Justice and the European Court of Justice (Cole, 2005: 4). 
Cole, an environmental lawyer, considers that irrespective of its inclusion in 
legislation, "courts throughout the world are increasingly inclined to accept 
the principle as a means of dealing with scientific uncertainty in 
environmental disputes". His view is that it "may fairly be regarded as an 
evidentiary tool in resolving dispute over the risks presented to the 
environment and to human health (Cole, 2005: 5). 
However, while it may be beyond doubt that the Precautionary Principle has 
been increasingly applied, its usefulness as a means of "resolving dispute" (if 
this means achieving general and lasting acceptance of decisions) is highly 
132 
questionable. An appropriate legislative and judicial instrument of decision 
and influence, with respect to vital determinations about the future of the 
world's technology must surely possess integrity of the highest possible 
order. The frequency, consistency and vehemence of criticism of the 
Precautionary Principle suggests that its integrity is far from being generally 
established or accepted. 
The Precautionary Principle is one of 27 principles contained in the Rio 
Declaration. A quick glance through them reveals that the others vary 
considerably in their puqmses and merits but that overall the document 
articulates a good mix of practical guidelines, morals-based political 
intentions and ideological statements. Although not unworthy or purposeless, 
the Rio Declaration is essentially a loose directional agreement that, in 
contrast to its sister document the Convention on Biological Diversity, is too 
unfocussed to be enforceable and appears not to have been framed with any 
real sense of legal authority or intent. 
In view of these observations, is unsurprising that the Rio Declaration 
contains many ambiguous, contradictory and vaguely expressed ideas. The 
foundation statement, Principle 1, for example, in its entirety, states: "Human 
beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are 
entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature" (UN, 1992). 
What this was intended to mean, in a legal or political sense, is open to 
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conjecture. It is not clear whether immans are described as being at the 
"centre" of concerns because they are the main cause of environmental 
degradation or because they should be the primary beneficiaries of 
sustainable development, or both. Nor is there any indication of whether the 
delegates considered the life of a villager in the Andes or that of a 
stockbroker on Wall St to be more productive and healthy, or whether either 
of them should be considered to live in harmony with nature. 
These are not petty or mean-spirited criticisms. If the Rio Declaration is to be 
accepted as a serious prescriptive document and if we are to allow the 
Precautionary Principle to shape our technological future, we must be certain 
that the values involved are appropriate and that they are accurately 
described. The form of expression used in Principle 1 suggests the intention 
of determining and defining a context for sustainable development, but as it 
stands it is merely suggestive of the general mood of the conference and is of 
little, if any, practical use. 
Principle 9 (which might well have been dubbed the "scientific principle") 
directly contradicts the most common interpretations of the precautionary 
principle at almost every level. It asserts that: 
States should cooperate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for 
sustainable development by improving scientific i.mderstanding through 
exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the 
development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new 
and innovative technologies. (UN, 1992). 
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It seems clear that the purpose of Principle 9 is to formally establish the 
conventional wisdom that science and innovation are central to improvement 
of the human condition, and therefore, also to the development of sustainable 
technologies. 
How principles 9 and 15 are supposed to be integrated is not clear, as the 
question of the intrinsically probabilistic nature of scientific findings is not 
addressed by the Rio Declaration and was presumably not considered 
contentious. What is apparent from the inclusion of Principle 9 is that 
interpretations of Principle 15 that question the validity of science, or its 
ability to advance the human condition and solve problems, are inconsistent 
with the intentions of the Declaration. 
If Principle 9 is ac...:epted as an endorsement of science, one logical -'·· 
interpretation of Principle 15 is that it is a device to prevent the probabilistic 
nature of science from being corruptly manipulated. The wording" ... lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures ... " suggests the closing of a loophole, and there is no hint 
in Principle 15 that "lack of full scientific certainty" is anything other than 
normal. If this is the case, the (anyway incorrect) implication that science can 
be certain is a misinterpretation of Principle 15. 
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The brief but somewhat rambling, preamble to the Rio Declaration indicates 
that the document was intended not to be prescriptive, but as an inclusive 
statement of solidarity. Its "goal" was to foster consensus on the issue of 
sustainable development so that "new levels of cooperation" and 
"international agrc.:ements" would become possible. There is no suggestion 
that the Rio Declaration itself constitutes such an agreement. The subject 
matter of its principles supports this understanding. For example: 
Principle 20 states: 
Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. 
Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable 
development. 
Principle 21 states: 
The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be 
mobilised to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable 
development and ensure a better futtiie for all. 
Principle 23 states: 
The environment and natural resources of people under oppression, 
domination and occupation shall be protected. 
Principle 25 states: 
Peace, development and environmental protection are interdependent and 
indivisible. 
While these principles express important and necessary intentions, and their 
content accurately reflects the broad ideology of the international community, 
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as written, they have no place in a document proposing to establish practical, 
legally applicable rules for the achievement of sustainable development. It is 
very difficult to see how any of them could be directly applied in any useful 
way. They are, though, not out of place in a formative document outlining the 
aspirations and a directional framework for emerging political values. 
It seems fair to conclude from the above that the purposes of the Rio 
Declaration and the intentions of its architects were consciously constructive 
and did not include undermining conventional science or its role. It is a 
document that sets down generally agreed ideas rather than a consistent and 
precise set of practical, legal rules governing an agreed international 
environmental strategy. Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility 
that a principle of the Rio Declaration, possessing its own internal integrity 
might be extracted and successfully applied. 
Principles and the "Wingspread" Precautionary Principle 
The word "principle" is an everyday word with the uncontroversial meaning 
of "an accepted or professed rule of action or conduct" (Macquarie 
Dictionary, 1991: 1403). The usual application of the word then is that it is a 
rule that can be applied passively (in an "accepted" sense) or actively (in a 
"professed" sense) but that in either case it is primarily concerned and 
associated with predictability of outcome. A principle essentially says "if a, 
then b". A principle is, therefore, more than anything else decisive. 
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Principles involve, less palpably, the idea of general acceptance on the basis 
of scientific, moral or legal reason. They are also by definition reductive. 
Whatever their context, their practical function is to provide shortcuts to 
desired endpoints. As such, to a greater or lesser extent, they eliminate the 
need for investigation and decision and provide structures that facilitate 
decision-making or learning procc:':lses. 
As a single entity with a simple function, any particular principle, as a 
decisive rule, should also be reasonably expected to articulate a single, 
distinct, unequivocal, substantiated and pivotal idea. Multiple, subje~tive, 
vague, hypothetical or ambiguous ideas - no matter how desirable or 
laudable - cannot with accuracy be described as principles as they are not 
capable of being decisive and, therefore, cannot function as rules of action or 
conduct. 
On this basis, there exists a considerable gap between the essential qualities 
of a principle and the qualities of the Precautionary Principle. A perhaps even 
more fundamental difficulty is that no single, generally agreed version of the 
Precautionary Principle exists and apart from the problematic Rio version, no 
attempt to draft a simple, coherent and practical precautionary rule appears to 
have even been made. 
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The Precautionary Principle is frequently cited or quoted, but it is not 
consistently understood as a clear idea with a clear reductive purpose. The 
term has been attached to a variety of ideas and intentions that have been 
expressed in a diversity of forms. Hahn and Sunstein (2005: 1) report that 
nineteen different versions have been identified, so its pivotal concept is yet 
to be precisely determined and the nomination of any single idea as definitive 
is likely to be contested. 
It has already been indicated that ihe form found in the Rio Declaration has 
been most general!y accepted and that it has been transferred directly to some 
Australian legislation. However, the more far-reaching version contained in 
the "Wingspread Declaration", made in 1998 by an international group of 
activist professionals after a two-day meeting in Wingspread, in Racine, 
Wisconsin, appears to have found significant and increasing, if limited 
support also (Hahn and Sunstein, 2005: 1; Montague, 1998; Takeuchi, 2004: 
3). This version has had some influence on understandings of what the 
Precautionary Principle means at the legislative level, but the ideas 
underlying its proposals would, were it generally adopted, amount to a 
significant ideological shift in mainstream thought. 
A memorandum to all legislators in the State of Hawaii, written by Dawn 
Takeuchi, a "Research Attorney" in the Hawaiian Legislative Reference 
Bureau, describes the Wingspread Statement as ''the most well-known" 
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definition of the precautionary principle (Takeuchi, 2004: 3). This report lists 
the "key components" of the precautionary prir;ciple as: 
1. Taking anticipatory action to prevent harm in the face of scientific 
uncertainty. 
2. Exploring alternatives, including the alternative of"no action". 
3. Considering the full cost of environmental and health impacts over time. 
4. Increasing public participation in decision making. 
5. Shifting responsibility for providing evidence to proponents of an activity. 
(Takeuchi, 2004: 2). 
The Board of Supervisors of the City of San Francisco has adopted a form of 
the precautionary principle defined by tenets closely resembling these' points 
(Takeuchi, 2004: 3). Since this represents a considerable escalation of the 
aims of the Precautionary Principle over the "Rio" version and as it is 
becoming legislatively and politically influential, some analysis of the 
"Wingspread" version seems necessary. 
The Wingspread Statement is far too long and complex to be described as a 
coherent or pragmatic precept. It is more a micro-manifesto on preservation 
of the environment and the containment of technology, premised upon the 
belief that technology is destroying the world. It asserts that: 
... there is compelling evidence that damage to humans and the worldwide 
environment is of such magnitude and seriousness that new principles for 
conducting human activities are necessary .... Therefore, it is necessary to 
implement the Precautionary Principle: When an activity raises threats of harm 
to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken 
even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established 
scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather than the 
public, should bear the burden of proof. ... Thus, as formulated here, the 
principle of precautionary action has 4 parts: 
1. People have a duty to take anticipatory action to prevent harm ... 
2. The burden of proof of harmlessness of a new technology, process, activity, or 
chemical lies with the proponents, not with the general public. 
3. Before using an~·~ technology, process, or che1nical, or starting a new activity, 
people have an obligation to examine "a full range of alternatives" including 
the alternative of doing nothing. 
4. Decisions applying the precautionary principle must be "open, informed and 
democratic" and "must include affected parties". (Montague, 1998). 
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The first difficulty raised is the assumption that the decisive regulatory action 
of suspending or banning technology should be taken in advance of clear 
scientific understanding, on the strength of a speculative "threat". Unless 
quite explicit qualifications, such as a time limit and a program of research 
were attached to such rulings, their consequences would almost certainly be 
irresolution and conflict. 
Beyond this, the implication that cause and effect relationships can be "fully 
established" at all exposes a critical conceptual ambiguity within the 
Precautionary Principle, because the idea of precaution itself is premised on 
science's intrinsic inability to "fully establish" anything. Consequently, a lack 
of "full establishment" alone does not comprise reasonable grounds for 
precautionary restraint. This means that an additional, more specific 
condition, such as broad (scientific) peer agreement is necessary, but such a 
solution would be unacceptable to advocates of precautionary action as it 
would render the first (universal) condition of uncertainty redundant and 
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simply replace the question in the hands of science. As the wording stands in 
the Wingspread Statement, it would be possible to suspend from use any 
technology at all, on the basis of an assertion that it comprised a biosafety 
"threat". 
Ordinary commonsense judgments aside, precautionary bans based on 
suspicion rather than evidence of problems, involve the attachment of a 
higher value to subjective opinion than to science, and the consequences 
reflect this. If the logic of Wingspread had been applied to GM cotton in 
1996, Bt varieties would have been indefinitely banned, while the chemical 
pesticide system, which was damaging the environment and destroying the 
industry, would have remained in place. In the case of GM canolas, some 
states continue to apply precautionary bans on the basis of speculated risks, 
leaving in place the environmentally dirty triazine-tolerant (TT) canola 
system and the certainty of contamination of waterways. No matter how the 
relationship is defined, the incompatible insinuations of precautionary action 
under the terms of Wingspread are that subjectivity is at least equivalent in 
predictive power to objectivity and that the attainment of scientific certainty 
is possible. 
Secondly, the assertion that "people" have a "duty" to anticipate and prevent 
harm does not make it true or even a useful idea. "Duty" can only exist in the 
context of specifically defined skills, knowledge and powers. Without these 
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preconditions, risk perception is likely to be uninformed and subjective and 
any action taken of arbitrary value. Ideologically justified "duty" is the stuff 
of totalitarianism. 
Thirdly, the in-principle placing of the burden of proof of harmlessness of 
innovations upon the shoulders of ''proponents" is, if conventional scientific 
values are rejected, an insistence that a negative be proved, which is not 
logically possible. This demand, according to Kellow (2002: 125) "is the 
logical equivalent of asking people to prove that they are not witches". 
In a more practical sense, the insistence that developers shoulder the burden 
of proof of the safety of their technology reinforces the notion of the private 
ownership of ideas and must tend to confine the innovative process and the 
ownership of intellectual property to the richer, corporate sector of society. In 
the longer term it seems likely to favour the concentration of the ownership 
of technology and wealth among established elites. 
Even so, in practice it may well mostly be appropriate for developers to bear 
the main responsibility for ensuring that their innovations are safe. It is not, 
however, appropriate that it be applied any more zealously than scientific 
convention suggests. Reversal of the burden of proof is an economic 
disincentive for innovation and must inevitably depress inventive activity, but 
it does not inevitably provide optimum outcomes. Rigid adherence to its 
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dictates would most probably have prevented all the major advances since the 
time of the industrial revolut~on, including the steam engine itself. This 
demand is currently preventing the adoption by developing nations of GM 
Golden Rice, which is capable of preventing the blindness and deaths of 
millions of children each year through vitamin A deficiency. 
Fourthly, the obligation to "consider" all alternatives including "doing 
nothing" when a new technology, process, chemical or activity is proposed is 
an unrealistic and unenforceable suggestion. Even if it were feasible to 
implement and p0~k:e it, its main effects would be to bind technology and its , ·1 · 
developers in a bureaucratic straightjacket that could seriously disrupt market 
forces. It is quite acceptable for an innovation to be found to be wanting in an 
open and objective process, but it would be very different for it to be declared 
unnecessary or unwanted by regulation. In a self-regulatory environment it 
would be unlikely to very much change the way decisions are already made. 
Competent administrations routinely weigh all viable alternatives, and 
anyway, consideration of the option of not adopting technology is always 
implicit in its adoption. Successful commerce and business does not have a 
long record of financing innovation with no inherent advantage over the 
status quo. 
Although it is not possible to isolate from this bundle of concepts any single 
idea that captures the essence of the Wingspread statement, it is a source of 
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various possible interpretations of precaution and its elements are in close 
keeping with the policies of green political parties and N GOs. Even if it lacks 
the ultimate legal blessing of legislative enactment, the Wingspread 
precautionary statement appears to have at least some legislative influence 
and is possibly more politically effective than a more precisely defined 
principle would be. The continuing bans on GM canola by some Australian 
States is a case in point: the State moratoriums are not the consequence of a 
single, specific threat that might be addressed, but are the product of broadly 
held uneasiness about a number of vaguely perceived issues. 
Difficulties with the "Rio" Precautionary Principle 
Economists Hahn arid Sunstein (2005: 1) warn of the need for authorities to 
carefully consider the consequences of formal adoption of the precautionary 
principle in any form because it "could lead to dramatic changes in decision 
making". They also remark upon the apparent reticence of the EU to commit 
to any specific version: 
The European Union has taken a leadership role in promoting the 
precautionary principle as a basis for making decisions on environmental 
policy and other areas, such as trade. The EU has not specified the version of 
the principle that it would like to use in particular settings. But it has clearly 
endorsed the general idea that regulatory action should be taken even when 
harm cannot be established, and indeed even when it is highly speculative. 
(Hahn and Sunstein, 2005: 1). 
While the legal need for elucidation of the meaning of the precautionary 
principle must ultimately force the issue of definition, the reality remains that 
for the time being, a diffuse, though significant political and legal 
precautionary pressure exists and the "Rio" version (repeated here for 
convenience) most closely resembles a coherent form of its legal intent. 
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation. (UN, 1992). 
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Hahn and Sunstein (2005: 1) paraphrase the intent of the "Rio" precautionary 
principle as paralleling the proverbial advice "better safe than sorry''. Peter 
Montague, who drafted the Wingspread version concurs, but also claims it 
means "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" and "look before 
you leap" (Montague, 1998). This last is perhaps only a hopeful suggestion, 
as a precautionary approach can surely involve little leaping. The expression 
"when in doubt, don't" seems a closer approximation of its intent. In any 
event, it is clearly agreed to mean that judgment should always err on the side 
of caution. 
The quintessential observation of precaution is that the known is more certain 
than the unknown. The moral values that precaution entails transform this 
observation into the belief that stability is more important than change, 
leading to the view that the retention of old and reliable technology is 
preferable to adopting technological innovation, along with its risks. 
Ultimately, the idea of precaution values the avoidance· of possible loss over 
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the possibility of gain. Precaution is, therefore, effectively a preserver of a 
status quo. It is not primarily concerned with the evolutionary necessity for 
continuous renewal, but with the risks of the unknowns associated with it, 
and in the final analysis, it deals with the problem of unknowns by preventing 
change. 
Peter Saunders and Mae-Wan Ho, in a paper entitled "The Precautionary 
Principle is Scientific" argue that the precautionary principle " .. .is based on 
science and it generally requires that more good science, not less, be 
undertaken so that sweeping assurances of safety can be replaced by solid 
evidence" (emphasis added) (Saunders and Ho, 2003). This short extract 
brings into focus the central problem of the precautionary principle - which is 
its inherent subjectivity and consequent absence of decisiveness. 
The question of what level of evidence constitutes "s0lid evidence" is an 
entirely individualjudgment. If the opinion of these authors about the solidity 
of existing scientific evidenc~ regarding the safety of GMOs that is 
documented earlier in their paper is any measure, the bar can be set 
impossibly high. Although a veritable army of profoundly competent and 
eminently qualified scientific specialists have repeatedly demonstrated and 
explained, over many, many years, that the safety of high-integrity GM 
technology is based on solid scientific evidence, the authors insist that this is 
not good enough. The precautionary principle requires, they write, " ... that 
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we should not press ahead with commercial crops until we have carried out 
the research necessary to establish that the technology we are using is safe" 
(Saunders and Ho, 2003). 
The claim that the precautionary principle is compatible with science 
indicates either a misunderstanding of science or a misreading of the 
precautionary principle or both. Far from being based upon the same precepts 
as science and having the potential to enhance it by raising the bar of 
scientific standards, the precautionary principle (interpreted at face value) 
betrays an ignorance of the working of science in its demand for the 
impossible - full scientific certainty. 
The pivotal logic of science is that strong empirical evidence supported by a 
theory amounts to useful power to predict. In essence, the underlying 
measure of this power is the frequency with which empirical observations 
accord with the theory. However, the power to predict can never be absolute, 
because the number of potential trials is infinite and conditions may vary 
unforeseeably. The con:>cquence of this is that science is inherently 
probabilistic and is conceived and expressed in probabilistic terms. It can 
never, properly, be expressed as a certainty. One of the practical values of 
this arrangement is that, interpreted intelligently, it functions as a built in 
precautionary :framework, imposing mathematical perspective and balance. 
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Consequently, when Saunders and Ho describe the meaning of the 
precautionary principle as the "obviously sensible" notion that " ... we should 
not go ahead with a new technology, or persist with an old one, unless we are 
convinced it is safe" (Saunders and Ho, 2003: 1) it would normally be 
presumed that scientific probability is the instrument of convincement that 
they have in mind. However, uncertainty is inherent to the probabilistic 
".Ondition, which means that no matter what quantity or quality of evidence is 
produced, fastidious critics (such as Saunders and Ho) can always point out, 
quite correctly, that it might be wrong: 
We are often told that GM foods must be si:fe because Americans have been 
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eating them for years. But if there have been hannful effects, how would we 
know? ... there is no control group. If all Americans are eating GM foods, 
none but the most immediate hannful effects are likely to be recognised. 
(Saunders and Ho, 2003: 3) 
Therefore, the as yet unanswered challenge for serious proponents of 
precaution, such as Saunders and Ho, remains to provide the world with a 
precise, objective standard of convincement (other than ordinary scientific 
probability, whic}l is clearly not convincing enough). This effectively means 
explaining exactly what principle, or factor of decision, actually operates 
:vhen the precautionary principle is implemented. 
In an analysis of the difficulties of usefully applying the precautionary 
principle, Hahn and Sunstein (2005: 1-3) point out various dilemmas 
associated with attempts to formulate policy on the premise of maximum 
safety: 
Risks, sometimes unforeseen, can arise from action as well as from inaction ... 
[and] reducing risk in one policy domain (say, the environment) could increase 
risks in another (say, defence)- especially when resources are scarce .... 
regulation might well deprive society of sjgnificant benefits, and hence 
produce serious harms that would otherwise not occur. In some cases, 
regulation eliminates the benefits of a process or activity, and thus causes 
preventable deaths. If this is so, then regulation is hardly precautionary; indeed 
it violates the precautionary principle. (Hahn and Sunstein 2005: 2-3). 
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Citing such examples as the various risks associated with differing forms of 
power generation, GM foods and trace-level water contaminants, they 
question the helpfulness of the precautionary principle to regulators. Another 
example given concerns the US EPA' s blanket ban on asbestos. This 
precautionary measure was overturned in a federal court because the EPA 
had not evaluated the harmful effects of alternative products, some of which 
were known carcinogens likely to decrease workplace safety (Hahn and 
Sunstein 2005: 3). Hahn and Sunstein's summary of the regulatory impact of 
precaution is not encouraging: "The most general point is that the 
precautionary principle is frequently paralysing: it can stand as an obstacle to 
regulation and non-regulation, and to everything in between" (Hahn and 
Sunstein 2005: 5). 
The authors also criticii:.e the selective application of precaution, which is 
usually used to target new rather than old risks and sensational rather than 
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subtle risks. They conclude that a general necessity exists to consider the 
negative impacts ·of technological costs in the context of the positive impact 
of technological benefits (Hahn an.d Sunstein 2005: 6). They argue that the 
purpose of cost/bcilefit analysis is not to pla\:c regulators in "an arithmetic 
straightjacket", but to provide ''the foundation of a principled approach for 
making difficult decisions" (Hahn and Sunstein 2005: 7). 
Aynsley Kellow acknowledges the reassuring plausibility of the "Rio" 
precautionary principle when he describes its superficial meaning as 
"commonsense", but he also draws attention to its incapacity to "be 
operationalised". He argues that it is necessary to "add meaning to the terms 
serious, irreversible, damage and cost-effective, and decide what level of 
uncertainty we are prepared to accept as a basis for action" (Kellow, 2002: 
124). It is scarccJy prudent, he points out, to ''take regulatory action on tlie 
basis of no evidence, or non-peer-reviewed science, or even a handful of 
scientific papers" (Kellow, 2002: 124). 
Kellow also identifies as a fallacy the implication that conventional science-
based regulatory approaches somehow lack prudence. Citing the history of 
tobacco regulation, he argues that there is no reason to suppose that science-
based regulation is inimical to the concept of balanced precaution. Regulatory 
measures against tobacco were introduced "long before we had identified 
precise mechanisms of causation ... on the basis of good peer-reviewed 
science which indicated a problem over thirty years ago" (Kellow, 2002: 
124). 
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Neither is there anything to suggest that precaution is necessarily the 
foremost priority of communities with respect to issues of health and the 
environ..ment or the development and adopticn of new technology. The 
example of motor vehicles demonstrates that as long as the benefits derived 
from use of a technology are sufficiently valued by a society, it may be 
prepared to tolerate even very significant costs (Kellow, 2002: 124-5). 
Alston Chase is critical of the term "Precautionary Principle" itself, which 
quite wrongly "suggests that public policy decisions based on it are made 
objectively" (Chase, 1997: 1 ). More generally he dismisses the thinking 
behind its conception as facile, regarding attempts to formulate generally 
applicable theories or simple rule~ for decision-making as naive (Chase, 
1997: 3). Making ::i. decision by its nature involves incomplete knowledge, 
and bridging the knowledge gap is inevitably a matter of making projections 
and assumptions about the future. Consequently, decision is largely about 
interpretation and opinion and is no less subjective than the assumptions of 
the person making it (Chase, 1997: 4). Thus, for the precautionary principle 
to have any effective function at all, he argues, it must incorporate subjective 
values, which he says are politically "green". 
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Chase's more fundamental position is that the bedrock of "green" values, the 
integrity of which is generally accepted without question, is seriously 
problematic. The environmentalist concept that all the organisms in a system 
are interdependent and indispensable, and exist in a stable, balanced or 
somehow coordinated "natural" state is, according to Chase, simply not 
supported by observation or reason. Environments are rather crucibles of life 
where relentless environmental pr~ssures and random, sometimes extreme 
events compel the life forms within them to continuously adapt in order to 
survive: 
biological systems are constantly assaulted by disturbances and as 
evolutionary change produces an incessant stream of unique conditions, no 
single state can be either "healthy" or "unhealthy" .... Random disturbance, 
not permanence or order, governs nature. Left alone, biological communities 
do not tend toward equilibrium, but lurch wildly, propelled by rapid shifts in 
species composition, climate and other conditions. 
The Precautionary Principle, in sum presupposes the nonsensical notion of the 
health of nature, which in tum is derived from the mistaken concept of the 
self-regulating ecosystem. Thus this decision-making rule seeks to bring about 
conditions that never existed, will never exist and never could exist. (Chase, 
1997: 5). 
The "common characteristic" to be found among cases of the application of 
the precautionary principle, writes Chase, is the avoidance of interventions in 
nature and its processes, but such precautionary regulation in the US has 
resulted in unwanted environmental outcomes. In Yellowstone Park and the 
Pacific Northwest forests, a regime of natural self-management of the 
environment replaced scientifically based management on ideological 
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grounds, but has led to severe environmental degradation, catastrophic fires 
and in some cases the permanent loss of natural resources (Chase, 1997: 6-7). 
Chase argues that precaution is presumptuous and that a Precautionary 
Principle preempting scientific analysis "is not prudential at all" because it 
encourages us ''to leap before we look [and to] jump to conclusions" (Chase, 
1997: 7-8). Consequently, he asserts, far from bringing enlightenment or 
common sense to regulation of the environment, a precautionary approach is 
frequently the ''worst possible one we could choose" (Chase, 1997:6). 
Summary 
The "Rio Principle" nominates "lack of full scientific certainty" as the single 
precondition necessary for mandatory precautionary action to be taken in the 
face of threats to biosafety. Thus, from a practical, political viewpoint, if its 
authority is accepted, proponents need only point out the (inevitable) 
existence of scientific uncertainty, in order to implement it. By its ordinary 
operation, it therefore biases regulatory activity against the conclusions of 
science and the possibility of balanced assessment. In consequence, its 
adoption must also skew administrative procedure against the orderly 
management of innovi'l,tion and by this means may prevent the free choice of 
socially advantageous technologies. 
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It may be concluded from this discussion that four major difficulties appear 
to be associated with the use ·of the Precautionary Principle as a regulatory 
device. Firstly, it is not in any sense a principle. It is not a discriminatory 
mechanism so it has no value as a decisive instrument. Secondly, it may 
nonetheless be applied as a principle, displacing scientific analysis and 
objective understanding, in regulatory decision-making processes. Thirdly, 
because it acts to neutralise unsubstantiated problems, it can neither 
anticipate nor stimulate solutions through technological advancement. 
Finally, it is by its nature and operation biased against innovation. 
In consequence, it could be expected that the application of precaution as a 
primary regulatory instn1u1ent would lead to: decisions that are inconsistent 
with scientific and economic logic, a low frequency of acceptance of 
regulatory outcomes, disruption of the research agenda, and rundown of 
affected industries. The remainder of this thesis considers the cases of the 
four GM crop varieties under consideration and comparatively evaluates the 
performance of two industries where science has determined GM outcomes 
and two where precautionary policy has prevailed. 
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Chapter 4. 
THE CASE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED COTTON 
Although cotton has a long and chequered history in Australia, this important 
and ancient crop 1 is now the basis of one of the handful of great Australian 
rural industries that are capable of exporting over a billion dollars worth of 
produce annually2. The Australian cotton industry has expanded enormously 
1 The original root of the word "cotton" is the Arabic word "qutun", which refers to fine 
textiles. During the Middle Ages the word "cotton" was applied in this sense, as a noun, to 
fine (usually woollen) fabrics and, as a verb, to the operation of raising the nap of textiles. Its 
modem meaning is of relatively recent coinage (Cotton Australia, 2006: 16; Macquarie 
Dictionary, 1991: 405). Cotton cloth dating from 2,500 BC has been retrieved from caves in 
Mexico, and there is evidence that cotton was cultivated, spun and woven in the Indus Valley 
in Pakistan 500 years earlier (Cotton Australia, 2006: 15; OGTR, 2002:3). 
Soldiers from the army of Alexander the Great took cotton goods back to Europe around 300 
BC, after the Persian Empire was conquered and Arab traders of the 1 '1 Century AD took 
muslin and calico to Italy and Spain. In the Ninth Century the Moors introduced cotton as a 
crop to Spain and by 1500 knowledge of cotton had become general around the world 
(Cotton Australia, 2006: 15). 
2 Australia grows some 3% of all cotton, producing an average of over 3 million bales 
annually, but only about 4% of the national crop is used domestically. With a value 
averaging around A$1.5 billion, Australian cotton exports are the world's third largest after 
the USA and Uzbekistan and account for 10% to 20% of international cotton trade (Agrifood 
Awareness, 2004: 2; Cotton Australia, 2006: 13, 18; Cotton Yearbook, 2006:49; The 
Australian Cottongrower, June/July 2003: 38). Between 1995/1996 and 2000/2001, cotton 
constituted an average of 1.6% of total Australian goods exported (King, 2001: 15), and was 
the fourth most valuable agricultural export after wheat, beef and wool. Cotton was the 
thirteenth most valuable of all Australian goods exports during that period. Cotton exports 
were of slightly less value than natural gas exports, of equivalent value to total alcoholic 
beverage exports and of greater value than milk/cream exports (King, 2001: 15). The cotton 
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over the last half century in spite of continual criticism of its environmental 
record3. The political issues of chemical contamination, heavy water 
consumption and to a lesser extent genetic modification have all, in their time 
threatened its existence. In respect of these criticisms, the industry has 
managed to offset the political deficit of its environmental image with the 
political credit of its successes and it has vigorously pursued strong growth 
industry earns approximately one in every twenty dollais directly derived from crops grown 
in Australia (ABS, 2005: 4). 
3 Cottonseed was brought to Australia from England with the First Fleet in 1788 and small 
trials were planted as regions north of Sydney were settled (Constable, 2004: 1; Queensland 
Cotton, 2007). The first small shipment ofraw cotton to England consisted of three bags and 
occurred in 1830 (Cotton Australia, 2006: 17). It was grown successfully in tropical 
Queensland from 1840 and remained that state's most important agricultural crop for some 
time (Moppett, 1992: Queensland Cotton, 2007). During the American Civil War (1861-
1865), Australian growers temporarily supplied British textile manufacturers (Constable, 
2004: 1; Queensland Cotton, 2007). Production peaked in 1871 at 5,204 bales and thereafter 
declined due to "poor prices ... irregular rainfall ... transport costs and transport time delays" 
(Queensland Cotton, 2007). Cotton was introduced to the Northern Territory in 1882, but 
failed due to overwhelming damage from insect pests (OGTR, 2002:3). 
The Australian industry was revived after World War I when the boll weevil devastated US 
production (Moppett, 1992). Encouragement and investment by British textile organisations 
led to rapid growth in Australian cotton production. The Australian Cotton Growing 
Association (Queensland) Limited, an industry management and marketing body, was 
instituted in 1921 (Moppett, 1992; Queensland Cotton, 2007). By 1934 total Australian 
cotton production had reached 17,000 bales, but by 1954 the industry was again "all but non-
existent" (Cotton Australia, 2006: 17). Cotton cultivation had begun in the Kimberley's in 
Western Australia in 1947, but again was unsuccessful due to insect damage (OGTR, 2002: 
3). Production was briefly re-established there in the 1960s and the early 1970s during the 
developmental years of the Ord River Irrigation scheme, but failed again for the same reason 
(Cotton Australia, 2006: 17). 
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and the improvement of its environmental credentials. The substantial value 
of cotton as an export and its central importance in its growing region has 
ensured ongoing political support for the industry4• 
At the farm level, it has worked to overcome the obstacles to its survival 
through a highly organised commitment to overcoming the practical 
limitations to economic and environmental sustainability. Agronomic and 
downstream problems have been identified and targeted with well-funded 
research, and the general willingness of its members to rapidly adopt the 
ensuing technological innovations is a prominent feature of the industry. 
To date, the Australian cotton industry has successfully addressed the 
difficulties that have confronted it and maintained a competitive edge in an 
increasingly demanding world market. The general willingness to adopt GM 
varieties in 1996 typifies the progressive attitude that has set the cotton 
industry apart from the rest of Australian agriculture and established it as a 
4 The modern Australian cotton industry dates from 1961 and owes its genesis to "the search 
to find uses for water from the newly constructed Keepit Dam on the Namoi River in 
northern New South Wales," according to water resources analyst Peter Crabb, in a report 
prepared for Environment Australia in 1996 (Crabb, 1996: 79). In 1961, two Californians, 
with expertise in growing irrigated cotton, produced 96 bales from 26 ha (65 acres) near Wee 
Waa (Crabb, 1996: 79; Moppett, 1992). As Australia was importing cotton, the 
Commonwealth introduced a bounty in 1963 to stimulate production and in that year 
plantings extended into the Macquarie Valley (Constable, 2004: 1; Moppett, 1992). 
Subsequently, the industry was able to take advantage of the Burrendong Dam's completion 
in 1968 before further expansion into the Bourke area, the Gwydir and Macintyre valleys, 
southern Queensland, south along the Darling and into southern NSW (Crabb, 1996: 79; 
Moppett, 1992). 
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strong and determined sector. It appears likely that domestic and international 
pressures on the industry will increase in the immediate future, so continued 
prosperity will remain contingent upon maintenance of a resourceful and 
adaptive approach 
Cotton is naturally a perennial shrub that may grow to a height of3.5 metres5, 
but in commercial agriculture it is grown as an annual reaching only 1.2 - 1.5 
metres It is grown as a summer crop, that is, it is sown in spring and 
5 The cotton plant is a member of the Hibiscus family and belongs to the genus Gossypium, 
which consists of around fifty species (Cotton Australia, 2006: 2; OGTR, 2002:3). The area 
of its ultimate origin is uncertain, but "the primary centres of diversity for the genus" are 
Mexico, N.E. Africa/ Arabia and Australia. DNA data suggests that the genus arose 10 - 20 
million years ago (OGTR, 2002: 3). Cotton is the world's most widely grown plant fibre 
crop, comprises 39% of the total fibre market and is cultivated in some 65 countries (AFAA, 
2004b; Cotton Australia, 2006: 2; OGTR, 2002: 4). It is grown warm temperate to tropical 
regions including southern and western USA, India and the Middle East, China, Central and 
South America, western and southern Africa and Australia (OGTR, 2002: 4; Rabobank, 
2005: 3-4) .. 
The 4 species of cotton are: Gossypzum hirsutum, G. barbadense, G. arboreum and G. 
herbaceum, which originated respectively in Central America, South America, North Africa 
and South Asia (Cotton Australia, 2006: 16; OGTR, 2002:3). G. hirsutum comprises 90% of 
world plantings and G. barbadense (known as long-staple cotton) most of the remainder. In 
Australia, G. hirsutum accounts for almost the entire crop, although a little G. barbadense is 
also grown. G. arboreum and G. herbaceum are grown in Asia (OGTR, 2002:3). These 
species were all independently selected, propagated and cultivated in places as diverse as 
Mexico, South America, Africa, Arabia, Pakistan and China in ancient times (Cotton 
Australia, 2006: 15; OGTR, 2002:3). 
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harvested in the autumn and the plant is destroyed at or after harvest6 (Cotton 
Australia, 2006: 2, 6; OGTR, 2002: 5). The plant thrives in warm to hot 
climates of low humidity and high sunshine hours 7, with at least 175 days ( 6 
months) that are free of :frost (Cotton Australia, 2006: 2, 12). Cotton requires 
a constant soil temperature of at least 14 degrees Celsius at 1 Ocm depth as 
well as adequate moisture in order to germinate and grow reliably8. 
Typically, these conditions occur in late September in Northern NSW and a 
month earlier in Central Queensland. (OGTR, 2002: 5-6). 
6 The calendar of a typical cotton farming operation involves soil preparation in 
August/September, sowing the crop in September/October, monitoring and managing the 
crop's growth (water, weeds, disease, nutrition) November - February, and harvesting, 
ginning and pressing the cotton when it is mature, sometime between March and May. 
Winter crops may afterwards be sown (Cotton Australia, 2006: 6; OG1R, 2002: 5). 
7 Within limits, growth rates and yields of cotton correlate positively with both temperature 
and sunshine hours (Cotton Australia, 2006: 6), while humidity and cool, wet weather, which 
are conducive to fungal diseases, inhibit production (OG1R, 2002: 14). Consequently, a hot, 
sunny and dry climate with adequate available water provides optimum conditions for the 
crop. 
8 In Australia, the existing cotton-producing region is located more or less centrally in the 
arable eastern portion of the country, in valleys of the Darling River catchment. While many 
areas of Australia fall within the crop's climatic parameters, the industry has evolved and is 
currently "concentrated in Northern NSW and Southern Queensland". It ranges from Hillston 
(NSW) in the south to Emerald (QLD) in the north and extends to the west as far as Bourke 
(NSW). Around two thirds of Australian cotton (63% in 2005/2006) is grown in 
central/northern NSW while the remaining third (37% in 2005/2006) is grown in southern 
Queensland (Cotton Australia, 2006: 5; Cotton Yearbook, 2006:42). 
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Research and experience has demonstrated that a combination of minimum 
tillage and crop rotation with wheat (2 years cotton, 1 year wheat) is 
advantageous for soil structure, nutrient status and water-use efficiency, as 
well as providing a disease break for Verticillium wilt, a serious and 
widespread fungal disease of cotton (Constable, 2004: 2, 3; OG1R, 2002: 
14). The identification of these factors and the development of appropriate 
soil management practices have been described by prominent Australian 
cotton researcher, Dr Greg Constable, as comprising "a key element of yield 
progress in the cotton industry" (Constable, 2004: 2). 
Attempts to introduce cotton to various other parts of Australia have failed in 
the past, but there seems no shortage of interest in extending and diversifying 
its agricultural base9. The emergence of water as a major political issue raises 
the possibility that significant constraints may be placed upon the cotton 
industry in the northern parts of the Murray-Darling basin and the short-term 
ability of technological solutions to compensate for heavy cuts to irrigation 
allocations is limited. If the cotton industry is to grow - perhaps even if it is to 
survive at all, it seems fairly clear that it must be grown in new areas. 
9 Cotton was grown in the north of Western Australia as recently as the early 1970s (Cotton 
Australia, 2006, 17) and ten years before that was successfully grown as far south as Swan 
Hill in northwest Victoria. Some interest has been shown by the Bayer corporation, in the 
revival of a cotton industry on the Murray, in the Swan Hill area and also in South Australia 
(Bayer, 2004b; Lush, 2004). 
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Consistent with this view, in 2002 the OGTR reported that GM cotton trials 
were being undertaken in Richmond, North Queensland, in Western Australia 
and in the Northern Territory (OGTR, 2002: 5). 
In 2005, the OGTR granted Bayer a licence to conduct trials of its "Liberty 
Link" group of GM cotton varieties in any agronomically suitable areas of 
the five mainland States and the Northern Territory (OGTR, 2005). The 
undertaking of such trials is subject to permission being granted at State level 
also. The existence of the licence, however, establishes the point that (in the 
opinion of Bayer corporation and the OGTR at least) a significantly extended 
portion of rural Australia could realistically consider adding cotton to its 
range of crops. Although this development might be interpreted merely as 
evidence ofBayer's desire to grow its business, it is likely that extension of 
the cotton industry's geographical base would further many other corporate, 
government, industry and community interests as well. 
About 80% of Australian cotton crops are irrigated, using water supplied by 
NSW and Queensland irrigation schemes, the remaining "dry land cotton" 
being reliant upon rainfall for sufficient moisture (Constable, 2004: 1 ). 
Although cotton requires low humidity, high temperatures and high solar 
radiation, "moisture availability is of critical importance" (Crabb, 1996: 79), 
in order "to maintain growth of the crop and the fibre" (Constable, 2004: 2). 
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For successful dryland crops, adequate soil water and its replenishment 
through rainfall at particular stages of plant development are "absolutely 
essential" (Crabb, 1996: 79). Irrigated crops are dependent upon applied 
water and grown in expectation of its availability, which can be uncertain. 
Water allocations are reduced under drought conditions - not infrequently to 
nil 10 (Constable, 2004: 2). 
The existing Australian cotton-growing region is "regularly affected by 
drought" (Constable, 2004: 2) and the frequency of extended dry conditions 
is reflected in the variability of annual national production statistics. Research 
since the 1970s has identified critical stages of crop development and led to 
the implementation of strategic water-management approaches designed to 
maximise irrigation efficiency (Constable, 2004: 2). Soil management and 
structure improvements have significantly improved irrigation efficiency, 
impacting positively on plant-water relations through increased soil water 
IO Crop returns from cotton are highly sensitive to seasonal variations in water availability 
and production levels have been erratic and generally poor in the recent run of dry and very 
dry years, often being reduced to less than half of those achieved in the better years (Cotton 
Yearbook, 2006: 40-42). Raw cotton exports for 2002/3 are fairly representative of the years 
since the tum of the century, with a value of A$1,154m. At the extremes, the figure of A$773 
million for 2004/2005 was a little more than a third of that achieved in 2000/2001 when 
exports were comfortably in excess of the A$2 billion mark. (ABS, 2004: 16; Cotton 
Yearbook, 2006: 42; DAFF, 2004; DFAT, 2005). Cotton exports have not exceeded A$1.5 
billion since 2001/2002 (Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 42). The period 1995/1996 to 2000/2001, 
which includes the years immediately following the 1996 introduction of GM cotton 
varieties, was a period of strong growth during which the average annual value of cotton 
exports was A$1.36 billion (King, 2001: 15). 
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storage capacity and enhanced root exploitation of improved soils (Constable, 
2004: 2). Considerable research resources are devoted to the improvement of 
cotton irrigation technology and practices (Cotton Australia, 2006: 10; 
Dalton, Raine and Broadfoot, 2001: v). 
On the basis of available data, Australian cotton irrigation systems are at least 
as efficient as any others in the world (Constable, 2004: 2). Research reported 
by the Cotton Catchment Communities CRC/CSIRO in 2003 showed that, on 
average, Australia was producing 2.5 kilograms of cotton lint11 per hectare, 
II The material that is directly harvested from the cotton plant (comprised of the dried fruit or 
bolls) is known as seed cotton and is processed in a cotton gin (corruption of engine) to 
separate the lint from the seed. The lint is spun into yam, which may then be knitted, woven 
or otherwise utilised (OGTR, 2002: 4). 
Cotton fibres are formed by the "epidermal cells of the seed coat [which] bears two types of 
fibres - long lint fibres valued by the textile industry and short, fuzzy fibres, known as 
!inters" (OGTR, 2002: 11). Cotton fibres consist of cellulose coated with a thin layer of wax 
(Cotton Australia, 2006: 2). The seed recovered after "ginning" retains a coat oflinters that 
are removed and put to various uses. There are first cut and second cut !inters. First cut 
!inters are longer and are used for such purposes as furniture and car upholstery, mattresses, 
bandages, cotton buds, bank notes, X-rays and mops (Cotton australia, 2002: 3; OGTR, 
2002: 4-5). Second cut !inters are very short and used as a source of cellulose for both 
chemical and food technology purposes. Their uses in foods include the provision of 
cellulose for "high dietry fibre products ... [and for] thickener ... in [products such as] ice 
cream, salad dressing and toothpaste" (OGTR, 2002:5). Chemically, they are used in the 
production of"cellulose derivatives such as cellulose acetate, nitrocellulose and a wide range 
of other compounds" (OGTR, 2002:5). 
Delinted seed is the source of cottonseed oil, cotton meal and cotton hulls (OGTR, 2002: 5). 
However, raw cottonseed contains "anti-nutritional and toxic factors including gossypol and 
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per millimetre of evapotranspiration, compared to 2 kg/ha/mm in California 
and 0.3-1.3 kg/ha/mm in developing countries (Cotton Australia, 2006:9). 
The Australian cotton industry's measurable efficiency in water-use has 
increased by 11 % since 1999 (Cotton Australia, 2006: 9). 
Table 4.1 below shows official Australian irrigation statistics for several 
important crops in 2002- 2003. Cotton was second to grazing in "total 
volume applied" and second to rice in "volume applied per hectare". 
However, the dollar return per ML of water for cotton, or its economic 
efficiency, outstrips sugar, rice, livestock and pasture (Cotton Australia, 
2006:9). The particularly hot and dry climatic conditions favourable to cotton 
are conducive to high levels of evapotranspiration, so irrigated crops grown 
in these environments, including cotton, have a high water requirement. 
Table 4.1. 
Cotton Rice Sugar Fruit Pasture Grapes Cereals 
Cane 
Total 
Water 1,525,502 615,375 1,293,099 659,893 2,826854 588,794 1,001,579 
ML/ 
Ha 6.5 14.1 5.4 4.8 4.0 3.9 2.8 
Comparative table of2002-2003 Australian irrigation water applications by crop, 
expressed as total megalitres and average megalitres per hectare (Linacre, 2005:5). 
cyclopropenoid fatty acids" and may be dangerous "if ingested in excessive quantities" 
(OGTR, 2002: 17). Cottonseed oil and !inters destined for human consumption, therefore, 
require "extensive processing to remove toxicants" (OGTR, 2002: 17). Although gossypol-
free cottonseed meal is approved for human consumption in the USA and is valued as a 
cheap source of protein in India and Central America, it is not consumed in Australia or New 
Zealand (OGTR, 2002: 18). 
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Cotton growing is also highly intensive, demanding significant capital 
investment in irrigation equipment, water supply, special machinery, "high 
annual inputs and a high level of management skills" (Crabb, 1996: 79), but 
is a financially rewarding investment, as "few crops provide a better return 
for the farmer" (Crabb, 1996: 79). The potential earnings, whether calculated 
on the basis of economic or water inputs make it an attractive proposition to 
farmers of the region in comparison to the limited alternatives. The 
fundamental profitability of cotton underlies the success of the industry in 
Australia and this basic fact of farming has led to the area sown increasing 
from around 50,000 ha in 1980 to a peak of over 500,000 ha twenty years 
later (Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 40; Crabb, 1996: 80). 
The present political sensitivity of water use and the prominence of cotton as 
an irrigated crop have revived public criticism of the cotton industry. Water 
extractions for the purpose of cotton growing (conducted entirely in the 
Murray/Darling basin) are, unsurprisingly, higher than for any other single 
crop (Linacre, 2005: 5). Due to this fact and the very heayy chemical use that 
was associated with conventional (pre-GM) cotton, the industry is still 
burdened with "a reputation for excessive use of pesticide and water" 
(Constable, 2004: 2)12• 
12 Constable attributes this unflattering and inaccurate image, at least in part, to open 
acknowledgement of these problems by the industry and "inaccurate reporting in our media" 
(Constable, 2004: 2). 
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The essential level of dependence of cotton upon water is difficult to 
unequivocally establish (Reid, 2006) - there is a dearth of relevant empirical 
evidence to support public argument. However, the availability of GM early 
maturing varieties of cotton has led to the recent rise of a cotton industry in 
Southern Kansas, USA (Kansas inc., 2005: 2), which (at 37 to 40 degrees 
North) is located on a similar latitude to Southern Victoria. The experience of 
cotton growers there is that cotton has a moderate demand for water: 
... time has shown us that there are many other advantages in choosing to 
grow cotton. For one, cotton does not need a great amount of water and is very 
drought tolerant. A profitable crop only needs about 8-9 inches of irrigated 
water compared to 15-19 inches for corn. This is especially important in 
western Kansas where water has become an important issue. A significant 
switch to cotton over other more water-intensive crops would drastically 
reduce the drain of pumping out ofOgallala Aquifer. 
Also because cotton does not need much water it is an excellent dry land crop. 
This is especially true in western areas of the state where farmers have a 
difficult time producing other dryland crops. One crop in particular that cotton 
could be a good substitute for is soybeans. In the western part of the state it is 
difficult to consistently produce non-irrigated soybean crops, so to be able to 
produce a profitable crop like cotton in its place would be a great benefit to the 
region. (Kansas Inc., 2005: 3). 
The Kansas primary industry view that cotton, as a "drought tolerant" crop, 
might form part of a solution to emerging water shortage sharply contrasts 
with the popular Australian view of cotton. Nine inches of irrigation is less 
than 2.3 ML/ha, but differing conditions, options and practices mean that 
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experiences in Kansas cannot be directly related to Australia, where 6.5 
ML/ha was used in 2002-2003. Nonetheless, it would seem that the empirical 
basis of Australian public perceptions about cotton requires clarification. 
Cotton consumes the greatest volume of irrigation water after "pasture for 
grazing" and the most "irrigation water per hectare" after rice (Linacre, 2005: 
5), but it also comprises a large and valuable primary industry and the 
superlatives do not necessarily denote fault. As cotton is the fourth largest 
Australian rural export after beef, wheat and wool, the sector is virtually 
bound to be the heaviest consumer of water, as beef, wheat and wool 
production involve far less dependence upon irrigation. In respect of all 
irrigated crops, variability of water requirement is inevitable and the capacity 
of a crop to convert water into income must be considered in its evaluation. 
According to Bruce Finney of the CRDC, the industry achieves on-farm 
efficiency gains of 2.5% to 3.0% annually and lint yield per megalitre of 
water doubled from one bale/ML to two bales/ML between 1996 and 2006 
(Finney, 2006). 
Water demand of the cotton plant is an established area of GM research, and 
Monsanto Australia already has a variety licensed and under trial that has 
been modified for "water use efficiency" (OGTR, 2007). Other modifications 
for environmental tolerance would have the potential capacity to extend the 
range of soils and locations where it is possible to grow cotton, so reducing 
pressure on the Murray-Darling water resource. The Kansas example 
demonstrates the feasibility of such options: 
Kansas has only recently become receptive to growing cotton because of new 
genetically engineered varieties. Cotton requires a lot of heat units to grow and 
Kansas does not stay hot enough, long enough to support normal cotton plants. 
With the development of early maturing varieties cotton can be harvested 
during Kansas' shorter summers. (Kansas Inc., 2005: 2). 
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The environmental movement has long opposed the cotton industry's access 
to water, but withholding water from cotton farmers makes little sense unless 
it is to be put to a more profitable use. 
The Cotton Economy 
As the producer of a "high value commodity", the cotton industry "makes a 
major contribution to the economies of the growing areas and to the 
Australian economy as a whole" (Crabb, 1996: 79). Australia has around 
1500 cotton growing enterprises, each typically growing 500 to 2000 hectares 
of cotton annually (Cotton Australia, 2006: 5; DAFF, 2004). Some of these 
are ''very large producing units" (Crabb, 1996: 79) while others are mixed 
farmers and smaller croppers who include cotton in their crop rotation 
(Constable, 2004: 2; DAFF, 2004). In excess of 4,000 businesses are directly 
dependent upon cotton production and some 10,000 people rely on the 
industry for employment. In the Gwydir, Namoi, Macintyre and Macquarie 
valleys, cotton accounts for at least 50% of total agricultural activity (Cotton 
Australia, 2006: 5). A consequence of this is that the broader fortunes and 
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interests of these regions are closely integrated with the health of the cotton 
industry. 
Since most Australian cotton is sold as raw cotton on the international 
market, the Australian crop is "forward sold" through processing and 
marketing companies up to three years in advance of sowing (Cotton 
Australia, 2006: 13). 1bis practice helps to reduce the uncertainty attached to 
commodity production and is conducive to industry stability and thus to 
planning and organisation at an industry level. 
Contemporary Australian cotton farms are "highly mechanised, capital 
intensive, technologically sophisticated and require high levels of 
management expertise" (Cotton CRC, 2005: 3). As the Australian cotton 
industry, unlike most, does not have access to either low-cost labour or 
government subsidies, a competitive advantage can only be maintained by 
continuously seeking a technological edge. Consequently, the industry is 
consciously progressive and strongly committed to an ongoing program of 
research that is supported with a $30 ~illion annual budget13 (Cotton 
Australia, 2006: 10). Thanks to its advanced technology, Australia is one of 
13 Growers directly contribute $2.25 per 227 kg bale ($10/tonne) through a compulsory 
research levy, which is matched by the Commonwealth Government to fund the Cotton 
Research and Development Corporation (CRDC), "the major industry research funding 
organisation" (Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 108). The 2006 Cotton Yearbook lists 94 ongoing 
research projects enjoying the support of the CRDC (Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 108-111). 
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the world's lowest-cost producer nations, along with China, Brazil and 
Pakistan, which depend on cheap labour. The US and Israel are extreme high-
cost producers (Cotton Australia, 2006: 12). 
Net downward pressure on the international cotton market is a function of 
separate pressures affecting supply and demand. Constant improvements in 
productivity tend to increase the availability of raw cotton and global 
production in 2004/5 was 26% higher than in 2003/4. At the same time, the 
trend in consumption is unfavourable and competition from synthetic fibres 
caused "cotton's share of the world fibre market [to fall] from 50% in 1986 to 
9% in 2004" (Cotton Australia, 2006: 13). Expansion of the global crop in 
recent years is largely due to large production increases in China and Brazil 
(Cotton Australia, 2006: 12). The direct consequence of these conditions for a 
commodity producer such as Australia, with little power to directly influence 
Sustainability programs are ranked highly in importance and account for 50% of the CRDC's 
budget (Cotton Australia, 2006: 10). 
The Cotton Catchment Communities Cooperative Research Centre (CCC CRC) is a 
"research cooperative body set up by the Federal Government ... which has committed $26.5 
million ... supported by pledges of$36.8 million in cash and $74.8 million in-kind from 
CRC partners" (DPI NSW, 2005). The partners include State departments of primary 
industry, universities, other research organisations and some industry interests. It has five 
research programs - farm, catchment, community, product and adoption. CCC CRC has 
ensured funding until 2012 and its aim is "to undertake a multi-disciplinary and cutting edge 
research program to develop and have cotton and grain growers adopt world's best practice 
in environmental and catchment management" (DPI NSW, 2005). 
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prices, is a constant necessity to minimise costs and to maximise yields and 
quality. 
Although it is the world's second largest producer of cotton14, the US 
industry is also the most heavily subsidised, the US government providing 
more than half of US cotton grower receipts (Cotton Australia, 2006: 14). 
Since their share of total production is so large, this has a depressing effect on 
international prices and on production levels in unsubsidised exporting 
nations such as Australia. If the US subsidies were removed, according to the 
CRDC, total Australian revenue would increase by $177 million overall and 
individual farm returns would increase by 19% (Cotton Australia, 2006: 14). 
Since Australia normally no longer protects or subsidises primary industry, 
the main strategy of the cotton industry has been to increase productivity and 
quality through the development and adoption of better technologies and 
practices. "Critical to the success of the Australian exports are price and 
quality performance of the fibre combined with low contamination levels and 
timeliness in delivery to market" (Turco, 2003: 38). 
14 Almost half of the world's cotton is produced by the US and China. China grows about 
25% of all cotton and is also the world's largest importer (18.5 million bales in 2005-2006). 
The US grows about 20% of total cotton and, with the decline of its own textile sector, has 
become the world's biggest exporter, selling over 16 million bales on the international 
market in 2004-2005 (Cotton Australia, 2006: 12-14; Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 49-50; The 
Australian Cottongrower, June/July 2003: 38). 
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Between 1994 and the 2004/2005 season, Australia increased its average 
yield per hectare by 50% (Cotton Australia, 2006: 5) while achieving 
considerable reductions in input costs through technological advances, 
including genetic engineering (Cotton Australia, 2006: 11). The industry also 
increased the area planted by 50% over this period. Australia's 2004/2005 
average yield was 2,088.4 kg/ha, the highest ever recorded by any country, 
compared to l,571kg/ha for the second-highest (Syria) and a world average 
of only 732 kg/ha (Cotton Australia, 2006: 5). In 2005-2006, Australia's 
average yield of 1783 kg/ha was close to double that of the US industry's 931 
kg/ha (Cotton Yearbook, 2006: 46). 
The second area of advantage that the Australian industry has been able to 
develop is that of quality. The imperative for the Australian industry has been 
to position itself as a "preferred supply base for cost efficient, quality specific 
and reliable supply oflint" (Turco, 2003: 38). Around 70% of all cotton 
produced is of lesser quality than the vast bulk of the Australian crop which 
is classified as "high-medium" or "fine" quality. "A large proportion" of 
coarser cottons is produced "in countries such as India, Brazil, China and 
Pakistan - thereby reducing the impact they have on the Australian marketing 
position", while only about 25% of US cotton provides "strong competition" 
for the Australian product (Turco, 2003: 38). 
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As a producer of high-medium to fine quality cotton, Australia "rarely 
competes for a share of the market against some of the bigger producing 
nations ... as there is rarely an oversupply of cotton of this type" (Turco, 
2003: 38). Australia has, therefore, established itself as a significant, 
competitive and committed participant in the international cotton trade. 
Pests, Insecticides and Genetic Modification 
The OG1R records that in excess of"l326 species of insect have been 
reported in commercial cotton fields worldwide but only a small proportion 
are pests" (OG1R, 2002: 12). The dominant variety cultivated in Australia, 
Gossypium hirsutum is subject to attack from 30 pests, the most economically 
significant of which are the larvae of two species ofmothHelicoverpa 
armigera, and Helicoverpa punctigera, as well as Tetranychus urticae, the 
two-spotted spider mite (DPI&F, 2005:1; OG1R, 2002: 12). T. ludeni and T. 
Iambi are less frequently encountered spider mite pests15. Aphids, thrips, 
15 Spider mites, the third major pest of significance to cotton, are of some relevance to the 
subject of this study, due to the significant exacerbating effect of broad-spectrum sprays 
upon their incidence (CCC CRC, 2006a: OGTR, 2002: 13) and the consequent remedial 
effect of GM technology on spider mite outbreaks. Spider mites are sap-sucking arachnids 
that live on the undersides ofleaves, cause "bronzing, reddening and eventual desiccation of 
the leaf' (OGTR, 2002: 13) and can also act as disease vectors. 
Predator activity early in the season is important in containing the size of mite populations 
(CCC CRC, 2006a). Predator species include ladybirds, thrips, lacewings, damsel bugs and 
big-eyed bugs (CCC CRC, 2006a: OGTR, 2002: 13). Mites are normally a late-season pest 
and can "significantly affect both yield and quality of co~on" (OGTR, 2002: 13)). A rapid 
life cycle of only 7 to 14 days in summer means that population build up can be very swift 
(CCC CRC, 2006a). 
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mirids and white fly are generally considered to be minor pests although all 
have the potential to cause serious economic damage under conducive 
conditions (Cotton Australia, 2006: 8; OGTR, 2002: 13). 
The common names of the two Helicoverpa species are, respectively, "the 
cotton bollworm", a widespread pest that attacks many agricultural and 
domestic crops around the world and "the native budworm", which is 
endemic to Australia and attacks a wide range of crops (OGTR, 2002: 12-13). 
Both species are occasionally referred to by their former generic name of 
Heliothis. A CSIRO pamphlet describes Helicoverpa caterpillars as "the main 
insect pest of cotton ... [that] have the capacity to completely destroy a cotton 
crop if not managed" (CSIRO, 2005: 1). 
The life cycle of a generation of Helicoverpa typically takes 42 days, from 
egg laying to egg laying, for both species. This allows 4 or 5 life cycles to 
occur during each 6 month cotton season (CCC CRC, 2006a). The 
caterpillars destroy the young leaves, buds and fruit of the cotton plant, 
particularly favouring reproductive tissue. They are capable of killing 
Mites in cotton provide an example of the now classic phenomenon of pest outbreaks arising 
from the use of broad-spectrum chemical control agents. The use of these chemicals to 
suppress pests such as Helicoverpa or green mirids (Creontiades dilutes) can cause 
destruction of the predator insect communities that limit the growth of mite populations, 
while leaving the mites themselves unaffected (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002: 13). The 
consequence can be unexpected surges in mite numbers resulting in substantial crop damage 
(CCC CRC, 2006a). 
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seedlings or boring in to maturing bolls and consuming their contents. 
Further, secondary damage may arise from opportunistic fungal infections at 
the sites of caterpillar damage. (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002" 12-13). 
Significant economic loss can result from quite low population densities, so 
awareness and control of insect numbers is critical. Under some 
circumstances, an average of as few as two caterpillars per metre of row may 
justify spraying an entire crop (CCC CRC, 2006a). 
In the case of the boll worm (H. armigera), the last generation of the season 
overwinters in the ground near the plant as pupae in a state of suspended 
development known as diapause (OGTR, 2002" 13). They re-emerge as adult 
moths in spring and after mating lay their eggs on a suitable host plant such 
as winter crops of wheat, grain, legumes or weeds before subsequent, 
bourgeoning generations infest cotton and other summer crops, including 
sunflower, maize and summer legumes. (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002" 
12-13). 
As relatively low numbers tend to survive the winter, 1 or 2 generations are 
usually required to increase the population to a seriously damaging level. 
Consequently H armigera is regarded as a mid-season to late-season pest. 
Post harvest cultivation of cotton fields, which kills the pupae, is one of the 
most effective non-chemical means of controlling H armigera and of 
inhibiting the development of insecticide resistance (CCC CRC, 2006a; 
OGTR, 2002" 13). 
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The native budworm (H punctgera) has almost identical morphology to H 
armigera and to the untrained eye the two species are indistinguishable at 
every stage of development. It is a migratory insect that lives and breeds on 
flowering plants in the semi-arid interior of the continent during the winter 
months (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002" 13). When the weather warms in 
spring, its host plants deteriorate and large numbers of adult H punctgera 
migrate en masse to the arable areas of Australia. Taking advantage of the 
"frequent, easterly moving weather fronts" (CCC CRC, 2006a) they can 
travel with great speed, often covering the vast distances involved (500 to 
1500 km is not unusual) in as few as one or two nights (CCC CRC, 2006a; 
OGTR, 2002" 13). 
Arriving in the Australian cotton growing region early in the spring, 2 to 4 
weeks before the emergence of the overwintering H armigera, the first 
generation of larvae feeds on pasture, weeds and early crops such as linseed, 
rapeseed and legumes (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002" 13). The next and 
subsequent generations target rapidly growing crops such as cotton and 
oilseeds. H punctigera is regarded as an early season cotton pest and tends 
not to persist into the more mature stages of the crop. By the end of the 
season, its numbers are reduced to a fraction of the peak population and very 
few individuals enter diapause and overwinter locally (CCC CRC, 2006a; 
OGTR, 2002" 13). 
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The differences between the behaviour patterns of the two species have great 
relevance for cotton growers. The staggered population development over the 
growing season means that Helicoverpa control is a season long concern and 
that under conventional management the appropriate species had to be 
targeted. In practice, this meant that growers needed to devote much of their 
time and other resources to continual crop-monitoring and the maintenance of 
spray coverage. H armigera 's habit of remaining in a particular cropping 
location as a permanent population also meant that under intensive, chemical 
agriculture, the frequent exposure of whole populations to insecticides led to 
rapid selection for resistance (CCC CRC, 2006a). 
The over-winter survival of H armigera individuals through diapause in the 
soil of cotton fields is central to the carryover of acquired chemical resistance 
from year to year and its permanent entrenchment in the population (CCC 
CRC, 2006a). The species' ability to rapidly incorporate resistance into its 
genome renders the strategy of chemical control unsustainable without an 
infinite range of suitable chemicals. The swift evolution of Helicoverpa 
resistance to DDT then to dieldrin and its successors, led to the abandonment 
of the very high yielding cotton production project on the Ord River in 1973, 
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after 25 years of research and investment (AAS, 2001; Cotton Australia, 
2006, 17; H CW A, 2001: 8-1 O; Willacy, 2006). 
For the next 23 years the inability of agrichemical technology to remain 
abreast of Helicoverpa resistance increasingly threatened the viability of the 
entire Australian cotton industry (Peacock, 2003, 1, 3; Perry, 2004, 1). In the 
case of the relatively recently developed synthetic pyrethroids, for example, 
the OGTR reports that 80% to 90% of individuals in any given population of 
H armigera are likely to have inherited a resistant genetic makeup (OGTR, 
2002" 12). 
H punctigera, on the other hand, with its migratory habit and its tendency to 
overwinter on weeds in the outback has exhibited a far less marked tendency 
to develop chemical resistance (CCC CRC, 2006a; OGTR, 2002" 13). 
Although, nonetheless, a very challenging pest, the "constant influx of H 
punctigera immigrants to the cotton growing areas is thought to be 
responsible for the lack of development of resistance to chemical pesticides 
in this species"16 (OGTR, 2002" 13). 
16 A further consequence of the outback overwintering habit of H punctigera 
is that the number of migrants in any particular year is determined by the 
conditions prevailing in the autumn-winter season in the interior. In a good 
year numbers are likely to be high, while the reverse applies in dry years and 
knowledge of these conditions can assist growers in their pest management 
tactics (CCC CRC, 2006a). 
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Until 1996, the major consequence of the biology of Helicoverpa for 
Australian cotton growers was that control of these pests was reliant upon 
informed and careful management including chemical rotation, and constant 
advances in chemical technology. Dependence on chemical control had the 
disadvantages of high crop inputs, various biosafety issues and community 
tensions. 
The outlay on insecticides and associated expenses was a significant cost 
component that could seriously affect profitability in a difficult year. As a 
variable cost, dependent upon seasonal conditions, pest control expenses 
could be an unpredictable threat to budgets and profits. Much cotton spraying 
was done from the air. Aside from predictable community concerns about 
conspicuous and continual aerial dissemination of insecticide, the public 
nuisances of aircraft noise and noxious smells were an ongoing difficulty for 
cotton growers and residents. 
Of far greater political importance was the broader Australian community's 
unease with heavy chemical use in the context of growing concern about 
environmental degradation. By the mid 1970s, the cotton industry had the 
unenviable reputation of being the "dirtiest" sector of Australian primary 
industry and as time passed, public pressure to reduce chemical use 
intensified. A 2005 Land & Water Australia case study observes: 
There is no doubt that there was considerable anxiety about the use of 
pesticides by the Australian cotton industry. This has been associated with 
perception (amplified by the media) that cotton pesticides might be a cause of 
leukaemia and other illnesses, particularly in children. Credibility has been 
gained by cases of fish kills associated with spraying of endosulphan, over 
which several prosecutions have taken place. As noted by Anthony (1998, p. 
13) "The Australian cotton industry, perhaps more than any other agricultural 
enterprise, has been at the epicentre of tension over agricultural practice. 
Clearly the use of chemicals and concern for the riverine environment have 
been key pressure triggers .... [The] perceptions of an increasingly urbanised 
community that agricultural practices are harmful are adding greater tension". 
(LWA, 2005:94)17• 
Irrespective of the level of hazard, the existence of public unease and 
displeasure over such heavy chemical use by the cotton industry was not 
17 Land and Water Australia continued: 
At the time when the pesticides program commenced, there was considerable 
anxiety in cotton growing areas about the use of pesticides and in particular 
endosulphan. The anxiety may have arisen from perception rather than 
scientific reality. As observed by Anthony (1998, p. 13), "scientific 
information generated by the [pesticides] program indicated no major impact 
of agricultural chemicals on the riverine environment". He further commented 
on the ability of chemical analyses to detect chemicals of less than one part in 
100 billion, and that it is impossible for any human activity to operate at a zero 
tolerance level. Nevertheless, there would have been a substantial willingness 
to pay by residents in towns in cotton growing areas for assurance that their 
health was not at risk from pesticides and that riparian areas were not subject 
to high levels of pesticide residue. It could be argued that the industry had a 
responsibility to remove this anxiety, which should have proceeded regardless 
of the pesticides research (LWA, 2005: 94). 
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unreasonable. In the course of delivering the 2004 HV McKay Lecture, 
Richard Roush, Director ofIPM at the University California, Davis18, pointed 
out that on a worldwide scale, "almost half of total, insecticide used in 
agriculture is applied to cotton, with roughly half of that used against 
caterpillars" (Roush, 2004, 2). Furthermore, in a largely unregulated 
agricultural environment, the gross human risks of chemical use are obvious 
and easily quantified. Until 1997, when China adopted GM cotton 
technology, "there were at least 10,000 insecticide poisonings and about 400-
1000 deaths per year in Chinese cotton growing areas" (Roush, 2004, 1). 
Questions of biosafety, or impact on the biological environment, essentially 
arise from the toxicity, mobility and persistence of chemical agents. The past 
heavy use of chemicals in cotton has led to a number of problems, including 
residues of chemicals such as endosulfan and atrazine in soils, foods and 
waterways (Constable, 2004: 3; Crabb, 1996: 79). Other substantial biosafety 
issues related to pesticide use in cotton included direct chemical hazard to 
operators, other workers and local communities, and damage to non-target 
insect populations. 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) and Best Management Practice 
(BMP). 
18 Since appointed Professor of Land and Food Resources at Melbourne University. 
The FAO has defined Integrated Pest Management (IPM) as: 
the careful consideration of all available pest control techniques and 
subsequent integration of appropriate measures that discourage the 
development of pest populations and keep pesticides and other interventions to 
levels that are economically justified and reduce or minimise risks to human 
health and the environment. IPM emphasises the growth of a healthy crop with 
the least possible disruption to agro-ecosystems and encourages natural pest 
control mechanisms. (Fitt et al, 2004: 2). 
In practice this means the adoption of an integrated suite of practices that 
minimises, but does not necessarily abandon, the use of chemical controls. 
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The intention is to reduce the environmental impact of agriculture without 
compromising productivity. 
The original approach in the cotton industry, adopted in the late 1970s was 
limited to the introduction of crop-sampling systems and pest thresholds to 
optimise pesticide use (Fitt et al, 2004: 2). It has now expanded and 
developed to include the minimisation of chemical applications, the use of 
pest resistant varieties, the protection and stimulation of beneficial 
populations, the use of selective and minimally resistant chemicals, the 
recognition of the "compensatory capacity of the plant" and an array of 
cultural control practices and tactics (Fitt et al, 2004: 2). 
The main principles ofIPM are: that low pest levels should be tolerated; that 
pest containment rather than eradication is the key to management; that each 
problem has its own solutions; that a low level of damage or loss is tolerable; 
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that diverse control measures should be applied; that pesticides should be a 
last resort and the least disruptive should be used at the "lowest practical 
levels" (Fitt et al, 2004: 3). 
The IPM system of the Australian cotton industry operates on the basis of 
four guiding concepts. These are the conservation and utilisation of beneficial 
species, the use of selective insecticides, the emphasis of both profit and 
sustainability and the integration of farm activities into a coordinated annual 
cycle (Pitt et al, 2004: 3). 
Pest tolerant varieties are described by Pitt et al (2004: 3) as ''the foundation" 
of IPM and, as such, GM insect resistant cottons "are a good platform for 
IPM". The cotton resistance management strategies that have been built on 
this platform "incorporate a broad range of biological and cultural tactics" 
(Pitt et al, 2004: 10). The coincidence of the "release ofBt cotton19 and the 
industry wide extension effort on IPM" has led, through the success of this 
step, to the consolidation of grower confidence in the IPM concept (Fitt et al, 
2004: 12). 
Adoption of IPM has significantly changed grower attitudes and practices, 
promoting professionalism and an awareness of the need for scientific 
19 Bt is the abbreviated form of Bacillus thuringiensis, a soil bacteria that is the source of 
certain insecticide resistance genes. 
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understanding and sustainability. These changes are reflected by quantifiable 
changes in the practices of growers, such as accurate record keeping and 
reductions in pesticide use on conventional cotton varieties (Fitt et al, 2004: 
11). 
The Australian cotton industry's Best Management Practice (BMP) program 
was initiated in 1993 as a strategy for improving ''the industry's 
environmental performance" (Cotton Australia, 2000: 1). The idea was 
initially conceived and developed "against the background of a hostile 
community" (Macarthur Agribusiness, 2004: 52) and was finally introduced 
as an industry wide scheme in 1997 (Grabosky and Gant, 2000: 26). 
Incorporating IPM, the purpose was a broader and more ambitious plan to 
"minimise the impact of cotton production on the environment" (Grabosky 
and Gant, 2000: 26). The intention was to institute best practice guidelines 
for IPM, farm management and farm design. A program of education that 
involved "practical manuals, best practice booklets, and training workshops 
for cotton farmers" was implemented and overseen by a BMP coordinator 
operating "at grass roots level" (Grabosky and Gant, 2000: 26). 
An initiative entitled the Good Neighbours Program, a "vehicle to encourage 
all cotton growers to adopt BMP" was put into effect the following year 
(Grabosky and Gant, 2000: 26). It specifically set out to recruit growers to 
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BMP, to gain community recognition of the industry's commitment to 
improvement, to change entrenched negative perceptions, to challenge critics 
and to create a better "political environment" for the industry (Cotton 
Australia, 2000: 1). 
Since then, "huge environmental and social advancements have been made" 
and pesticides, for example, are no longer regarded as a major problem, so 
new goals have been set (Macarthur Agribusiness, 2004: 52). BMP has 
become recognised as a marketing tool, as well as a means of achieving 
sustainability and improving community relations, so the advances of the past 
ten or fifteen years can be applied to sell the product as well as to stabilise the 
industry (Cotton Australia, 2005b). 
The cotton industry has, therefore, investigated the concept of "badging" 
BMP cotton and a gap in the market has been identified for "better cotton, 
better grown, that cannot be claimed by our international competitors" 
(Cotton Australia, 2005b). It has accordingly developed objectives of 
"differentiating Australian cotton ... from that of our competitors", and 
providing an incentive for "growers, ginners, classers and marketers to 
support this ... industry initiative" (Cotton Australia, 2005b). 
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Genetically modified cotton 
Given the availability of the technology, the forward-looking attitude of 
cotton growers and the pressure of the practical and political problems that it 
was facing, it seems in retrospect quite unsurprising that the cotton industry 
was so quick to develop and adopt GM technology. The incentives were 
strong: 
The increasing difficulty of controlling cotton bollworm, Helicoverpa 
armigera, in Australia due to its resistance to many chemical insecticides and 
the pressure to reduce the usage of chemicals led to the adoption of transgenic 
cotton as the key component of its pest control strategy by the Australian 
cotton industry. (Akhurst, James and Bird, 2006). 
Ingard cotton was the first GM crop and "the second genetically modified 
organism (GMO) to be released into the Australian environment for 
commercial use" (O'Neil, 2007: 1). The essential features of this innovative 
development in crop protection were summarised by Agrifood Awareness 
Ltd: 
In 1996, insect-resistant GM cotton was grown commercially for the first time, 
after six years of field trials. Known as Bt or Ingard cotton, the GM cotton 
developed by CSIRO, using a gene owned by Monsanto, contains a gene from 
the soil bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), which allows the plant to produce 
the Bt protein which kills cotton's major pest, heliothis or the cotton 
bollworm, when it eats the leaves. (AFAA, 2003: 1). 
It might be added that the (Bt) protein in point (more specifically known as 
CrylAc) (Akhurst, James and Bird, 2006) is one of a number of identified Bt 
proteins that are specifically toxic to true caterpillars (Lepidoptera larvae) but 
harmless to other insects, fauna, humans and the wider environment. 
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The Bt genome is a rich source of genetic material with insecticide-
generating properties. "Many thousands of different isolates of B. 
thuringiensis have been collected and their insecticidal protein content and 
activity spectrum determined". These have been classified according to a 
"naming system based on their protein sequence and the type of insects for 
which they are toxic" (Llewellyn et al, 1992). For example, genes classified 
under the "Cry l" prefix are toxic to insects belonging to the order 
Lepidoptera (moths and butterflies) and "Cry 2" genes, are toxic to both 
Lepidoptera and Diptera (flies and mosquitoes). 
But the activity of Ingard cotton had an even more specific focus. According 
to Constable, Llewellyn and Reid (1998) ''the protein [CrylAc] is specific to 
sites on the gut wall of a few Lepidopterous species". This leads to an 
additional advantage in terms of specificity. Since the protein can only be 
ingested by consumption of plant tissue, the range of possible targets is 
reduced to those members of the order Lepidoptera that are both vulnerable 
to the protein and capable of parisitising cotton. Thus the new Ingard cotton 
variety, which had had the CrylAc gene inserted into its genome, was able to 
precisely target those insect species that belonged to a small group within a 
single insect order. 
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The adoption and performance of GM cotton in Australia 
Monsanto' s GM Ingard cotton was first sown commercially in the 1996-1997 
growing season, when 30,000 ha, or 10% of the total cotton crop, were 
planted to the new variety. This area grew in regulated annual increments of 
up to 5% of the total crop area to the maximum that was allowed for Ingard, 
which was 30% of the total crop area, or 165,000 ha, in 2001-2002 (AFAA, 
2004b; Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). This maximum was a product 
of the consciously cautious but flexible approach that was taken to managing 
the risks inherent in the GM crop. It recognised that: "management to prevent 
or delay the development of resistance to Bt in the target insect pests is ... the 
key to the successful and long-term use of Ingard'' (Constable, Llewellyn and 
Reid, 1998). 
Risk assessment during the development phase and the early years of the 
commercial production of lngard was coordinated by the non-statutory 
forerunner of the OGTR, the Genetic Modification Advisory Committee 
(GMAC) and approved "in the absence of other mechanisms" by the National 
Registration Authority for Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals (NRA) 
(Radcliffe, 2006). The approach was science-based and, in terms of risk, 
conservative and meticulous. It involved the implementation of a detailed 
Resistance Management Strategy (RMS), sometimes referred to as a 
Resistance Management Plan (RMP) by Monsanto and the cotton industry as 
a condition of approval and use (AF AA, 2004b ). 
189 
Beyond the more elementary questions of biosafety that are routinely dealt 
with during the earlier developmental phase of GM varieties, the probability 
of serious environmental risk was considered within the framework of three 
distinct areas. These were that Helcoverpa might develop resistance to 
CrylAc, that Ingard could outcross to native Australian cotton species and 
that populations of non-target insect species might be unintentionally harmed 
by CrylAc. The last of these was found to be of very low probability, but in 
the first two cases, higher probabilities demanded that a number of 
sometimes quite exacting, control measures be imposed (AF AA, 2004b ). 
These requirements placed a significant burden of responsibility upon 
cottongrowers. 
The practices and standards that growers of GM cotton are required to follow 
are demanding, but flexible and responsive in nature. They are reviewed 
seasonally in accordance with the prevailing conditions and the state of the 
science: 
Because Bt cotton involves the use of biotechnology, like other genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), it is subject to stricter regulatory control than 
conventional varieties ... Of particular concern is the risk that insects will 
develop tolerance to Bt varieties. Every season the Transgenic and Insecticide 
Resistance Management Strategy (TIMS) committee of the Australian Cotton 
Growers Research Association (ACGRA) undertakes a detailed consultation 
with the cotton industry to develop the Insect Resistance Management Strategy 
(IRMS). 
Growers of transgenic cotton are required to sign an agreement (under the 
Agricultural and Veterinary Chemicals Act 1994) to follow an Insect 
Management Plan. (L WA, 2005: 86) 
When Ingard was introduced, the measures included provision for: 
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restrictions pertaining to geographical location, a cap on the overall portion 
of the cotton crop that could be planted to Ingard, the establishment by each 
grower of appropriate "pest refuge" crops, compliance with recommendations 
for planting and harvesting timetables, compliance with spray thresholds and 
"pupae busting" or post harvest cultivation requirements (AF AA, 2004b; 
LWA, 2005: 86). 
The retention of these practices has remained central to the industry's 
approach to maintaining sustainable production of GM cotton. Growers of the 
current variety are "required to follow the Bollgard II Resistance 
Management Plans" (AF AA, 2004b ). Under the terms of the OGTR licence, 
Monsanto is required to "ensure appropriate training for persons covered by 
the licence" (OGTR, 2002: 90) and it has accordingly "established 
stewardship protocols ... including a training accreditation course that 
growers must complete and pass before they can buy the technology" (Perry, 
2004). 
The most restrictive of the measures originally taken was the cap on the 
percentage of the overall cotton crop that could be sown to Ingard. This was 
initially set at 10% and was finally pegged at 30% in 2001-2002, a constraint 
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that reflected the vulnerability of the single Bt gene to the biological pressure 
for pest resistance to develop (AF AA, 2004b; Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 
1998). A late season decline in the Bt protein levels of lngard cotton had 
been observed by researchers, and this decline was found to coincide with the 
survival of some Helicoverpa larvae, a combination of circumstances that 
was potentially conducive to the development of more strongly resistant 
genetic combinations. Consequently, the cap was pegged at 30% of the crop 
as "a resistance management precaution" (L WA, 2005: 87). 
By this time, however, research was well advanced in the development of the 
more sophisticated Bollgard II, which has two different Bt genes and was 
first trialled in 1997-1998. The OGTR granted Monsanto a licence for 
Bollgard JJin 2003 and it has since replaced lngard, (AFAA, 2003: 1, 2; 
Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
As a safeguard against the outcrossing of lngard cotton to either native or 
feral cotton species, its terms of approval initially limited its use to specified 
shires located below the latitude of 22 degrees South. Cotton is killed by 
frost, but in frost free climates can survive as a perennial shrub. It was 
considered that at or below this latitude, frosts would reliably kill any plants 
or escapes that were not otherwise destroyed by the end of the growing 
season (AF AA, 2004b; Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
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Outcrossing was, anyway, not considered likely. CSIRO cotton breeders, 
Constable, Llewellyn and Reid reported to the Australian Agronomy 
Conference in Wagga Wagga in 1998 that "extensive studies" have shown 
that the likelihood of genetic crossover from cultivated cotton to endemic 
species is "negligible". They pointed out that any hybrids "that can be 
artificially produced are completely sterile", while in 200 years of Australian 
cotton cultivation "no natural hybrids with native species have ever been 
reported". However, they warned that the potential for weediness and 
outcrossing is "not a trivial issue", citing a case of the transferral of a 
herbicide resistance trait from canola to wild turnip (Constable, Llewellyn 
and Reid, 1998). 
The 22 degrees latitude South restriction was eventually abolished on 
different scientific grounds. In a media release of the 26 October 2006, the 
Gene Technology Regulator, Dr Meek, explained the decision: 
Recent research has demonstrated that caterpillar pests are not the major factor 
controlling cotton growth in northern Australia. The spread of cotton is mainly 
limited by the availability of water and nutrients, and/or competition from 
other plants and insects such as grasshoppers. Therefore the genetic 
modifications will not make the GM cotton lines weedy. (OGTR, 2006b). 
All cotton growers are required to provide specified areas of "pest refuge 
crops". Pest refuges may be large areas of sprayed conventional cotton, small 
areas of unsprayed conventional cotton, or other crops such as sorghum or 
maize in which the pests can thrive and breed (AF AA, 2004b; Constable, 
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Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). The rationale behind this strategy is based upon 
elemenary principles of genetics. In conjunction with the other measures 
taken to minimise the population of pests that have been exposed to Bt 
cotton, the active propagation of much larger populations without this 
exposure means that the "resistance genes ... will be diluted by mating with 
moths from the refuge" (Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
Pupae destruction through post-harvest cultivation had (as indicated above) 
been an important element of conventional control of Helicoverpa armigera, 
with the purpose of minimising both early season pest numbers and any 
season to season carryover of genetically carried chemical resistance. The 
continuation of this practice was considered to be critical to the success of 
Ingard, as any influential level of carryover of resistance would result in it 
quickly becoming ineffective (Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
Given the critical role of generational selection in the development of 
resistance, steps were also taken to limit the number of generations of 
Helicoverpa that could mature and reproduce within a crop each season. The 
"period of selection imposed on the insects" (Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 
1998) was constricted by controlling the length of the growing season. This 
was achieved at the industry level through a requirement that growers comply 
with ''planting windows and plough-down dates" (Constable, Llewellyn and 
Reid, 1998). 
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Spray thresholds are specified levels of pest populations at which spraying is 
recommended. The population level within a particular crop can be 
established for the various stages (eggs, larvae, pupae, adult) of insect 
development, by counts within measured sample areas (Constable, Llewellyn 
and Reid, 1998). Compliance with spray thresholds ensures that control 
measures are implemented before insect numbers exceed readily manageable 
levels. This minimises economic loss through damage and contains the 
development of genetic resistance in pest populations in Bt crops. 
Further requirements of the Ingard RMS obliged growers to follow 
procedures designed to prevent the occurrence of volunteers, to destroy any 
volunteers that might occur, to adhere to practices conducive to the 
preservation of beneficial predator insects and to avoid the use of Bt sprays 
on Bt crops, which would promote the selection of Bt resistant individuals 
(CCC CRC, 2006b). 
The agronomic performance of Ingard and the effects of the circumspect 
provisions of the RMS appear to have met the most optimistic of industry 
expectations. Six years after its introduction, Dr Gary Fitt, a Director of 
CSIRO Entomology, described GM cotton technology as "the quantum leap 
forward for the industry" (AF AA, 2004b ). The Grain Research and 
Development Corporation (GRDC) referred to the adoption and impact of 
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GM cotton in equally enthusiastic terms. "Genetically modified cotton was 
introduced in Australia in 1996 without a whisper of controversy and has 
transformed an ailing industry, beset by insect and disease problems, into a 
billion dollar-a-year export success story" (Perry, 2004, 1). 
Although most growers reaped multiple economic and management 
advantages from having access to lngard cotton, the most dramatic impact 
was undoubtedly the immediate and remarkable decrease in the frequency of 
applications of chemical insecticides. The adoption of lngard led directly to a 
reduction by 50% -60% of sprays against caterpillar pests (AF AA, 2004b, 3; 
Peacock, 2003, 1; Roush, 2004, 2). Land & Water Australia is more specific 
(L WA, 2005: 85), recording, for Helicoverpa sprays, "an average annual 
reduction of 56% and a reduction of 80% in light insect years, for lngard 
cotton, based on CRDC surveys". 
With respect to the conspicuous success of the technology, the lngard 
experience was central to the consolidation of grower acceptance of the more 
environmentally sensitive approaches to pest management that are inherent to 
IPM programs. The CSIRO's Dr Gary Fitt observed that lngard "has allowed 
growers to become more confident with managing pests in softer ways" 
(AFAA, 2004b). Accordingly, use of the potent but environmentally 
undesirable chemical endosulfan has been reduced by 90% (AF AA, 2004b; 
L WA, 2005: 85), with an ensuing "decline in endosulfan contamination 
levels in rivers in cotton producing areas" (L WA, 2005: 85). 
196 
In terms of quantitative reductions in chemical applications, total pesticide 
use in the Australian cotton industry was estimated by the former Cotton 
CRC (Cooperative Research Centre) to have declined by 6,200 tonnes of 
concentrates annually as a consequence of the combined strategies ofIPM 
(Cotton Australia, 2006, 8). The central IPM measure overwhelmingly 
influencing this massive cut-back in pesticide use was the adoption of GM 
varieties, including Bollgard II. While the high figure for the overall tonnage 
decrease is informative, falls in the rates of chemical application, that have 
significance at the individual enterprise level, are of greater agronomic, 
economic and environmental importance. The introduction of Ingard reduced 
the average annual applied insecticide rate from over 6.0kg/ha to around 3.5 
kg/ha (Roush, 2004, 4). Since the introduction of Bollgard II, it has fallen 
even more spectacularly to about 0.5 kg/ha, which results in a total decrease 
of about 5.5 kg/ha, or 92%, a reduction that was achieved over a period of 
less than 10 years. 
The Ingard varieties were quickly phased out after the introduction of 
Bollgard II in the 2003-2004 growing season (CSIRO, 2003; L WA, 2005: 
87; Perry, 2004: 1). Althoughingardhad involved the use of only a single Bt 
gene and was thus potentially susceptible to the evolution of pest resistance 
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to it, the practicality of the technology and effectiveness of the RMS was 
confirmed by the performance of the variety. When lngard as withdrawn, "no 
observable resistance to the Bt toxin" had been "detected" (L WA, 2005: 87). 
With regard to the identified risk of unintentional impacts on benign and 
predator insects populations, CSIRO cotton breeders reported that no 
evidence of problems was observed: 
Large ecological impact studies failed to find any significant effect on the 
several hundred insect species found in cotton fields, other than the expected 
reduction in the numbers of the very few insect species that exclusively 
predate on or parasitise Helicoverpa, since the number of caterpillars, their 
food source in the Ingard crop, was significantly reduced. (Constable, 
Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
International experience with Bt protein in various crops confirms these 
findings. In his 2004 HV McKay Lecture, Richard Roush referred to the quite 
widely believed, but erroneous understanding that GM Bt crops pose a threat 
to members of the wider Lepidoptera community such the Monarch butterfly. 
Impacts on non-target species have been intensively investigated and 
published since 1994, but in spite of the publicity generated by a small 
laboratory study on Monarch butterflies (and the lack of publicity to several 
more extensive papers published in 2001 in the Proceedings of the US 
National Academy of Science 2001), the effects ofBt crops on non-target 
species are clearly and consistently much less than in conventional agriculture. 
(Roush, 2004: 2). 
Since little if any scientific evidence has emerged to support the negative 
predictions and the criticisms of Bt cotton varieties made from outside the 
industry, internal confidence in the technology has grown. Probably the most 
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contentious aspect of GM cotton for growers has arisen within the industry 
itself and concerns the "technology cost". This is the price of the licence to 
grow the varieties (L WA, 2005: 87) and is effectively a royalty that is paid to 
the owner(s) of the gene patent, who, in the case of the Ingard and Bollgard 
(and Roundup Ready) cotton varieties is the Monsanto corporation. 
According to a Land & Water Australia study of cotton, the GM technology 
cost is a "major issue in the Australian industry" (L WA, 2005: 87). The price 
of a licence has soared through a period that has presented serious difficulty 
for many growers, on account of the long drought and falling cotton prices. 
Licence costs were around $170/ha in 2002-2003, $192 in 2003-2004, $250 
in 2004-2005 and growers "had the expectation of the price reaching $300/ha 
in 2005-2006" (L WA, 2005: 87). However, simple analysis of the economics 
of the crop does not support the case that the licence cost imposes an 
unreasonable burden on producers and it is certainly less expensive than the 
chemical control altemative20. 
2
° For the year 2006-2007, for example, average cotton yields were over 1,910 kg/ha (NFF, 
2008), and the cotton export price averaged A$1.69/kg (ABARE, 2007a:58), so the average 
gross return per hectare was $3227.90. If the technology cost was as high as $350.00 a gross 
residue of$2,877.90/ha (or 89.2% of gross receipt) would have remained. While other costs, 
such as sales commission, industry contributions, harvesting, ginning, transport, fertiliser, 
irrigation, capital investment and routine operations would no doubt account for a good deal 
of this residue, these figures suggest that there is still room for handsome profits to be taken, 
even on moderate acreages. 
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The Bollgard II variety that superseded Ingard has fulfilled its promise of 
further and heavier reductions in chemical applications. It was released for 
commercial trials in the 2002-2003 season and became generally available to 
growers in the 2003-2004 season with a 40% cap on plantings. In 2004-2005 
when Ingard was withdrawn from the market, the industry cap was raised to 
95% of the crop. Subsequently GM maximum area restrictions were 
abolished as the provision of 10% pest refuges had been determined to be a 
sufficient resistance preventative (Apted, McDonald and Rodgers, 2005: 535; 
APVMA, 2003: 5; AFAA, 2004b; CSIRO, 2003; LWA, 2005: 87). In that 
year Bollgard II was sown by 95% of all growers and 71 % of the total 
Australian cotton crop was planted to Bollgard II (L WA, 2005: 87). 
The Bollgard II genome has had two B. thuringiensis genes, Cry lAc and Cry 
2Ab inserted into it (Mahon et al, 2003). The possibility that problematic 
levels of resistance to the Ingard gene (Cryl Ac) would eventually develop 
through the simplicity of its "single site" of activity had long been recognised 
and the precautions of the IngardRMS, particularly the 30% cap were a 
response to this concern. According to leading CSIRO cotton breeders 
Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, the addition of the Cry 2Ab protein 
considerably enhances the ability of Bollgard II to avoid pest resistance: 
This protein has a different site of action [from Cry lAc] in the larvae gut 
wall, so any insect possessing resistance to one Bt protein will be killed by 
another (sic). Ecological models demonstrate that this approach could delay 
resistance by a factor of ten; eg if resistance were to occur in five years with a 
single gene, then resistance would not occur for 50 years with the two genes. 
(Constable, Llewellyn and Reid, 1998). 
Although this variety may be grown in unlimited amounts, growers are 
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"required to follow the Bollgard JI Resistance Management Plan" (AF AA, 
2004b ). Investigation of the potential for identified cases of natural 
Helocoverpa resistance to Cry 2Ab to develop is the subject of ongoing 
CSIRO research that aims to ensure the continuing effectiveness of the 
resistance strategy (CSIRO, 2005b ). 
At the time of its introduction, Bollgard II was projected to reduce pesticide 
use by 70 - 90% and it was launched with the expectation that its 
technological "life expectancy" might exceed 25 years (AF AA, 2004b, 3; 
CSIRO, 2005, 1; Peacock, 2003, 1; Perry, 2004, 1; Roush, 2004, 4). Benefits 
of this magnitude have been more generally reported in overseas experiences 
of "two-gene" cotton21 . 
21 In the USA, Bt cotton has allowed insecticide use to be reduced by 70 - 90%, while in the 
Hebei Province of China, where it was introduced in 1998, it has reduced insecticide 
applications by 80% and overall costs by 30% (Roush, 2004, 1-2). In China as a whole, 
Huang et al (2004, 1) reported a slightly lower, but comparable, 60% (35 kg/ha) reduction in 
pesticide use and an overall increase of 10% in yield. 
Roush also reports a remarkable reduction in cases of human poisoning from insecticides in 
China. Since its 1998 introduction to China, Bt cotton has been credited with annually 
preventing at least 200 deaths as well as several thousand less serious cases of insecticide 
poisoning (Roush, 2004: 1-2). Reduced risk of contamination of field workers is also 
relevant in Australia, where supplementary manual weed control is not uncommon. 
201 
Precise quantification of the benefit in Australia is not easy, partly because 
the variations in pest pressure between different districts can be large. A 
comprehensive, industry wide survey conducted by the Institute for Rural 
Futures on behalf of Cotton Consultants Australia during the 2004-2005 
growing season established that growers applied, on average, a total of 3 .25 
sprays to Bollgard II, compared to the 11.8 that were applied to conventional 
varieties22 • Ninety percent of growers applied only one spray for Helicoverpa 
to their Bollgard II crop (Doyle et al, 2005: 3, 6), which, given the necessity 
to combat resistance with chemical sprays, suggests that the current 
technology is close to being as effective as it is likely to get. 
Grower acceptance has been rapid and the CRDC reported in its Annual 
Operating Plan 2006-07 that GM varieties accounted for "almost 90 percent 
of plantings in the 2005-06 season" (CRDC, 2006: 2). Monsanto, which has 
the lion's share of the GM cotton market, gives the figure of 89% for ''total 
biotech" cotton hectares harvested in 2005/2006 (Monsanto, 2006b ). In 
December 2006, with reference to the areas planted in that season 
(2006/2007), it reported 86% of the total was planted to Bollgard II, 64% to 
22 The survey also quoted various grower reports of the advantages of using Bollgard II. 
These included "ease of management for smaller growers", its suitability for "sensitive areas 
such as along the river and highway to minimise spray drift" and, by "taking care" of the 
"bugs", its capacity to "allow the grower to concentrate on nutrition and water" (Doyle et al, 
2005: 5). 
the herbicide resistant Roundup Ready23 and 11 % to the new release 
Roundup Ready Flex24 (Monsanto, 2006b ). These figures refer only to 
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23 Herbicide resistance is the other major modification of the cotton plant that is in 
commercial use in Australia. This trait accounts for the great majority of the GM crop 
acreage worldwide (Evenson, 2003). Herbicide tolerance confers economic advantage to the 
grower through decreased chemical costs and weed control operations. It also provides 
benefits in terms ofbiosafety, comfort and worry to operators and others having direct 
contact with chemicals. Cotton varieties modified to be resistant to less expensive and less 
toxic herbicides such as glyphosate and glufosinate make simple "over the top" spraying of 
the entire crop area possible (AFAA, 2003b, 1-2; AFAA, 2004b, 3; Charles, 2002: E3.l; 
University of Sydney, 2004, 1). 
Typically, the wider environment benefits from the use of non-residual herbicide resistant 
crops, with reductions in the volume, frequency and toxicity of chemical applications. The 
United States Department of agriculture reckoned that by 2003, US farmers were annually 
substituting 5.4 million lb (2.4 million kg) of glyphosate for 7.2 million lb (3.3 million kg) of 
the previously applied chemicals that were 3.4 to 16.8 times more toxic and twice as 
persistent in the environment (USDA, ERS, 2003). 
Roundup Ready cotton, Monsanto's glyphosate resistant variety was released in 2000 and 
achieved almost 40% market penetration (by area) "within two years of its introduction" 
(Fitzgerald, 2004, 2), reaching 64% by 2006-2007 (Monsanto, 2006b). The economic 
advantage it offers is "one explanation for the extremely rapid uptake of the "Roundup 
Ready" technology in the Australian Cotton Industry" (Crossan and Kennedy, 2004: 7). 
These University of Sydney researchers cite a "yield benefit of$225 per hectare" for "low 
weed pressure scenarios", while other economic gains "gave a total economic benefit of$395 
per hectare". The licence cost ofRoundup Ready® cotton was $50/ha in 2004/2005 (BDA, 
2004: 28). Charles (2002: E3.7) found considerable variation in the net economic advantage 
gained, ranging from $130 to $587 per hectare according to the system of management used. 
Glyphosate is regarded as safe and is used as an everyday domestic and industrial herbicide. 
"Low soil mobility, together with relatively little persistence and human and aquatic toxicity 
render glyphosate as (sic) potentially one of the least environmentally hazardous herbicides 
to non-target organisms" (Crossan and Kennedy, 2004: 10). It is considered to involve "an 
extremely low risk of off-site contamination" (Fitzgerald, 2004, 2). 
Monsanto's varieties, but include "stacked" varieties with dual (Bt and 
herbicide resistance) traits. 
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The main limitation of Roundup Ready cotton is that "older cotton is less tolerant" to 
glyphosate, which restricts applications to young plants with "up to four true leaves" 
(Charles, 2002: E3. l). This stage of growth "reflects a very real application restriction" and 
later applications risk severe ''yield penalties" (Charles, 2002: E3.4). Poor weather 
conditions, wet ground, dry ground (weed stress), too large an area to cover quickly and 
mechanical breakdowns can lead to a failure to apply the spray in time. If the "over-the-top" 
window between emergence and the four leaf stage is missed, control directed sprays and/or 
shields must be used, which reduce effectiveness (Charles, 2002: E3.l-E3.4). This writer 
stresses the risks of weeds developing glyphosate tolerance under an over-simplified regime 
and emphasised the importance of maintaining an integrated approach to weed management 
(Charles, 2002: E3.6). 
Bayer Crop Science has developed a parallel variety that is resistant to the herbicide 
glufosinate, which has some similar advantages to glyphosate. In 2005, the OGTR granted it 
a commercial licence for a "phased introduction over 3 years to commercial scale planting" 
beginning in August 2006 (OGTR, 2005). 
24 A more recently released variety that can tolerate glyphosate for the entire season. 
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Chapter 5. 
THE CASE OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED CANO LA 1 
Cano la is a genetic derivative of both oilseed and fodder rapes. Since its 
introduction to Australian crop rotations in the late 1960s, it has become an 
important contributor to the mainstream cropping economy and is now well 
established as a major Australian export commodity. 
Cano la seed is primarily a source of edible oil that has a very desirable 
analytical profile. "It is low in saturates, high in monounsaturates and 
contains a high level of oleic acid" (NCGA, 2007), a combination that is 
regarded by nutritionists as outstanding. It is mostly consumed as cooking oil 
and as a processed food constituent, being an important raw material for 
margarine. Canola is also a promising prospect as a renewable energy source, 
in the form of biodiesel. Canola meal, the mare that remains after the oil 
extraction process, is a useful source of protein for animal foods (OGTR, 
2002b: 3). 
Because the "fatty composition of the oil is genetically controlled" (Raymer, 
2002), canola was bred from various strains of the traditional but essentially 
1 This case study is based on material gathered before Victoria and NSW lifted their bans on 
GM canola. In the absence of data arising from general industry experience with GM 
varieties, it necessarily treats the Australian GM canola case material as the product of 
precautionary regulation. 
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inedible crop known as rape2 or rapeseed, using conventional plant breeding 
techniques, during the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. The process was 
undertaken in Canada and involved a series of ambitious, imaginative and 
often innovative varietal engineering programs. Extensive local research in 
canola producing nations such as Australia, over the last forty years has also 
been vital to the success of what has become an international crop and 
industry. 
The story of canola' s evolution as a new broadacre crop is, at one level, the 
narrative of an entire industry's sustained focus, over half a century, on the 
principles and values of high quality science, in the pursuit of a more 
attractive product. The fruit of this focus and commitment is "a new, high 
value oil and protein crop that has gained tremendous acceptance worldwide" 
(Raymer, 2002) and which annually yields some 12 million tonnes of oil with 
the capacity to enhance public health everywhere (Downey, 2006: 67). It is 
also a story that, through its somewhat complex narrative threads, sets out 
much of the context from which the idea and the science of genetic 
modification sprang. 
2 The names "rape" and "rapeseed" are derived from the Latm word rapum, meaning 
"turnip" (DPI Victoria, 2000: 1) Brasszca rapa is the botanical name for the turnip and the 
ancient line of rapeseed is in fact a variant of the common turnip with which it can freely 
breed. Linnaeus incorrectly classified them separately, as B rapa-rapa meaning "root" (the 
turnip) and B. campestris meaning "of the field" in the 18th century. The error was later 
recognised and rectified (Thomas, 2003: 1). 
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The Origin and History of Canola 
The plant is a member of the Brasscicaceae family3, which consists of some 
375 genera and 3200 plant species mainly originating in the northern 
hemisphere (OGTR, 2002b: 2; Thomas, 2003: 1). The genus Brassica, to 
which canola belongs, is comprised of about 100 species, many of which are 
quite important food or fodder crops in Australia and elsewhere. It includes 
such familiar plants as cabbage, cauliflower, swede, broccoli, Brussels 
sprouts and mustard. (DPI Victoria, 2000: 1; OGTR, 2002b: 2). It also 
includes a number of important weeds4 such as bird rape (B. campestris L.) 
and wild turnip (B.tournefortii Gouan.) (Lamp and Collet, 1984: 78-79). 
Canola has been developed from three distinct varietal groups, which are 
derivative of several older oil crop species. The first two, Brassica rapa5 and 
Brassica napus L., spp. oleifera are both commonly known as "oilseed rape" 
3 The Brasscicaceae or "cabbage" family is still quite frequently referred to by its former 
family name of"Cruciferae'', and its ubiquitous vegetable crop members are still commonly 
called "crucifers". This name arose from the characteristic formation of the four petals of the 
flower, which resemble a cross (Thomas, 2003: 1). 
4 Around 52 genera and 160 species belonging to Brasscicaceae are recorded in Australia 
(OGTR, 2002b: 2). A number of these species are of considerable economic importance as 
crops, but the family also includes "a host" of troublesome and often economically 
significant weeds of croplands, pasture and wasteland (Thomas, 2003: 2). 
5 B. rapa is an ancient species that is the oldest known form of rapeseed. 
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or "rapeseed"6. The third is Brassicajuncea7, otherwise known as "brown 
mustard". For historical reasons relating to the immediate origin of different 
germplasms8, the Canadians, who provide much of the canola literature, often 
refer to B. rapa as "Polish canola" and B. napus as "Argentine canola". For 
similar reasons, B. juncea is sometimes called "canola quality brown 
mustard" (Thomas, 2003: 1 ). 
Genetic evidence suggests that B. napus9 with 19 chromosomes is very 
probably the product of a union between B. rapa (the turnip species, with 10 
6 B. napus is believed to have arisen in either the Mediterranean or northern Europe in the 
middle ages, probably about a thousand years ago, but certainly before the 131h century when 
it was being grown in Europe (OGTR, 2002b: 2; Raymer, 2002; Thomas, 2003· 2). Smee no 
wild form of the species has been identified, its genesis is considered most likely to have 
been the consequence of human activity Its origin was probably as a selection made from 
hybrids resulting from accidental crossings that occurred between older, cultivated Brasszca 
species, (Raymer, 2002). 
7 B juncea is a recently introduced (2002) form of canola that was conventionally bred in 
Canada from brown mustard lines. Its advantages are that it is agronomically better suited to 
some soils and climates than the older varieties and the mature pods do not shatter as easily, 
which facilitates harvesting operations (Thomas, 2003: 3). 
8 Germplasm is the genetic resource or plant-breeding raw material. 
9 The traditional cattle and sheep fodder crop B napus var. napus, which is also rather 
confusingly referred to as "rape", is a closely related, but visually quite distinct vanant that 
tends to produce abundant leafy matenal rather than bulbs or flowers and oily seeds (DPI 
Victoria, 2000. 1; Knox, Thompson and Campbell, 2006· 59). Its use 1s confined to the 
provision of stock fodder. 
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chromosomes) and B oleracea (the cabbage species, with 9 chromosomes) 
(OGTR, 2002b: 2; Thomas, 2003: 2). 
Archaeological evidence suggests that the cultivation and use of Brassica 
species has been established for several thousand years, which places them 
"among the oldest cultivated plants known to humans" (Raymer, 2002). B. 
rapa is known to have been grown around 2000 BC in India, and there are 
indications that it was cultivated and used as early as 5000 BC (Colton and 
Potter, 1999: 1; Raymer, 2002; Thomas, 2003: 2). By 2000 years ago its 
distribution ranged from the north ofEurope 10 to East Asia with a "primary 
centre of diversity in the Himalayan region" (Raymer, 2002). 
Before the industrial revolution, the special value of rapeseed primarily lay in 
its qualities as a source oflighting oil (Colton and Potter, 1999: 1), for it 
could be grown almost anywhere and when oil was extracted and burned it 
"produced a smokeless, white flame" (Thomas, 2003: 2). It also seems to 
have been used to some extent for cooking, despite the presence of 
10 Rapeseed is tolerant of low temperatures, requiring relatively few heat units to successfully 
complete its reproductive cycle and since this characteristic is rare among oil-producing 
plants, rapeseed was of particular value as a readily cultivable oil source in northern Europe 
before trade and modern economies provided alternatives (Thomas, 2003: 2). 
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compounas with very strong and unpleasant flavours and often high levels of 
constituents that have since been determined to be toxic 11 (Thomas, 2003: 2). 
The arrival of steam power with the Industrial Revolution led to a substantial 
increase in demand for rapeseed oil as it had the peculiar ability to "cling to 
water and steam washed metal surfaces better than any other lubricant" 
(Thomas, 2003: 2). It was this invaluable and unique quality that was to lead 
directly to the establishment of rapeseed production as an organised sector of 
primary industry and, by this mechanism, if indirectly, to the establishment of 
the canola industry. 
The most important and fortuitous step in the evolution of the modern, global 
canola industry was probably the decision to establish a rapeseed industry in 
Canada in 1942 to supply steam engine lubricant for allied railways and 
shipping (Downey, 2006: 68; Thomas, 2003: 2). This arose from the ... 
.. critical shortage of rapeseed oil that followed the World War II blockade of 
European and Asian sources in the early 1940s. The oil was urgently needed as 
a lubricant for the rapidly increasing number of marine engines in naval and 
merchant ships. (Thomas, 2003: 2). 
11 Keith Downey, a plant breeder who was a leadmg figure in the post-war canola 
development program, vigorously defends the post-war init1at1ve to promote its consumption, 
asserting that "Asian peoples had consumed rapeseed oil for centuries with no ill effects" 
(Downey, 2006: 68). 
210 
Canada was able to provide the necessary resources and since it was an 
advanced western democracy, well removed from the theatres of war, the 
supply was likely to be reliable. Small pre-war research-station trials using 
seed of Polish origin had already shown that the crop could be successfully 
cultivated "in the cooler, moister regions of the Canadian prairies" (Downey, 
2006: 68). 
However, seed was in short supply and even after devoting the first season to 
seed increase, relatively little was available for planting in 1943. Fortunately, 
a search located an alternative supply in the US, where seed companies were 
able to makeup for the shortfall with a total of 19,000 kg of seed that had 
originally been sourced from Argentina. The Polish seed already propagated 
in Canada was a strain of the ancient B. rapa line, while the Argentine seed 
was of the derivative B. napus variety (Thomas, 2003: 2). 
Although this phase of the industry's development was limited by the 
duration of the war and the continued use of steam technology, an organised 
and productive agricultural sector was born. Farmers had learnt that 
"rapeseed grew well on the prairies and was well suited to the climate of the 
parkland region" (University of Saskatchewan, 2007). They had also learnt 
that although B. napus "outyielded" B. rapa, it required a longer growing 
season and was more subject to shatter12 of the seed pods at maturity 
12 Premature pod opening with loss of seed. 
(Thomas, 2003: 2). In consequence B. rapa quickly became the preferred 
variety of growers. 
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Through the war years the Canadian Government had guaranteed farmers a 
price of 6 cents a pound to ensure supply and the sown area had grown to a 
respectable 79,000 acres (32,000 hectares) by 1948 when this guarantee was 
removed (Downey, 2006: 68). By this time diesel had become the preferred 
engine technology of western post-war industry and steam was in decline, so 
the market was collapsing and with no more price support, the outlook was 
not optimistic. Unsurprisingly, by 1950 the crop had all but disappeared from 
Canadian farms (Downey, 2006: 68). 
At about this point in time, it became apparent that a market for edible 
rapeseed oil existed in Japan, where it was preferentially sought as a deep 
frying medium. The traditional Japanese practice of on-growing transplanted 
rapeseed seedlings in rice paddies through the interval between rice seasons 
had been abandoned in the post-war years because of a labour shortage, so 
rapeseed and frying oil were in short supply (Downey, 2006: 68). 
This provided an unexpected opportunity for the Canadians to reap an 
immediate profit from their expertise and resources, with the possibility of 
gaining a foothold in a rapidly growing economy. More importantly, it 
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provided the industry with the breathing space to develop a domestic market 
in Canada, which at that time was importing 90% of its edible oil needs 
(Downey, 2006: 68). 
There were, however, obstacles to the sale of rapeseed oil as an edible 
product in Canada. The presence of very high levels of long chain fatty acids, 
(erucic acid particularly, and eicosenoic acid) was a peculiarity of the oil that 
had raised the concern of some nutritionists. Of the total fatty acids present in 
rapeseed oil (which represent almost all of its content), that extracted from 
Brassica napus was composed of 41 % erucic acid and 15% eicosenoic acid, 
while the oil of Brassica rapa contained 23% erucic acid and 9.9% 
eicosenoic acid (Downey, 2006: 68). 
Laboratory animal tests were undertaken to determine whether or not the 
consumption of rapeseed oil constituted a risk to health, but the outcomes 
were fairly unhelpful as results were inconclusive. While rats were "initially" 
reported to suffer from "enlarged adrenals" and reduced "performance" 
"under stress" there was no clear evidence of toxicity (Downey, 2006: 68). 
Some public controversy ensued, but the long record of apparently safe 
rapeseed oil consumption in Asia apparently won over the regulators, as well 
as sufficient consumers to secure a place for the product in the domestic 
market (Downey, 2006: 68). The area sown to rapeseed crops in Canada 
steadily increased from the low point of 1950 (Downey, 2006: 68, 75). 
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Although toxicity had not been demonstrated, non-specific concern with the 
safety of rapeseed oil consumption and, more worryingly, the unanswered 
questions about the potential dangers of long chain fatty acids constrained the 
ability of the industry to thrive and expand. As long as this uncertainty 
existed, the established market would remain vulnerable and the development 
of new markets would be very difficult. The "potentially very large" US 
market was already "closed ... because rapeseed oil had never been in 
widespread use there and was not included in the US "GRAS" list of foods 
(generally recognised as safe)" (Downey, 2006: 69). It became clear to the 
Canadians that the industry would not grow while doubts and allegations 
about the safety of rapeseed oil consumption persisted 13 • 
13 Some fifty years later, erucic acid, which is present at trace levels in various oils, is still a 
controversial substance and is regarded by some authorities as a potentially dangerous 
biochemical agent. According to the UK Food Standards Agency, it has been "shown to 
cause fatty deposits in the hearts of test animals" when consumed at high levels (Food 
Standards Agency UK, 2004) Although these deposits remain only as long as erucic acid 
continues to be consumed and no unequivocal empirical evidence has been presented to 
show that it is a positive threat to good health in humans, their correlation means that a 
potential link to heart disease cannot be ruled out. A limit of"5% of the total fatty acid" is 
applied to erucic acid in foods m the UK. (Food Standards Agency UK, 2004). 
Food Standards Australia New Zealand reports a link between the consumption of erucic 
acid and "myocardial lipidosis in a number of species ... [and] an association between 
dietary erucic acid and heart lesions in rats" (FSANZ, 2003: 4) but rules out an association 
between these conditions and "the consumption of rapeseed 011" in humans (FSANZ, 2003: 
18). On the basis of animal studies, a "tolerable level for human exposure" is considered to 
be about 500 mg of erucic acid per day for an adult of average weight (FSANZ, 2003 · 19). 
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The uncertainty about erucic acid in rapeseed was the genesis of a scientific 
response that ultimately led to the emergence of new crop: "chemists and 
breeders turned their attention to developing techniques to search for and 
develop germplasm with little or no long chain fatty acids" (Downey, 2006: 
69). More specifically, this meant finding a means of "genetically blocking 
the biosynthetic pathway for fatty acid carbon-chain elongation, from oleic to 
eicosenoic to erucic, as the oil is laid down in the developing seed" (Downey, 
2006: 69). 
The enormity of such an undertaking by conventional plant breeding methods 
is may not be apparent outside the scientific circles concerned with this work, 
but the research was groundbreaking and its ultimate success is recognised as 
a scientific milestone: 
One of the most remarkable achievements of modem plant breeding was the 
development of canola quality Brasszca napus from rapeseed by the reduction 
Current normal levels of consumption of canola oil are considered to pose no risk to "public 
health and safety" (FSANZ, 2003: 21). 
The Australian Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (which has no direct responsibility 
in regard to the determination of toxicity) takes a different view and 1s less delicate about 
articulating the risks it perceives to be associated with rapeseed oil and its constituents. In the 
introduction to its background publication "The Biology and Ecology of Canola (Brasszca 
napus)", it declares that - "Traditionally, B napus is unsuitable as a source of food for either 
humans or animals due to the presence of two naturally occurring toxicants, erucic acid and 
glucosinolates" (OGTR, 2002b: 2). 
of erucic acid content in the oil and glucosinolates in the meal. (Quijada et al, 
2004: 1982). 
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Veteran Canadian canola breeder Keith Downey describes the development 
of canola as "a story of successful genetic manipulation of an introduced crop 
by a small, self-motivated team of chemists, plant breeders and animal 
nutritionists" (Downey, 2006: 67) and emphasises the technical difficulties 
associated with canola research conducted during the 1950s. As an example, 
he points out that "it required 2 lb of seed and a technician 1 week just to 
determine the fatty acid chain lengths of an oil" (Downey, 2006: 69) 14. 
14 The Canola Council of Canada's Cano/a Growers Manual, outlines the complexity and the 
tedious length of the task of developing new canola vaneties: 
"Vanety development is a team effort that involves plant breeders, 
pathologists, crop quality chemists, physiologists and agronomists - as well as 
highly trained technicians to back up these professionals The plant breeders 
make crosses among promising matenals and select for yield and quality 
characteristics. After several years of selection, promising lines are entered 
into pnvate and public evaluation trials called Co-operative Tests that are 
located at over 20 locations across western Canada. After one year of testmg in 
private trials plus one to two years in the public Co-operative Tests, the lines 
that meet all the required standards for oil quality, yield, herbicide tolerance 
and disease resistance are evaluated by the Western Canada Canola/Rapeseed 
Recommending Committee. Lines that meet the criteria of the Committee are 
recommended to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency for registration. 
It usually requires eight to 10 years from the initial crosses until a variety is 
registered, followed by an additional two to three years of seed multiplication 
before a variety is ready for commercial production". (Thomas, 2003: 3). 
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The first "low-erucic B. napus variety, "Oro" emerged in 1968 and was the 
product of a program centred on a "poorly adapted European forage variety 
with a much reduced level of erucic acid" (Downey, 2006: 69). Shortly 
afterwards, in 1971, "Span" the first "low erucic B. rapa variety" became 
available (Downey, 2006: 69). 
Fortuitously for rapeseed producers, the major work on these "low-erucic" 
lines was completed just in time to save the industry from a potentially 
disastrous situation that arose just before "Span" was released. In late 1970, 
the Second International Rapeseed Congress, held in Canada heard that 
Canadian and European researchers had observed "abnormal numbers of 
heart lesions in laboratory animals fed high levels of rapeseed oil" (Downey, 
2006: 69). The conventional product was now clearly a poor prospect for 
growers and oil producers and had this finding come a little earlier, it might 
have destroyed the industry overnight 15. 
15 A huge and immediate cooperative response from the "entire industry" enabled it to 
qmckly adopt the new varieties and successfully overcome the problem (Downey, 2006: 69). 
The little existing low-erucic seed of both species was taken to California for "winter 
increase" and the seed thus produced sown again in Canada the following spring. In this 
fashion, the supply of low-erucic seed was rapidly increased to the point of meeting the 
industry's need for planting material. By 1973, the entire industry had successfully been 
converted to the new varieties and its "4 million acre crop" had been preserved (Downey, 
2006: 69). 
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At this time, industry researchers were also investigating another concern 
about the chemical composition ofrapeseed. This was the presence of high 
levels of glucosinolates in the mature seed, which particularly affected the 
high protein meal used for stockfeed that remained after the seeds were 
pressed to extract the oil. 
The glucosinolates "are a class of about 100 naturally occurring 
thioglucosides that are characteristic of the Cruciferae and related families in 
the order Capparales" (NTNU16, 2007: 1). They "are important aroma and 
flavour compounds in Brassica vegetables such as cabbage, Brussels sprouts, 
broccoli, cauliflower and horseradish" (Hansen et al, 1995: 1069). During the 
process of being broken down by enzymatic hydrolysis, glucosinolates 
release chemical products that are responsible for many of the plants' 
characteristic odours and flavours, including the "biting taste" of mustard and 
horseradish (NTNU, 2007: 1). 
While glucosinolates occur in "all parts of the plant" (NTNU, 2007: 1) they 
are accumulated and concentrated "in the seed" (Downey, 2006: 72). They 
may constitute "up to ten percent of the dry weight" of seed, but in other 
parts of the plant account for only about a tenth of this level (that is around 
1 % of dry weight). An individual plant may contain as many as 15 distinct 
glucosinolates (NTNU, 2007: 1). 
16 Norwegian University of Science and technology. 
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Some glucosinolates have breakdown products, such as nitriles, thiocyanates, 
isothiocyanates (or ITCs, which are significant in biofumigation\ 
epithionitriles and vinyl oxazolidinethiones, all of which can have 
"toxicological effects" (NTNU, 2007). Consequently, the presence of these 
glucosinolates in agricultural crops such as rapeseed and Brassica vegetables 
is considered undesirable. Although, in part, providing plants with a 
mechanism protective against herbivores, parasites and a range of pathogens, 
the wider "biological role of glucosinolates and their degradation products" is 
an area of Brassica biochemistry and botany that is not well understood 17 
(NTNU, 2007: 1). 
•Explained below. 
17 The biochemical/botanical function ofglucosinolates is closely associated with the activity 
of enzymes known as myrosynases, which occur within the same plants and catalyse the 
degradation of glucosinolates when the two associate. The products of the resultant 
hydrolysis appear to perform "important roles in the plant defence system against insect, 
fungi and microorganism infections" (NTNU, 2007: I). While the evolutionary functions of 
the system appear to be "diverse", its complete purpose is not clear, although "the 
complexity of the myrosynase-glucosinate system indicates an important role in the life cycle 
of plants" (NTNU, 2007:1). 
The hydrolysis of glucosinolates and the generation of the active breakdown products that 
are released is achieved as the result an unusual mechanical arrangement within the plant 
(NTNU, 2007: 1 ). Glucosinolates are understood to be located in the vacuoles of ordinary 
plant cells, while myrosynases are isolated from them in specialised "myrosin" cells. When 
tissue is damaged, such as by insect or microbial activity, the "two components of the system 
[are brought] into contact" and the breakdown products released (NTNU, 2007: 1). 
The presence of glucosinolates at moderate levels is considered to provide 
positive nutritional and gustatory qualities to Brassica vegetables 18 . 
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However, since their concentration is far higher in the seeds of most Brassica 
species, including those comprising traditional rapeseed crops, there is a clear 
potential for difficulties to emerge in seed crops grown primarily for 
consumption, especially if substantive quantities might be ingested. 
"Glucosinolate levels are not significant with respect to oil quality but do 
affect the quality of meal for livestock feed following oil extraction" 
(Livinstone et al, 1995: 1). Toxicity and excessive pungency are the obvious, 
potentially problematic characteristics of glucosinolates and these were the 
specific hurdles that the infant rapeseed oil industry had to overcome 
(Downey, 2006: 72; Thomas, 2003: 4). 
Although rapeseed meal "is an excellent source of protein with a favourable 
balance of amino acids ... the use of rapeseed meal in rations was limited by 
its glucosinolate content" which "resulted in reduced feed efficacy" (Thomas, 
2003: 4). The failure of stock to thrive was linked to the presence of high 
levels of glucosinolates in the meal. Although comparable to soy meal as a 
18 In addition to the function m their natural location as instruments of plant survival, some 
glucosinolates, particularly (as is quite well known) those found m broccoh, have been 
identified as exhibiting anticarcinogemc activity (NTNU, 2007. 1). This characteristic of 
220 
source of protein and thus a potentially valuable dietary staple for non-
ruminants, "feed efficiency and weight gains with swine and poultry were 
well below expected levels" (Downey, 2006: 71). A further, compounding 
difficulty was that palatability was low so animals were reluctant to eat it 
(Downey, 2006: 72). 
These characteristics amounted to "a major market constraint" because they 
"restricted the amount of meal that could be fed and, in turn, limited the 
amount of seed that could be processed (Downey, 2006: 71). 
When the cells of rapeseed are ruptured in the presence of moisture, among 
the products that are released through the hydrolysis of glucosinolates, are 
ITCs (isothiocyanates). Aside from a range of other properties, these 
compounds are "active goitrogens that interfere with iodine uptake by the 
thyroid gland in swine and poultry, resulting in goitre and poor growth" 
(Downey, 2006: 72). 
Heat treatment of the meal itself, aimed at denaturing the enzyme involved, 
was the first approach that was investigated, but as it proved to be only a 
partial solution as hydrolysis was also found to occur "in the gut" (Downey, 
2006: 72). Consequently, achievement of "the ultimate objective" - the 
these compounds 1s under investigation by various research mstitutions for its therapeutic 
potential (NTNU, 2007: 1). 
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suppression of glucosinolates at a genetic level - became imperative 
(Downey, 2006: 72, 73). 
In 1967, the seeds of a Polish variety known as "Bronowski" were found to 
be a source of low glucosinolate genetic material (Thomas, 2003: 4). This 
material was incorporated into the low erucic acid breeding program and led 
to the development of the first low ereucic/low glucosinolate B. napus variety 
"Tower" in 1974 (Downey, 2006: 73; Thomas, 2003: 4). Low ereucic/low 
glucosinolate varieties have become known as "double low" varieties 
(Thomas, 2003: 4). 
In 1977 a "double low" B. rapa rapeseed variety, "Candle" was also released 
"so that the second complete crop changeover could occur" (Downey, 2006: 
73). Complete conversion of the industry to the "double low" varieties was 
largely achieved by 1980 and "extensive studies" by animal nutritionists have 
since shown that meal derived from these new varieties is "a safe, wholesome 
and economic high protein supplement" (Downey, 2006: 73). 
By the early 1980s, the breeding programs of the previous thirty years had 
altered the old rapeseed varieties beyond recognition. A little valued, 
essentially redundant industrial crop had been genetically transformed, a 
small revolution in its end use had occurred and its economic value had been 
multiplied astonishingly. In short, a new crop and a new industry had been 
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invented and established. Given the critical implications of these changes for 
the marketability of the final product, and the unfortunate accidental 
association of the word "rape" with rapeseed, a new varietal brand name for 
the new crop and product seemed a logical progression (Thomas, 2003: 4). 
The new name that was coined, "canola", distinguished the new, edible-oil 
producing varieties from conventional rapeseed and was originally used as an 
industry trademark that was registered by the Western Canadian Oilseed 
Crushers' Association in 1978 (Canadian Canola Association, c2006: 20; 
Downey, 2006: 74; Raymer, 2002; Thomas, 2003: 4). The name was an 
acronym taken from the breeding history of the variety: "Improved varieties 
were named "canola" after the "CANadian-Oil-Low-Acid" breeding 
program" (Livingstone et al, 1995: 1 ). However, it was quite quickly elevated 
from a brand name to a generic term. The success of canola has been 
remarkable and many billions of dollars worth of its product are now 
annually traded on the international market, so "the term "canola" is not just 
a Canadian term and is no longer an industry trademark" (Thomas, 2003: 4). 
Canola seeds now "commonly contain 40% or more oil and produce meals 
with 35% to 40% protein" (Raymer, 2002). Its oil now typically contains less 
than 0.5% erucic acid, 5% to 8% saturated fats, 60% to 65% monosaturated 
fats, 30% to 35% polyunsaturated fats and less than 20 mmoles of 
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glucosinolates per gram19. It has been widely promoted as a "health" oil 
(Colton and Potter, 1999: I; Raymer, 2002). 
Canola was given "Generally Recognised As Safe" (GRAS) approval by the 
US Food and Drug Administration in 1985, which led to the opening of 
markets there as well as in a number of other countries that are guided by US 
rulings and standards (Cano la Council of Canada, c2006: 21; Downey, 2006: 
69). A strong domestic industry, concentrated mostly in North Dakota, has 
since been established in the US and it is now the world's seventh largest 
canola producer, but the US continues to be a significant export destination 
for Canadian canola (AAFC, 2004). 
In 1999 Codex Alimentarius confirmed the name "canola" as the accepted 
term for low erucic acid rapeseed and formally accepted the much more 
19 The word "canola" is defined in vanous acts of the Canadian Parliament (Thomas, 2003: 
4) and "refers to cultivars of oilseed rape that produce seed oils with less than 2% erucic acid 
... and meals with less than 30 mmols (micromoles) of aliphatic glucisinolates per gram" 
(Raymer, 2002). Downey (2006: 74) reports a proposal to reduce these limits to 1 % erucic 
acid and 18 mmols "of all glucosinolates in the whole seed". 
recently developed Brassicajuncea (canola quality mustard) as a form of 
canola (Cano la Council of Canada, c2006: s)2°. 
Canola in Australia 
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Rapeseed (of Canadian origin) was first commercially cultivated in Australia 
in 1969 after trials conducted from the early 1960s. Interest in the crop was 
triggered by the imposition of quotas on wheat production (Colton and Potter, 
1999: 1). The cultivars grown were very high in erucic acid and glucosinoles 
and although better quality strains were soon available, they were unpopular 
with Australian farmers as their yields were low. The emergence of a 
crippling susceptibility to "blackleg" disease in Australia emphasised the 
need for local breeding programs and these were initiated by Victoria, 
Western Australia and NSW, in that order, between 1970 and 1973. The 
desired combination of high quality, high yields and blackleg resistance, 
however, was not achieved until 1987 (Colton and Potter, 1999: 2). 
20 Industrial grade rapeseed is still grown for non-food purposes and produces 01ls with 45% 
or more eruc1c acid and variable, but frequently high glucisinolate levels (Colton and Potter, 
1999: 1; Raymer, 2002). 
"Specific uses of rapeseed and crambe oils are based on their long chain 
molecules or molecules with double bonds. Oils high in erucic acid have 
special attributes that make them useful in manufacturing. These include high 
smoke and flash points, oiliness and stability at high temperatures, ability to 
remain fluid at low temperatures and durability". (Erickson and Bassin, 1990: 
24) 
A wide range of apphcations exists for conventional rapeseed oil. In general, rapeseed yields 
at least 40% oil and 35% to 40% protein (Raymer, 2002). 
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Canola is commonly grown and is an easily identified crop when in flower, 
providing eye-catching expanses of vivid yellow colour through the cropping 
districts in spring. Varieties are of either a "spring" or "winter" type, a 
characteristic that is not related to species. B. napus and B. rapa occur in both 
spring and winter forms (Thomas, 2003: 7). 
"Winter" types, such as are usually grown in Europe have a vernalisation (or 
chill factor) requirement and will not flower or yield satisfactorily without 
exposure to at least threshold levels of chill, measured as a product of 
magnitude and time. "winter" form of canola plant must be subjected to 
certain points and durations of low temperature in order to. These varieties 
are sown and established prior to the onset of winter and harvested the 
following autumn, 12 months after sowing (OGTR, 2002b: 3). Some winter 
type varieties of B. napus produce abundant quantities of high quality fodder 
and are commonly grown in Australia as a winter/spring grazing crop 
(Kirkegaard et al, 2006). 
Spring types of canola, such as are grown in Australia, have no vernalisation 
requirement and are sown with the autumn break in April or May. These 
varieties flower for about a six week period and mature in late spring to early 
summer, 5 to 7 months after sowing (OGTR, 2002b: 3). Canadian canola 
varieties, which are also mostly spring types, are grown in warm conditions 
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with long day lengths and are able to mature in less than 4 months (OGTR, 
2002b: 3). 
Both B. napus and B. rapa are grown in Canada, B. rapa being "better 
adapted to short season growing areas" (Thomas, 2003: 3). 
B rapa is an important commercial oilseed crop for Canada, Sweden, Finland 
China and India. It provides an alternative crop for areas subject to short 
growing seasons. B rapa differs from B napus in being a self-mcompatible, 
obligatory outcrossing species. It is not currently produced as a commercial 
crop in Australia and 1s identified as a weed species. (GMAC, 1997: 1). 
Because the rapeseed varieties introduced to Australia before the 1970s had 
been selected for Canadian and European conditions, they were unsuitable 
and the industry did not thrive until local breeding programs had successfully 
identified appropriate varieties (Cowling, 2006). 
When rapeseed was first grown commercially in Australia using imported 
varieties, blackleg (Leptosphaeria maculans) destroyed the industry. Overseas 
germplasm proved to have insufficient blackleg resistance for Australian 
conditions. As a result of intensive breeding and selection, most current 
Australian bred varieties are highly resistant to blackleg .. Overseas sprmg 
canola does not have sufficient resistance, meaning that new traits such as 
herbicide resistance must be incorporated into an Australian canola 
background before commercialisation. (Marcroft et al, 1999). 
In Australia, canola seed is sown with the aim of establishing an optimum 
plant population level of 50-70 plants per square metre (this equates to 
sowing rates of 4 to 6 kg/ha, or 3 kg/ha for hybrid seed). Sowing depth is 
increased in warm, dry conditions (OGTR, 2002b: 3). 
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Assuming competent management, water availability, especially during the 
period of seed growth, is the most critical limiting factor to canola yield. The 
highest yields are achieved in a long cool season with an uninterrupted and 
adequate supply of moisture. Under average Australian conditions, yields are 
typically in the 1-2 tonnes/hectare range, but may reach 5 tonnes/hectare in 
exceptional circumstances (OGTR, 2002b: 3). 
Biofumigation 
Field experiments have confirmed that there is a scientific basis to grower 
observations that the addition of canola to traditional crop rotations led to 
greater vigour in following wheat crops (Kirkegaard et al, 1999). This effect 
is the result of canola's anti-pathogenic activity, which is known as 
biofumigation. It refers to: 
the suppression of soil-borne pests and pathogens by b10cidal compounds, 
principally isothiocyanates (ITCs) released from Brassicaceous rotation and 
green manure crops when glucosinolates (GSLs) in their tissues are 
hydrolised .... In broad acre cropping, Brass1ca oilseeds such as canola are 
thought to be superior break-crops for subsequent cereal crops, partly due to 
their b10fumigation effects on cereal pathogens. (Kirkegaard et al, 1999). 
More controllable "pot studies" and in vitro tests have revealed in more detail 
the extent and the mechanisms of the biofumigant capability of canola, 
particularly in respect of the "suppression of a range of soil borne cereal 
pathogens" (Kirkegaard et al, 1999). 
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Similar research with mustard has shown that glucosinolate hydrolysis 
products are capable of "suppressing weed seeds and pathogens" (Hancock, 
2005: 7). An ongoing US research program into ITCs is directed towards 
refining and managing these products for use as sterilants in organic farming 
systems and even as a mainstream alternative to methyl bromide (Hancock, 
2005: 7). Hancock, a Grain Development Officer in the Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture, writes that Indian mustard meal has been 
imported to Queensland at a cost of AU$300/t "for use as a biofumigant in 
high value horticultural enterprises and turf farms" (Hancock, 2005: 7. He 
reports that it has also been used as a "pet friendly" "active ingredient in snail 
pellets" (Hancock, 2005: 7). 
The biofumigant activity of canola is generally considered by farmers to 
"unlock wheat yield" ("The Grower", Issue 15, May 2006: 2) and partly 
accounts for the rapid expansion of the Australian canola industry during the 
1990s. The benefit, however, is not universal and has been observed to vary 
according to the pathogen status of a soil and other specific conditions that 
may apply to a location or affect a growing season. A soil with good 
pathogen status will probably show less wheat yield response to including 
canola in the rotation than to using a nitrogen-fixing legume crop such as 
lupins, beans or peas (Rice, 2005). 
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A review of crop rotation alternatives by agricultural consultants in central 
NSW shows that the inclusion of canola in cereal crop rotations may increase 
the yield of subsequent wheat crops by as much as 72%, and on average, does 
so by 19%. The yield benefit resulting from the effects of canola may persist 
into the second and third wheat crop that follow it, with average yield 
benefits over that time of up to 13% (Rice, 2005)2 1• 
Canola is by no means a panacea for cereal disease control, but its adoption 
into rotations has been "particularly effective" in combating the fungal 
disease "take-all", "the major root disease in southern NSW" (Murray, 2004). 
It has also been found to control a range of root diseases in other crops such 
as cotton, beans, sesame and carrots. The modes of action of glucosinolates 
seem to be quite complex and in addition to direct anti- pathogenic activity, 
they appear to stimulate the growth of beneficial microbes that themselves 
have anti-pathogenic functions (Smith, 2001: 1 ). 
21 General acceptance of the value of canola in crop rotations is evident at both 
administrative and grower levels. In 2000 the Victorian DPI described canola as "an 
excellent choice to enhance or extend a crop rotation. It is a high yield and profitable crop in 
its own right as well as an excellent fit with cereals or pulses" (DPI, 2000: 2). It suggested 
that a realistic target yield was 2.0 to 2.5 tonnes per hectare and that a 2.0 tonne crop would 
"return a gross margin of $400 per hectare compared to $230 per hectare for a 2.5 tonne per 
hectare wheat crop" (DPI, 2000: 2). In 2006, a successful northern Victorian grower (DPI, 
2000: 2) reported yields of 2.4 tonnes per hectare and a gross margin of $500 per hectare for 
both canola and cereals. This grower considered that canola and cereal crops were mutually 
beneficial, asserting that "canola is necessary m the rotation to grow a good cereal crop, and 
cereal is essential to growing a good canola crop" (Pritchard, 2006: 2). 
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Canola Production 
Among vegetable oils produced worldwide, canola is ranked second to 
soybeans, and by 2000/2001 accounted for 13% of total oilseed production 
(Raymer, 2002). It has progressively outstripped peanut, sunflower and 
cottonseed since significant production began in the early 1980s with a peak 
of 47.4 million tonnes in 1998/1999. A low point of32.5 million tonnes 
occurred in the poor 2002/2003 season and production has since risen again 
to 42.3 million tonnes in 2004/2005 (Oilseeds WA, 2005: 2; Raymer, 2002). 
In 2004/2005, the EU, the world's largest producer was responsible for the 
production of 14.3 million tonnes of canola, 34% of the world total, with 
China, Canada and India producing 12.0, 7.0 and 5.8 million tonnes 
respectively (Oilseeds WA, 2005 :2). 
After a period of very consistent increases in canola production and 
consumption over the last two decades, the current market trend suggests that 
a market plateau and possibly even a ceiling has been reached (Oilseeds WA, 
2005:3). World production has not returned to the 1998/1999 level and five 
key producer nations seem to have emerged, whose share of the market has 
consolidated at the expense of smaller producer nations that have apparently 
abandoned the crop (Oilseeds WA, 2005: 3). Australia is the fifth, or 
smallest, of these key producers and with a yield of 1.5 million tonnes 
produced 3.5% of the world's canola in 2004/2005. 
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However, as an export-focussed industry its share of the global market is 
proportionally greater than the bare production figures might suggest and it is 
the world's third largest canola exporter, after the EU and Canada (Smith and 
Jimmerson, 2005). In 2002/2003 (a drought year in eastern Australia) 
Australia grew only 1.5% of the world crop, but its exports still amounted to 
7% of total international canola trade (Smith and Jimmerson, 2005; Oilseeds 
WA, 2005: 3). 
Production in Australia is undertaken mostly in NSW, Victoria, SA and WA. 
Areas sown and total state yields are quite variable, although WA tends, on 
average, to be the largest producer. Victoria's production volume has been 
more consistent than the other States since the turn of the century, probably 
due to more stable rainfall patterns (Oilseeds WA, 2005: 2). 
Table 5.1 
VIC NSW SA WA TOTAL 
TONNES 358,000 300,000 232,000 399,000 1,289,000 
Average canola production by state, 2000 to 2005. Source: Oilseeds WA, 2005 
Canola is Australia's major oilseed crop. It is the source of 57% of the 
nation's oilseed, while a further 36% is derived from cotton (AOF, 2005), so 
the two industries typically provide over 90% of Australian oilseed. ABS 
placed the gross value of the 2003/2004 Australian canola crop at A$685.7 
million, up from the previous (drought) year's value of A$388.8 million. In 
2001/2002 the value was a comparable A$675.0 million (ABS, 2005: 13). 
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Australia's canola industry does not compare in size with wheat or cotton, but 
it is a significant and substantial crop that is important to the economic health 
of rural Australia. In 2003/2004, total agricultural commodities had a national 
value of A$36.9b of which the State of Tasmania's share was A$857.0m 
(ABS, 2005: 4&6). In that year, at A$685.7 million, canola accounted for 
1.9% of gross Australian agricultural returns, which was equivalent to 80% of 
total Tasmanian agricultural production. Compared to the performance of 
other sectors, this was almost one and a half times the value of Australian 
potato production and more than double the value of Australian egg 
production (ABS, 2005: 11&16). 
Herbicide Tolerant Canola 
Although herbicide tolerance has become publicly associated with GM 
technology, especially in the case of canola, conventional plant breeding 
programs have explored this area of the science for some time: 
Canola has natural tolerance to a range ofherb1c1des such as the grass 
selectives, trifluralin and clopyralid. Tolerance to other herb1c1des has been 
achieved by intensive, conventional selective breeding and by gene transfer 
technology. (Madin and Bowran, 1999: 1). 
Two herbicide-tolerant canola types of economic significance are grown in 
Australia. These are selections that have genetic tolerance to either triazines 
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("TT" canola) or imidazolinone ("IT" canola). Both of these lines of the plant 
were bred by methods that are classed as "conventional"22 . 
Imidazolinone resistant canola varieties have been in commercial use in 
Australia since 2000 and have been planted to a moderately significant 
extent, despite some drawbacks. No compromise of yield or oil quality in 
comparison to conventional canolas has been associated with the cultivation 
of imidazolinone resistant varieties. However, the particular herbicide group 
involved (Group B) is described by the OGTR's Biology and ecology of 
canola (Brassica napus) as "high risk in terms of development of herbicide 
resistance [by weeds]" (OGTR, 2002b: 24). According to OGTR, "resistance 
has emerged in some areas of Western Australia so that the use ofIT canola 
varieties is limited". 
Madin and Bowran, in literature published by the Western Australian 
Department of Agriculture, specify four other areas of weakness. They report 
that in their experience, the Imidazolinone imazethapyr is 
a relatively expensive herbicide and although with (sic) a good weed spectrum, 
it is slow acting and offers suppression rather than control of some weeds. It 
22 The term "conventional" is used to distinguish older methods of plant breedmg from GM 
and its associated techniques. The practices involved, however, are not confined to simple or 
essentially "natural" procedures such as selective cross-breeding, but may include 
mutagenesis, a process of induced mutation involving stimulation from either chemicals or 
radiation. Unlike GM, which is precise, 1t produces new genetic patterns and combinations at 
random from which individuals may be selected for further research and propagation. 
has also demonstrated residual activity on following cereal crops on occasions. 
(Madin and Bowran, 1999. 1). 
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Weed researchers, Peterson et al (2001: 11) of Kansas State University have 
reported the incidence of acquired weed resistance to acetolactate synthase 
(or ALS) inhibitors (the group of herbicides to which the imidazolinones 
belong) in a number of weeds. With respect to other pertinent characteristics 
they comment: 
These herbicides have exceptionally low mammalian toxicity and have 
minimal environmental concerns because oflow use rates. Herbicide drift and 
spray contamination, however, are a concern because susceptible crops are 
very sensitive to these chemicals. Many of the ALS inhibiting herbicides can 
carry over in the soil and injure subsequent crops. (Peterson et al, 2001: 11). 
While certainly not environmentally catastrophic, the negative aspects of the 
imidazolinones, especially their persistence and the rapid development of 
resistance, would appear to rule imidazolinone tolerant canola out as a long-
term prospect for Australian farmers23 • 
23 An agronomic "package deal" consisting ofa patent herbicide (containing 1mazapic and 
imazapyr) as well as "1midazolinone tolerant canola seed and a Best Management Practice 
Program" (Jackson and Paton, 2000) has been marketed under the "Clearfield Production 
System" brand name in Australia since 2000 by the German-based chemical company, 
BASF. "Clearfield" seed is the product of a breeding program involving gene patterns 
constructed by chemical mutagenesis, a process of deliberate stimulation of gene mutation 
that is classed as a conventional plant breeding practice (Biotechnology Australia, c2007). 
This package has also been successful in Canada, where no triazine tolerant canola 1s grown, 
and currently accounts for about 20% of total Canadian canola acreage. GM varieties account 
for about 70% of the total area of Canadian canola and conventional varieties make up the 
balance of around 10% (Crabtree, 2006: 2). 
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Triazine tolerant canola first became available in Australia in 199324 • The use 
of chemicals from this group of cheap "pre emergent" weedicides allows an 
entire crop to be sprayed, either at or shortly after seeding, with a triazine 
herbicide (simizine and atrazine are applied to canola in Australia) capable of 
killing weeds in the early stages of root development (Colton and Potter, 
1999: 2; Davies, Cook and Barton, 1994: 209; Piper, 1996; Stanley, 2003: 1). 
This option has been very popular in Australia, especially in Western 
Australia, where the area of canola grown increased tenfold between 1996 
and 199925 and TT varieties now comprise almost all canola (Colton and 
Potter, 1999: 2; Madin and Bowran, 1999:1; Norton, 2003:4). 
The disadvantages of poorer yield and oil content that are associated with 
"TT" canola are experienced across the board26, but it has, nonetheless, been 
24 TT canola was originally bred by a Canadian scientist, Dr Gerhard Rakow m the early 
1980s. Using "classical means" (OGTR, 2002b: 23), he produced a substantially resistant 
line of canola from a cross between canola and a selected, triazine-resistant individual of the 
B. rapa species described as "a mustard weed" (Crabtree, 2006: 1). 
25 Many areas of WA were unsuitable for canola production pnor to the ava1labi lity of TT 
canola, due to unmanageable Brass1caceous weed problems. 
26 According to the OGTR: 
"Triazine tolerant ("TT") canola has been selected to be tolerant to triazme 
herbicides (Group C) with the resistance originating from a cytoplasmic 
mutation. The gene conferring resistance is mhented maternally and, therefore, 
cannot be spread to neighbouring paddocks by pollen movement. The triazine 
resistance mechanism also imparts a phys1ological penalty to the plant 
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accepted by Australian farmers because of practical advantages that usually 
compensate for the loss of volume and quality (Colton and Potter, 1999: 2-3). 
The disadvantageous characteristics of these canolas are a result of their 
"mode of tolerance" (GRDC, 2004:1) oftriazines, which acts through a 
section of the photosynthetic system (known as Photosystem II, Site A) that 
is modified in these plants27 (GRDC, 2004: 1; Peterson et al, 2001: 9; Stanley, 
2003: 2). 
On the basis of its rate of uptake, TT canola translates into a considerable 
economic advantage for many growers, despite its yield limitations. 
Compared to conventional varieties, paddock operations are simplified and 
resulting in reduced fitness .... Triazine tolerant canola continues to have a 
yield disadvantage of 10-15% and about 3-5% lower oil content than 
conventional varieties but is accepted by farmers because it allows canola to 
be grown where Brass1caceous weeds are a problem". (OGTR 2003b: 105) 
This particular line of research and development was abandoned in Canada in the mid-
1990s, at the time of the adoption of GM varieties by that country, because of its "20-30% 
yield penalty" (Crabtree, 2006: 1). 
27 Robert Norton, a leading Australian canola agronomist writes: 
"TT varieties suffer from an inefficient photosynthetic system, which leads to 
lower vigour and reduced growth, yield and seed oil content. Robertson et al .. 
identified a 26% lower seed yield for TT canola compared to conventional 
canola types in weed free situations. Despite this penalty, TT cultivars have 
enabled growers to use robust in-crop herbicides to control weeds that were 
intractable in conventional varieties. This technology has been reliable and 
relatively cheap, which has contributed to its widespread adoption in Australia" 
(Norton, 2003: 4). 
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the chemicals are cheap and effective (Norton, 2003: 22). In "the majority of 
cases" it is sown "because the weeds (particularly Brassicaceae species) 
present cannot be controlled in the conventional varieties" (OGTR, 2002b: 
24), thus allowing "canola to be grown where it could not be considered 
before" (Colton and Potter, 1999: 2 - 3). As long ago as the late 1990s TT 
canola represented 90% of Western Australian plantings (where wild radish 
is a severe and entrenched problem) and 25-30% of those in the eastern states 
(OGTR, 2002b: 24). 
A number of other emerging and potential problems are associated with the 
use of TT canolas. The OGTR specifies "lower resistance to blackleg and 
persistance of triazines in the soil" (OGTR, 2002b: 23). It also points out that 
"parts of Western Australia have a long history of triazine herbicide use ... 
and [that] there is already evidence of atrazine resistant annual ryegrass 
and triazine resistance in wild radish" (OGTR, 2002b: 23). In 1999, 
agricultural scientists Madin and Bowran cautioned that "triazine resistance is 
the most prevalent of all herbicide resistances in the world" (Madin and 
Bowran, 1999: 4) and that "triazine resistant weeds do loom as a significant 
problem, ... given the extensive use oftriazines in TT canola, lupins, pulse 
crops and pasture" (Madin and Bowran, 1999: 1). 
In addition to several minor risks (such as pollen drift and changes to the 
weed spectrum) that are almost inevitably attached to the use of herbicide-
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resistant crops and which may be here considered to be side-issues, Madin 
and Bowran also cited the carryover of herbicide in the soil and the carryover 
of resistant canola plants as weeds28 in subsequent crops in the rotation, as 
areas of concern with respect to TT canola (Madin and Bowran, 1999: 3). 
Perhaps the greatest threat to the long term use of TT canolas, however, is the 
well-documented tendency for triazines to contaminate the wider 
environment, including both surface and groundwater (Davies, Cook and 
Barton, 1994: 209; Hamblin, 2001). This issue, which has led to increasing 
political criticism and community resistance to their use will very likely lead 
to some or all of them being either severely restricted or completely banned. 
According to research conducted by the Tasmanian Inland Fisheries 
Commission, triazines: 
... are noted for their relative persistence and leachability . with half-lives in 
surface waters rangmg up to six to eight months ... Given widespread use of 
these materials in both agriculture and forestry, it is anticipated that such 
contamination would be both frequent and widespread. (Davies, Cook and 
Barton, 1994: 209). 
28 In following pulse (leguminous seed) crops that normally rely on triazines for weed 
control, these herbicides are, naturally, meffect1ve for controllmg "volunteer" TT canola. 
Cereal crops, on the other hand, are vulnerable to damage from even shght soil residues of 
triazines (Stanley, 2003· 3,5). Under some circumstances, it is possible for residual triazine at 
extremely low levels (the equivalent of250 ml/ha) to "kill a wheat crop", while barley and 
oats are even more sensitive to them (Stanley, 2003: 5). While, with foresight and the 
availability of alternatives, management of these situations is usually possible, it may well be 
both expensive and inconvenient. 
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While responsible use of this group of chemicals has not been scientifically 
shown to pose any serious threat to the soil environment or humans, "they are 
known to be very toxic to aquatic organisms" (Waugh and Padovan, 2004: 19). 
According to a Northern Territory Government review of pesticide use and risk 
to water resources, atrazine is highly soluble, highly mobile and is a high 
leachate risk, but is only moderately persistent and a moderate run off risk29 
(Waugh and Padovan, 2004: 19). 
The existence of scientific uncertainty about the more serious risks posed by 
triazine use has led to the persistence of concern and the application of 
international political pressure. In Australia, the Greens party has actively 
opposed the ongoing use of triazines in forestry and farming and has conducted 
a strong campaign against them on the basis of these perceived, if debatable, 
threats to human health and the environment. 
29 A comprehensive Commonwealth level review ofatrazine, initiated in 1995 to investigate a 
series of serious biosafety concerns, acknowledged the presence of sometimes high residual 
levels of atrazine in the environment but found no good evidential reason to ban the chemical. 
Its recommendation in its 2004 "Second Draft Final Review Report", was that: "Active 
constituent approvals [and] ... product registrations are to be affirmed" (APVMA, 2004: 12), 
while label instructions were amended to extend and strengthen safety precautions. 
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Irrespective of their merits and dangers, the fate of triazines seems to be 
sealed30. Europe has moved to discontinue the use of atrazine "because it poses 
an unacceptable risk to ground water" (Marohasy, 2005: 2). According to the 
CSIRO's Ecos magazine, the EU nations, including the UK are phasing 
triazines out because "they leach rapidly from the rootzone and can 
contaminate groundwaters and waterways" (O'Neill, 2007b: 20). This action 
brings the rest of Europe into conformity with the position taken by France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden, which had all banned atrazine by 2002 
(Kingsley, 2002). 
30 The detection oftriazine residues in waterways and water supplies, sometimes at high levels 
(APVMA, 2004: 115), has strengthened the public position of those opposed to their use and 
has forced primary industry and government to adopt a defensive, retreating attitude in 
response. Tasmanian Greens MHA, Kim Booth and Primary Industry Minister, Steve Kons 
demonstrated their respective positions during a debate in the Tasmanian House of Assembly 
in 2005: 
"Mr BOOTH - The Government failed to support the Greens' Chemical 
Trespass Bill, which was voted down by both Liberal and Labor. If the 
Chemical Trespass Bill had become an act, it would have in fact prevented the 
sorts of situations we have now where you have simazine contamination of 
water supplies such as the Orford drinking water, and atrazine detected in 
water catchments in various parts of the State. The Minister for Primary 
Industries and Water is here now, and I will defy him to deny that the oyster 
kills in Georges Bay were in fact caused by chemical contamination. 
Mr Kons - It hasn't been proven. The results ... said there was a multiplicity 
of factors that may have contributed to the deaths. 
Mr BOOTH - Well there we are." (Tasmanian Parliament, 2005). 
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Dr Rob Norton, an agronomist at the University of Melbourne, put the issue in 
a realistic perspective when he told the ABC's Landline program in 2004 that 
"Triazines are an outdated herbicide" (ABC, 2004). He pointed out that they 
had multiple failings and that "In particular, atrazine is identified as an aquatic 
pollutant" (ABC, 2004). Dr Norton estimated that 600 to 800 tonnes of 
triazines are applied to canola crops annually in Australia, all of which could 
potentially be replaced by GM varieties31 (ABC, 2004). 
Australian canola farmers have responded to the economic pressure to remain 
competitive by almost universally adopting herbicide tolerant varieties. 
During 2005-6, non-GM herbicide-tolerant canola varieties comprised 
approximately 90-95% of Western Australia's canola crop, with most of this 
being tnazine tolerant varieties. In eastern Australia (SA, Vic and NSW) 
approximately 80-85% was herbicide tolerant, with 60-70% triazine tolerant 
and 15% imidazolinone tolerant varieties. (OGTR, 2007b: 47). 
Conventional canola is a poor alternative to herbicide resistance but the 
currently available herbicide resistant options, although economically and 
environmentally acceptable in the very short term, are likely to become 
31 Although defenders oftriazines might reasonably argue that the evidence against them 1s 
slim, the potential or hypothetical risks have to be weighed against the palpable benefits and 
compared with available alternatives. Given the outlined agronomic disadvantages and the 
frequency with which sometimes very high levels of chemical residues at have been detected 
in waterways - especially in catchment areas for public water supplies - the continued use of 
atrazine-tolerant canola would seem a relatively short-term prospect if reasonably safe and 
affordable alternatives exist. 
increasingly unattractive under the twin pressures of biosafety and 
economics. 
GM Canola 
If the necessity to reduce chemical and energy inputs and to increase yield 
and quality outputs is accepted as an ongoing and pressing condition of 
survival for mainstream canola growers, the development and adoption of 
GM herbicide resistant canolas are logical steps for the industry to take. 
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The concern of contemporary agriculture to avoid persistent and dangerous 
chemicals has both political and environmental advantages. The cotton 
industry's move to insect resistant varieties has transformed its public image 
and its practices. The technological change has also delivered productivity 
gains, as reduced paddock operations translate into reductions in costs and 
increases in quality control, thus enhancing the industry's ability to compete. 
Until the arrival of GM Bt varieties, Australian cotton producers were 
politically, environmentally, economically and operationally encumbered by 
the millstone of insect control. In the case of canola production, the pertinent 
variable cost, which has the capacity to most dramatically impact on industry 
competitiveness is weed control. Weed control typically accounts for almost 
60% of production costs per hectare in conventionally grown canola, 
according canola farmer and 2005 Nuffield Scholar Andrew Broad (Broad, 
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2006: 28). It is, consequently, this area of crop economics that over the last 
25 years has been identified and targeted by the industry and its researchers 
as the greatest potential source of productivity gains. 
However, productivity gains across the board put downward pressure on 
prices, so growers selling their product into a commodity market that reflects 
or represents international prices can only compete and survive if their costs 
structures are comparable to those comprising the mainstream of production. 
The very high rates (effectively, industry-wide) of Australian adoption of TT 
and IT canola, notwithstanding their agronomic disadvantages, reflect the 
cost burden of weed control in conventional crops and the pressures imposed 
by the international price of canola as a commodity. 
With rare exceptions, 32 Australian farmers are now heavily reliant upon 
herbicide resistance as a crop trait in order to operate profitably. Alternative 
markets for non-GM canola, although essential to a GM-free industry, do not 
appear to exist. A secure and profitable, preferential market for large 
tonnages of Australian-grown, conventional canola would be reflected in 
preferential sales, a price premium, and evidence of upward pressure on 
production. Very clearly, this not the case. 
32 Such as, situations of low weed pressure, localised soil or environmental lim1tat10ns or 
individual grower requirements. 
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Australian canola growers, typically, are obliged to choose from among the 
currently available TT and IT seed varieties if they are seeking to minimise 
crop inputs. Further improvement or refinement of these options would 
necessarily involve overcoming the disadvantages and limitations that have 
already been described. These can be summarised as: herbicide 
purchase/application costs (particularly in the case ofIT canola); the 
compromises of yield and quality inherent to TT canola; the existing and 
emerging limitations of efficacy of the two groups of herbicides; the 
problems of ongoing residual activity in the soil where they are applied (both 
groups) and their movement into and persistence in the wider environment. 
Monsanto' s Roundup Ready and Bayer' s Invigor herbicide resistant GM 
canola varietiess address all of these issues with almost complete success. 
They have been developed and licensed in Australia and involve the use of 
either of two commonly used broad spectrum, non-residual, post-emergent, 
herbicides glyphosate and glufosinate-ammonium (usually referred to as 
"glufosinate"). These chemicals are respectively marketed as Roundup and 
Liberty33 . 
33 Bayer separately markets glufosinate as a non-selective herbicides Basta and Finale for 
horticultural and more general use. Monsanto has retained the name Roundup for all 
applications. 
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Probably the most critical advantage that the GM varieties hold over TT and 
IT canolas is that in contrast to the problems ascribed to the triazines and 
imidazolinone, the use of these two herbicides does not involve any serious, 
known, biosafety risk. Both are of low general toxicity and are strongly 
adsorbed by soil particles, so they tend to remain confined to the location 
where they are applied. Both are also quite rapidly degraded by soil and 
water microbes. Glyphosate typically has a soil half-life of 60 days and 
glufosinate only 7-20 days (Aventis, c2006: 6; Bayer, 2004: 1-2; Hamblin, 
2001; Roundup Bulletin, 1995: 5). 
Glyphosate and Tolerance 
Kansas State University weed scientists Peterson et al (2001: 12) describe 
glyphosate as having "exceptionally low mammalian toxicity and ... minimal 
pollution concerns because of high adsorption to soil colloids". The Western 
Australian Water and Rivers Commission recommend glyphosate for use in 
wetlands, partly on account of its low toxicity (especially to fish) and its 
limited mobility: 
It is poorly absorbed along the digestive tract and does not b1oaccumulate. It 
has a low toxicity to bees, fish and other aquatic organisms ... Glyphosate is 
strongly adsorb~d and inactivated by soil and by organic and mineral 
suspended particles in water bodies, so leaching and contamination of runoff is 
negligible. (Taman, 2001: 2). 
Glyphosate is an EPSPS (5-enolpyruvyl-shikimate-3-phosphate-synthase) 
inhibitor, which kills plants by disrupting the biosynthetic function ofEPSPS, 
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an enzyme that is essential to aromatic amino acid production (Peterson, 
2001: 12; Shaner, 2006: 1-2). EPSPS function is critical to plant growth and 
it is especially active in meristematic tissue where cell division and 
differentiation occurs (Peterson, 2001: 12; Shaner, 2006: 1-2). Glyphosate 
must be translocated from the point of application to the developing root and 
shoot tips, where growth is occurring, for it to be effective34 . 
Two forms ofEPSPS exist, one (EPSPS I) that occurs in plants (as well as 
some other organisms) and is vulnerable to glyphosate, and another (EPSPS 
11) that occurs in some bacteria and is not vulnerable to glyphosate. Two 
genes responsible for the synthesis ofEPSPS II have been used to produce 
glyphosate resistance in crop plants such as Roundup Ready canola (Shaner, 
2006: 1-2). These genes are known as CP4 EPSPS (derived from 
Agro bacterium sp.) and goxv24 7 (derived from Ochromobactrum anthropi) 
(OGTR, 200lb:l). 
Glufosinate and Tolerance 
The Northern Territory Government's herbicide review rates Bayer's 
herbicide, glufosinate, as "low" in respect of runoff and leachate risk as well 
34 Two modes ofresistance to glyphosate have emerged in the 11 species of weeds that are 
known to have developed tolerance to it. One involves changes to the "target site" (EPSPS) 
of glyphosate and the other causes interference with the uptake and transport of glyphosate 
within the plant. Both modes ofresistance have, so far, proved susceptible to higher rates of 
herbicide (Shaner, 2006: 2). 
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as in terms of its mobility and persistence (Waugh and Padovan 2004: 21). It 
is, however, highly soluble in water and is toxic to fish at moderate levels 
(50% mortality at or above 14 ppm) (Aventis, c2006: 7). Glufosinate has not 
been demonstrated to be toxic to bees or earthworms (Aventis, c2006: 7). 
Peterson et al (2001: 12) of Kansas State University describe glufosinate as 
having "low mammalian toxicity and minimal pollution concerns because of 
high adsorption to soil colloids". 
The herbicide glufosinate-ammonium is the synthetic form of an amino acid, 
phosphinothricin, that has been bound to ammonium. Phosphinothricin (PPT) 
was originally isolated from a substance that was identified in a soil 
bacterium, Streptomyces viridochromogenes, in 1971. In 1976 Hoechst, in 
Germany, identified its herbicidal qualities and after a long period of 
development, glufosinate, as the herbicide Basta eventually became available 
in Australia in 1990 (Aventis, c2006: 2). 
According to Peterson et al at Kansas State University, glufosinate activity 
within the target plant: 
... inhibits the activity of the glutamine synthetase enzyme that is necessary 
for the plant to convert ammonia mto other nitrogen compounds 
Consequently, ammonia accumulates and glutamine levels decrease. Plant 
damage probably occurs due to the combined effects of ammoma toxicity and 
deficiency of amino acids required for other metabolic processes. 
[Glufosinate] has limited translocation35 . (Peterson et al, 2001: 12). 
35 The limited systemic activity (translocation) of glufosinate within the plant (itself probably 
caused by plant response to the herbicide) means that it is most effective when applied 
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Glufosinate resistance in canola (and other crop plants) has been conferred 
through the insertion into their genomes of the "PAT" and "BAR" genes 
(Beriault et al, 1999: 619; OGTR, 2003c: 41). The PAT gene and the BAR 
gene are dominant genes that were respectively (and fairly predictably) 
sourced from the genomes of Streptomyces viridochromogenes and its close 
relative Streptomyces hygroscopicus . The expression of either of these genes 
triggers production of the enzyme phosphinothricin acetyl transferase (PAT). 
PAT catalyses the detoxification of PPT and is thus capable of inactivating 
glufosinate, so when one (or both) of the genes is inserted into a plant's 
DNA, it will confer resistance to glufosinate. The PAT and BAR genes have 
both often been used as marker genes (Acre, 2002; Beriault et al, 1999: 619; 
Nill, 2001). 
The two GM canola varietal groups around which the Australian political 
debate has centred - Monsanto's Roundup Ready and Bayer's In Vigor-
although licensed by the OGTR, are still unable to be commercially grown in 
much of Australia due to the continuation of State and Territory Government 
thoroughly to small weeds and Jess effective agamst large, perennial weeds. This limitation 
also has the advantage, however, ofrendering it a relatively safe herbicide to use around 
larger established crop plants such as fruit trees and generally reduces the nsks associated 
with drift (Aventis, c2006: 5; Beriault et al, 1999: 619). In the normal course of events this 
characteristic would not compromise its effectiveness in the cultivation of herbicide resistant 
annual crops, where large or perennial weeds ought not be present. 
249 
bans36. Both, through the use of softer herbicides, surpass the agronomic and 
biosafety advantages of TT and IT canola, and can reasonably be expected to 
deliver significantly superior economic outcomes for growers37 . 
36 Victoria and NSW did not renew their moratoriums against these vaneties when they 
expired in February 2008. They continue to be banned in all other States except Queensland. 
37 These varieties have been the subject of extensive tnals and scrutiny and m 
biotechnological terms are the exact equivalents of herbicide resistant GM cotton varieties 
that have been grown legally in Australia for a number of years. For example, the first 
generation of Roundup Ready cotton (legal) and canola (banned) were both modified with 
the CP4 EPSPS gene, while the various herbicide tolerant lines of Liberty Lznk cotton (legal) 
and Jn Vigor canola (banned) are all modified with the BAR gene and/or the PAT gene 
(OGTR, 2001: 1; OGTR, 2002c: 1; OGTR, 2003, 1-6; OGTR, 2003c: 15; OGTR, 2005: 1). 
